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This has been a thrilling scientific journey so far! During the last twelve years I had 
the special privilege to work with outstanding scientific researchers in the field of 
educational technology and cognitive psychology. 
 My journey began when I became a student teaching assistant for statistics at 
the Department of Educational Science at the Albert-Ludwigs-University of 
Freiburg. Working with Norbert M. Seel, Klaus-Peter Wild, and Thomas Eckert 
inspired me to dig deeper into the methodological understanding of education. 
Especially the application of statistical procedures for complex research designs kept 
me reading about and experimenting with various statistical software packages. 
Within this first stage of my journey I also developed my interest for the theoretical 
understanding of cognitive structures. 
 Using simulations for educational purposes marks the second stage of my 
scientific journey. Working with Sara-Dunja Menzel and Volker Schweinbenz on 
developing a simulation game for a better understanding of the complex processes of 
a school organization laid the foundation for a larger research project I recently 
initiated with my dear colleague and friend Volker Schweinbenz. Within this second 
stage I also got to know the scientific world outside of Freiburg through the ~monist 
project. Traveling to project meetings in Bielefeld and Frankfurt and discussing ideas 
of the project with Dietrich Dörner, Sören Lorenz, and Wolfram Horstmann set light 
into the various possibilities of scientific life.  
 The third stage of my scientific journey started when I got involved in a new 
project on model-based learning and teaching. Together with my innovative 
colleagues Bettina Couné, Katharina Schenk, and Ulrike Hanke, new approaches for 
the assessment and analysis of cognitive structures have been laid out. 
 My dissertation project marks the forth part of my scientific journey. Putting 
together my experience and ideas into a completely new project resulted in the 
development of a new technology for an automated assessment and analysis of 
cognitive structures – the SMD Technology. Defending my dissertation at the same 
day as my dear colleague and friend Pablo Pirnay-Dummer did, marked a very 
special day in this forth stage of my scientific journey. 
 Continuing working on my dissertation project and joining the ideas of Pablo 
Pirnay-Dummer with my ideas marks the highlight of the fifth stage of my scientific 
journey. Travelling the world and presenting our work together has always been a 
highly inspiring and joyful time. The number of my international collaborators has 
	   5 
grown ever since. It is always great to discuss new ideas with wonderful people and 
great researchers such as David H. Jonassen, Roy B. Clariana, Valerie J. Shute, 
Harold F. O’Neil, Tiffany A. Koszalka, James W. Pellegrino, Andrew S. Gibbons, 
and many more. Furthermore, the continuous support of J. Michael Spector helped 
me to push towards new projects and implementing new ideas into powerful tools – 
HIMATT (Highly Integrated Model Assessment Technology and Tools). Closely 
related to my projects on assessment and analysis of cognitive structures is a great 
colleague and a wonderful friend, Tristan E. Johnson. All our projects turned out to 
be respected in the scientific community. Additionally, organizing various 
conferences at the Albert-Ludwigs-University of Freiburg introduced me to a new 
group of great researchers, namely Pedro Isaías, Kinshuk, and Demetrios Sampson. 
Together with J. Michael Spector I am honored to be part of the CELDA (Cognition 
and Exploratory Learning in the Digital Age) conference committee organizing an 
annual international conference. Furthermore, a strong international research group 
focusing on problem solving, serious games, and their assessment has grown 
constantly, including my great colleagues Deniz Eseryel and Xun Ge. As a result of 
this highly productive stage of my scientific journey, most of the papers of this 
cumulative work originate from this period. Additionally, several edited volumes and 
a monograph in collaboration with Norbert M. Seel are some of the products of this 
stage. 
 Moving from the Albert-Ludwigs-University of Freiburg to the University of 
Mannheim marks another important stage of my scientific journey. At this current 
stage I am happy to seek advice from many valued colleagues, especially from 
Norbert M. Seel, Matthias Nückles, Oliver Dickhäuser, Olga Zlatkin-Troitschanskai, 
Klaus Breuer, and Peter Drewek. 
 I want to thank all the above mentioned colleagues and friends and those I 
may have forgotten for their inspiration, motivation, and continuous support. I shall 
not attempt to thank my wife Kathrin, my son Remo Max and my family. Everything 
I am and will be is a complex combination of their unconditional love, patience and 
unique ways. I dedicate this effort to them and hope to be worthy of the lives they 
live. I am looking forward to the next stages of this thrilling scientific journey! 
 
Dirk Ifenthaler 
Freiburg, December 2010 
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1 
PROLOGUE 
Strong theoretical foundations and precise methodology are always the one and only starting point for 
good research. Without sound foundations nothing follows, and thus a deep understanding of the 
theoretical assumptions of cognitive structure and methodology involved is mandatory for research on 
cognition and learning as well as for instructional design. Several research projects contribute to the 
overall scientific knowledge with regard to cognitive structure and its assessment, analysis, and 
instruction. Cognitive structure continued to be a key subject in different fields of research for more 
than a century. For good reason. Foundations from cognitive science, computer science, philosophy, 
and cognitive psychology describe the workings of the human mind in tasks of deductive and 
inductive reasoning, especially for reasoning in uncertainty. They lead to theories of problem solving 
and to theories of learning and instruction which are both highly interdependent. The development of 
useful systems has always been a goal for scientists and engineers serving professional communities 
in the fields of instructional design and instructional systems development. This cumulative work 
outlines a research project which enables an insight into cognitive structure highlighting ways of 
assessment, analysis, and instructional innovations.  
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Advances of technology 
As instructional psychology is becoming more specialized and complex and 
technology is offering more and more possibilities for gathering data, instructional 
researchers are faced with the challenge of processing vast amounts of data. Yet the 
more complex our understanding of the field of learning and instruction becomes and 
the more our theories advance, the more pronounced is the need to apply the 
structures of the theories to sufficiently advanced methodology in order to keep pace 
with theory development and theory testing. In addition to obtaining a good fit 
between theory and diagnostics, this task entails making the methodology and tools 
feasible (easy to use and easy to interpret). Otherwise, the methodologies will only 
be used by their developers. The development of useful systems has always been a 
goal for scientists and engineers serving professional communities in the fields of 
instructional design and instructional systems development.  
 The progress of computer technology has enabled researchers to adopt 
methods from artificial intelligence, graph theory, feature analysis, feature tracking, 
and applied statistics and to use computers to implement computer-based 
instructional systems. Researchers have now also succeeded in developing more 
effective tools for the assessment of knowledge in order to enhance the learning 
performance of students.  
The structure of this cumulative work 
 Several research projects contribute to the overall scientific knowledge with 
regard to cognitive structure. The following peer-reviewed publications build up this 
cumulative work highlighting ways of assessment, analysis, and instructional 
innovations. Table 1.1 illustrates the individual chapters and the corresponding 
publications.  
 Chapter 2 (based on Ifenthaler, 2010d) addresses information retrieval from 
human memory and how it will reflect in part the individual’s cognitive structure 
within and between concepts or domains. Accordingly, this chapter critically reflects 
possibilities and limitations of a systematic assessment and analysis of cognitive 
structure and introduces important concepts (e.g., externalization, representation, re-
representation).  
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 In chapter 3 (based on Ifenthaler, 2010c) it is argued that a wide variety of 
empirical approaches for the analysis of external representations of cognitive 
structure exist, but they often lack a solid theoretical foundation and their analysis is 
considered to be very time consuming. On the other hand, new technologies such as 
concept mapping tools are being introduced into learning environments, but the 
analysis of data collected with such new technologies still places a huge demand on 
methodologies. The purpose of chapter 3 is to introduce the computer-based and 
automated SMD Technology for relational, structural, and semantic analysis of 
externalized representations. 
 Chapter 4 (based on Al-Diban & Ifenthaler, in press) determines the strength 
and limitations of new methodological approaches. Overall, it is worthwhile to 
compare analysis approaches for measuring externalized mental models 
systematically in order to test their advantages and disadvantages, strengths and 
limitations. A series of pair-wise comparative studies show strengths, unique 
characteristics, and collective viability of different assessment and analysis methods. 
However, the above mentioned study only focused on conceptual differences of the 
analysis approaches and did not use empirical data. Accordingly, chapter 4 reports an 
empirical case study and compares two analysis approaches - QFCA (Qualitative & 
Formal Concept Analysis) and SMD (Surface, Matching, Deep Structure) - using 
identical data. The aim of this comparative study is to determine conceptual and 
empirical strengths and limitations of two different approaches for analyzing 
externalized cognitive structure. 
 Chapter 5 (based on Pirnay-Dummer, Ifenthaler, & Spector, 2010) introduces 
an integrated set of assessment tools called HIMATT (Highly Integrated Model 
Assessment Technology and Tools) which addresses this deficiency. HIMATT is 
Web-based and has been shown to scale up for practical use in educational and 
workplace settings, unlike many of the research tools developed solely to study basic 
issues in human learning and performance. In this chapter, the functions of HIMATT 
are described and several applications for its use are demonstrated. Additionally, two 
studies on the quality and usability of HIMATT are presented.  
 The “mystery of cognitive structure” is questioned in chapter 6 (based on 
Ifenthaler, Masduki, & Seel, in press). Many research studies have clearly 
demonstrated the importance of cognitive structures as the building blocks of 
meaningful learning and retention of instructional materials. Identifying the learners’ 
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cognitive structures will help instructors to organize materials, identify knowledge 
gaps, and relate new materials to existing slots or anchors within the learners’ 
cognitive structures. The purpose of this empirical investigation is to track the 
development of cognitive structures over time. Accordingly, it is demonstrated how 
various indicators derived from graph theory can be used for a precise description 
and analysis of cognitive structures. Results revealed several patterns that help to 
better understand the construction and development of cognitive structures over time. 
 Chapter 7 (based on Ifenthaler, accepted) investigates cross-domain 
distinguishing features of cognitive structures. In this experimental study, 
participants worked on the subject domains biology, history, and mathematics. 
Results clearly indicate different structural and semantic features of cognitive 
structures across the three subject domains. Additionally, we found that written texts 
and causal maps seem to represent different structure and content across the three 
subject domains when compared to an expert’s representation. 
 Chapter 8 (based on Ifenthaler & Seel, in press) reports findings from an 
experimental study in which 73 participants in three experimental groups solved 
logical word problems at ten measurement points. Changes of cognitive structures 
are illuminated and significant differences between the treatments are reported. The 
results also indicate that supportive information is an important aid for developing 
cognitive structures while solving logical problems. 
 Chapter 9 (based on Pirnay-Dummer & Ifenthaler, in press) presents an 
experimental study which integrates automated natural language-oriented assessment 
and analysis methodologies into feasible reading comprehension tasks. With the 
newly developed toolset, prose text can be automatically converted into an 
association net which has similarities to a concept map. The study investigates the 
effects of association nets made available to learners prior to reading. The results 
reveal that the automatically created graphs are highly similar to classical expert 
graphs. 
 Chapter 10 (based on Ifenthaler, 2009) reports a final experimental study on 
automated individualized feedback. Here, feedback is considered an elementary 
component for supporting and regulating learning processes. Different types of 
model-based feedback are investigated. Seventy-four participants were assigned to 
three experimental groups in order to examine the effects of different forms of 
model-based feedback. With the help of seven automatically calculated measures, 
	   14 
changes in the participants’ understanding of the subject domain “climate change”, 
represented by causal diagrams, are reported. 
 Finally, the epilogue highlights ongoing and future research projects for 
gaining a better insight into cognitive structure. These projects focus on new 
methodological developments as well on instructional applications. 
TABLE 1.1 
Peer-reviewed publications of the cumulative work 
 
Chapter 
No. Publication 
Impact factor from 
Journal Citation 
Reports®, Thomson 
Reuters	  (if available) 
Chapter 2 
Ifenthaler, D. (2010). Scope of graphical indices in 
educational diagnostics. In D. Ifenthaler, P. Pirnay-
Dummer & N. M. Seel (Eds.), Computer-based 
diagnostics and systematic analysis of knowledge (pp. 
213-234). New York: Springer. 
N/A 
Chapter 3 
Ifenthaler, D. (2010). Relational, structural, and semantic 
analysis of graphical representations and concept 
maps. Educational Technology Research and 
Development, 58(1), 81-97. doi: 10.1007/s11423-008-
9087-4 
1.183 
Chapter 4 
Al-Diban, S., & Ifenthaler, D. (in press). Comparison of two 
analysis approaches for measuring externalized mental 
models: Implications for diagnostics and applications. 
Journal of Educational Technology & Society. 
1.067 
Chapter 5 
 Pirnay-Dummer, P., Ifenthaler, D., & Spector, J. M. (2010). 
Highly integrated model assessment technology and 
tools. Educational Technology Research and 
Development, 58(1), 3-18. doi: 10.1007/s11423-009-
9119-8 
1.183 
Chapter 6 
Ifenthaler, D., Masduki, I., & Seel, N. M. (in press). The 
mystery of cognitive structure and how we can detect 
it. Tracking the development of cognitive structures 
over time. Instructional Science. doi: 10.1007/s11251-
009-9097-6 
1.341 
Chapter 7 
Ifenthaler, D. (accepted). Identifying cross-domain 
distinguishing features of cognitive structures. 
Educational Technology Research and Development. 
1.183 
Chapter 8 
Ifenthaler, D., & Seel, N. M. (in press). A longitudinal 
perspective on inductive reasoning tasks. Illuminating 
the probability of change. Learning and Instruction. 
doi: 10.1016/j.learninstruc.2010.08.004 
2.372 
Chapter 9 
Pirnay-Dummer, P., & Ifenthaler, D. (in press). Reading 
guided by automated graphical representations: How 
model-based text visualizations facilitate learning in 
reading comprehension tasks. Instructional Science. 
doi: 10.1007/s11251-010-9153-2 
1.341 
Chapter 10 
Ifenthaler, D. (2009). Model-based feedback for improving 
expertise and expert performance. Technology, 
Instruction, Cognition and Learning, 7(2), 83-101. 
N/A 
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2 
SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT AND ANALYSIS OF 
COGNITIVE STRUCTURE & 
It is argued that the order in which information is retrieved from memory will reflect in part the 
individual’s cognitive structure within and between concepts or domains. When compared to that of a 
novice, a domain expert’s cognitive structure is considered to be more tightly integrated and to have a 
greater number of linkages between interrelated concepts. There is thus immense interest on the part 
of researchers and educators to diagnose a novice’s cognitive structure and compare it with that of an 
expert in order to identify the most appropriate ways to bridge the gap. However, an assessment and 
analysis of cognitive structures is always biased as we do not know the direct functions of 
internalization and externalization. Additionally, the possibilities of externalization are limited to a 
few sets of sign and symbol systems – characterized as graphical and language-based approaches. 
This chapter critically reflects possibilities and limitations of a systematic assessment and analysis of 
cognitive structure and links them to theoretical and methodological foundations. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
& This chapter is based on: Ifenthaler, D. (2010). Scope of graphical indices in educational 
diagnostics. In D. Ifenthaler, P. Pirnay-Dummer & N. M. Seel (Eds.), Computer-based diagnostics 
and systematic analysis of knowledge (pp. 213-234). New York: Springer. 
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Introduction 
Knowledge representation is a key concept in psychological and educational 
diagnostics. Thus, numerous models for describing the fundamentals of knowledge 
representation have been applied so far. The distinction which has received the most 
attention is that between declarative (“knowing that”) and procedural (“knowing 
how”) forms of knowledge (see Anderson, 1983; Ryle, 1949). Declarative 
knowledge is defined as factual knowledge, whereas procedural knowledge is 
defined as the knowledge of specific functions and procedures for performing a 
complex process, task, or activity. Closely associated with these concepts is the term 
cognitive structure, also known as knowledge structure or structural knowledge 
(Jonassen, Beissner, & Yacci, 1993), which is conceived of as the manner in which 
an individual organizes the relationships between concepts in memory (Ifenthaler, et 
al., in press; Shavelson, 1972). Hence, an individual’s cognitive structure is made up 
of the interrelationships between concepts or facts and procedural elements.  
 Further, it is argued that the order in which information is retrieved from 
memory will reflect in part the individual’s cognitive structure within and between 
concepts or domains. When compared to that of a novice, a domain expert’s 
cognitive structure is considered to be more tightly integrated and to have a greater 
number of linkages between interrelated concepts. There is thus immense interest on 
the part of researchers and educators to diagnose a novice’s cognitive structure and 
compare it with that of an expert in order to identify the most appropriate ways to 
bridge the gap (Ifenthaler, et al., in press; Ifenthaler & Seel, 2005). By diagnosing 
these structures precisely, even partially, the educator comes closer to influencing 
them through instructional settings and materials. 
Functions of representation and re-representation 
However, it is not possible to measure these internal representations of knowledge 
directly. Additionally, it is argued that different types of knowledge require different 
types of representations (Minsky, 1981). Therefore, we argue that it is necessary to 
identify economic, fast, reliable, and valid techniques to elicit and analyze cognitive 
structures (Ifenthaler, 2008). In order to identify such techniques, one must be aware 
of the complex processes and interrelationships between internal and external 
representations of knowledge. Seel (1991, p. 17) describes the function of internal 
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representation of knowledge by distinguishing three zones – the object zone W as 
part of the world, the knowledge zone K, and the zone of internal knowledge 
representation R. As shown in Figure 2.1, there are two classes of functions: (1) fin as 
the function for the internal representation of the objects of the world 
(internalization), and (2) fout as the function for the external re-representation back to 
the world (externalization).  
 
FIGURE 2.1. Functions of representation and re-representation 
Neither class of functions is directly observable. Hence, a measurement of cognitive 
structures is always biased as we are not able to more precisely define the above 
described functions of internalization and externalization (Ifenthaler, 2008). 
Additionally, the possibilities of externalization are limited to a few sets of sign and 
symbol systems (Seel, 1999b) – characterized as graphical and language-based 
approaches.  
 Lee and Nelson (2004) report various graphical forms of external 
representations for instructional uses and provide a conceptual framework for 
external representations of knowledge. Graphical forms of externalization include (1) 
knowledge maps, (2) diagrams, (3) pictures, (4) graphs, (5) charts, (6) matrices, (7) 
flowcharts, (8) organizers, and (9) trees. However, not all of these forms of 
externalization have been utilized for instruction and educational diagnosis 
(Ifenthaler, 2008; Scaife & Rogers, 1996; Seel, 1999a). Other forms of graphical 
approaches are the structure formation technique (Scheele & Groeben, 1984), 
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pathfinder networks (Schvaneveldt, 1990), mind tools (Jonassen, 2009; Jonassen & 
Cho, 2008), and causal diagrams (Al-Diban & Ifenthaler, in press). Language-based 
approaches include thinking-aloud protocols (Ericsson & Simon, 1993), teach-back 
procedures (Mandl, Gruber, & Renkl, 1995), cognitive task analysis (Kirwan & 
Ainsworth, 1992), and computer linguistic techniques (Pirnay-Dummer, et al., 2010; 
Seel, Ifenthaler, & Pirnay-Dummer, 2009). 
 As discussed above, there are numerous approaches for eliciting knowledge 
for various diagnostic purposes. However, most approaches have not been tested for 
reliability and validity (Ifenthaler, 2008; Seel, 1999a). Additionally, they are almost 
only applicable to single or small sets of data (Al-Diban & Ifenthaler, in press; 
Ifenthaler, 2010c). Hence, new approaches are required which have not only been 
tested for reliability and validity but also provide a fast and economic way of 
analyzing larger sets of data. Additionally, approaches for educational diagnostics 
also need to move beyond the perspective of correct and incorrect solutions. As we 
move into the 21st century, we argue that the application of alternative assessment 
and analysis strategies is inevitable for current educational diagnostics. 
  Alternative assessment and analysis strategies 
Externalizations are the only available artefacts for empirical investigations. An 
externalization is always made by means of interpretation. But the externalization 
also needs interpretation for its analysis. These are two different kinds of 
interpretation. All kinds of features may be clustered for a description and 
aggregation of the artefact. Some of the interpretation is done by the learner and 
some of it is carried out by humans and technology. In most cases a mixture of all 
three interpreters will be part of the assessment. This mixture and the complexity of 
the construct both make it specifically difficult to trace the steps and bits of 
knowledge.  
 Not all types of externalizations have the same types of properties and 
strengths, e.g., written language is always sequenced and has multiple dimensions at 
the same time (it is still impossible to trace them all), concept maps are not semantic 
webs most of the time due to underspecification problems and a lack of 
homogeneity, association networks do not have directions and propositions, causality 
networks can not deal with dynamics, and representations of dynamic systems are 
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almost impossible to aggregate – nor are they supposed to be aggregable in the first 
place. The list is not even complete (see Ifenthaler & Pirnay-Dummer, 2010a).  
 There is no easy and no complete way to integrate any of them, and the 
strength of good research therefore lies, maybe more than in other research domains, 
in a fitting integration: Multiple perspectives on the same construct are usually 
needed. Only if the research questions are very specific may a single approach 
suffice. But this is rarely the case. Researchers and practitioners will have to 
carefully justify their selection alongside their research questions and goals, 
especially if important long-term decisions are based upon the assessments. The 
same care should be taken for decisions in the field. The only way to make better 
decisions about the kind of externalization as well as the type of instrument to be 
used on it is to know the strengths and weaknesses of the instruments (Ifenthaler, 
2008; Ifenthaler & Pirnay-Dummer, 2010a). It is worth the effort to acquaint oneself 
with at least a representative selection of the available tools. 
 Once the external re-representations have been assessed and aggregated, two 
competing demands are at hand: First, we need to keep as much information from the 
external re-representations as possible. Secondly, especially in large datasets the 
information needs to be condensed in such a way that we are still able to selectively 
decide on or test our theories and practical goals. Combining both demands is not 
always easy and the measures need to be chosen carefully with an eye to the research 
question, evaluation, analysis, or designed plans in order to provide the proper 
answers.  
 In the field of computer-based diagnostics knowledge artefacts (objects of 
investigation) are very often graphs. If they are not graphs from the start, they are 
usually transferred into graphs after assessment. The purpose is aggregation 
(Ifenthaler, 2010d; Ifenthaler & Pirnay-Dummer, 2010a). Purely qualitative methods 
are the exception. However, their opposition to any kind of aggregation lies in their 
nature, and they can be aided by computer programs but not carried out 
automatically. Any aggregation of qualitative research results is at least to be 
considered a mixed method: Aggregation is quantitative by nature. This does not, on 
the other hand, mean that all aggregation serves the same purpose or that it can not 
differ in quality and the amount of information it preserves. As always, the choice of 
the right measures and comparisons is determined by the research question or 
practical goal. The main reason for comparison is the further processablity of the 
	   20 
artefacts, which is especially interesting for computer based analysis because it can 
be automated. The measures allow questions about whether one group of experts 
structures things differently than another or whether a group of learners makes 
progress over time, e.g., as compared to experts.  
 With computer-based analysis, large data sets are attainable even if resources 
are limited. When the objects under investigation are graphs, graph theory provides 
the only logical choice for analysis and a stable basis for several further 
developments (Harary, 1974; Tittmann, 2003, 2010). Surprisingly, the application of 
graph theory can only rarely be found in research on learning and instruction 
(Ifenthaler, 2010d). Usually very simple measures are used as single indicators 
which do not carry much of the initially rich information and are usually not 
validated at all (Ifenthaler, 2008). And even in the case that graph theory is applied, 
the measures used sometimes lack a connection to the theories of learning and 
instruction, and the scope of the measures is sometimes misinterpreted. 
 Good theories and sound research have a great chance of leading to practical 
improvements. The process may take time, but eventually when things are explained 
properly, the process succeeds; slower but usually more stable than by the use of 
intuitive approaches. But sometimes the odds are even more optimistic. These are the 
cases where the investigation itself is part of the improvement. The need for 
assessment strategies which support the process under assessment at the same time is 
not new (Ifenthaler & Pirnay-Dummer, 2010b).  
 However, with new technologies at hand, at least parts of this demand can be 
better fulfilled. This cumulative work will start with knowledge constructs, 
representations, and assessment methods and moves on to decisions on specific 
measures and reasoning. Then, the impact the assessment, the interpretation, the 
aggregation, and methodological decisions have on knowing and the learning process 
itself is presented. As diverse as they may be, the methods and technologies which 
will be described have one common advantage: They use the cognitive facilities and 
assess them at the same time. Moreover, they all use them in the way in which they 
are used in everyday situations. Even when used for assessment only, these methods 
do not create an artificial assessment situation which leads too far away from the 
usual reflection. Thus, this leads back to the beginning, where it is stated that the 
investigation of knowledge is recursive – and that the recursion may very well be 
infinite in theory (Ifenthaler & Pirnay-Dummer, 2010b).  
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3 
TOWARDS A NEW METHODOLOGY & 
A wide variety of empirical approaches for the analysis of external representations of cognitive 
structure exist, but they often lack a solid theoretical foundation and their analysis is considered to be 
very time consuming. On the other hand, new technologies such as concept mapping tools are being 
introduced into learning environments, but the analysis of data collected with such new technologies 
still places a huge demand on methodologies. The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the 
computer-based and automated SMD Technology for relational, structural, and semantic analysis of 
externalized representations. First, the theoretical foundation fort he proposed methodology is 
introduced. Second, the complex processes of externalizing internal knowledge representations (re-
representation) will be discussed. Third, the SMD Technology, which enables a measurement of 
graphical representations and concept maps with three different quantitative indices, is presented. 
Then, the empirical reliability and validity testing of the SMD Technology is highlighted. Finally, a 
broad field of applications for the SMD Technology within the field of research, learning, and 
instruction is discussed. 
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Introduction 
The demand for good instructional environments presupposes valid and reliable 
tools, instruments, and methodologies for educational research. However, many of 
them are developed with little or no theoretical justification, which leads to doubtful 
findings and no contribution to the improvement of learning environments (Novak, 
1998). Accordingly, the development of new tools, instruments and methodologies to 
capture key latent variables associated with human learning and cognition requires a 
solid theoretical foundation.  
 One central interest of psychological and educational research is internal 
cognitive processes and systems, which are described by theoretical constructs such 
as mental models and schemata (Seel, 1991). However, mental models and schemata 
are theoretical scientific constructs which are not directly observable. Accordingly, 
researchers can only learn about mental models or schemata if (1) individuals 
communicate their internal systems (Seel, 1991) and if (2) valid and reliable 
instruments and methodologies are used to analyze them (Seel, 1999a). A wide 
variety of empirical approaches for the analysis of external representations of mental 
models and schemata exist (Al-Diban, 2002), but they often lack a solid theoretical 
foundation and their analysis is considered to be very time consuming (Ifenthaler, 
2008). On the other hand, new technologies such as concept mapping tools are being 
introduced into learning environments, but the analysis of data collected with such 
new technologies still places a huge demand on methodologies.  
 The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the computer-based and automated 
SMD Technology for relational, structural, and semantic analysis of graphical 
representations and concept maps. First, the theoretical constructs of mental models 
and schemata as a key concept for understanding human learning and problem 
solving processes are introduced. Second, the complex processes of externalizing 
internal knowledge representations (re-representation) will be discussed. Third, the 
SMD Technology, which enables a measurement of graphical representations and 
concept maps with three different quantitative indices, is presented. Then, the 
empirical reliability and validity testing of the SMD Technology is highlighted. 
Finally, a broad field of applications for the SMD Technology within the field of 
research, learning, and instruction is discussed. The chapter ends with a conclusion 
and future perspectives.  
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Background 
Mental models and schemata are theoretical constructs for understanding human 
learning and problem solving processes. Following the verdict of Piaget (1950, 
1976), it is argued that new information is processed by the complimentary processes 
of assimilation and accommodation. According to Seel (1991), a person can 
assimilate new information as long as an adequate schema can be activated. If the 
activated schema does not match exactly, it can be adjusted by means of accretion, 
tuning, or reorganization. The accretion process is defined as an accumulation of 
new information to the existing schema. Tuning can be described as a change of 
single components within the activated schema. The result of a successful adjustment 
of a schema is a subjective plausible solution of a problem or the understanding of 
new information. However, if the processes of accretion and tuning are not 
successful or if no schema is available at all, new information can only be 
accommodated by the process of reorganization. According to Seel (1991), the 
process of reorganization is realized by constructing a mental model (see Figure 
3.1). 
 
FIGURE 3.1. The process of assimilation and accommodation 
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Mental models are dynamic ad hoc constructions of individuals that provide 
subjective plausible explanations on the basis of restricted domain-specific 
information. Johnson-Laird (1983) describes the model building process as a step-
by-step reconstruction of an initial mental model (fleshing out). Additionally, the 
reduction to absurdity (Seel, 1991) is used to test whether the activated mental model 
can be replaced by another mental model. However, as long as an activated mental 
model provides enough subjective plausibility to meet the requirements of a 
phenomenon to be explained, there is no need for the construction of a new mental 
model. Seel (1991) assigns mental models four general functions, (1) simplification, 
(2) envisioning, (3) analogical reasoning, and (4) mental simulation. Depending on 
the objective of the model-building person, one of the four functions is used for the 
mental model building process. In comparison to the activation of an available 
schema, the mental effort for the construction of a mental model is higher and more 
time consuming (Seel, 2008).  
 Accordingly, learning, reasoning, and problem solving involve the 
construction of mental models and schemata. In order to support successful learning, 
reasoning, and problem solving, it is necessary to investigate the mental model 
building process precisely. However, as it is not possible to measure internal 
representations of knowledge directly (e.g., schemata, mental models), the following 
paragraph will focus on the complex processes of externalizing internal knowledge 
representations. 
Externalization of internal knowledge structures 
Theoretical constructs such as the mental models and schemata discussed above are 
used by cognitive and educational researchers to explain the complex phenomenon 
of human learning, reasoning, and problem solving. As long as these internal 
knowledge structures are not directly observable, researchers require adequate tools, 
instruments, and methodologies to allow people to externalize them. According to 
Scandura (2007), there exist various possibilities how to construct such knowledge 
representations. We consider the process of externalization as a conscious process of 
communicating mental models or schemata using adequate sign and symbol systems 
(see Le Ny, 1993). Hence, externalization can be realized through speaking out 
aloud, writing a text, drawing a picture, or constructing a diagram, graphic, or 
concept map (Ifenthaler, 2008). 
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FIGURE 3.2. Interrelation of internal and external representations 
 
As shown in Figure 3.2, we are able to distinguish between internal representations 
(e.g., mental models, schemata) and external re-representations (communicated using 
adequate sign and symbol systems). Furthermore, we argue that these two types of 
model representations are interrelated. First, through the process of internalization, a 
person is able to construct a mental model or activate an available schema. From the 
point of view of instructional design, the process of internalization is where we can 
systematically influence the construction of mental models by providing well-
designed external re-representations (e.g., learning materials, feedback, etc.) of 
phenomena to be explained (e.g., Norman, 1983).  
 Second, the process of externalization enables a person to communicate his or 
her understanding of phenomena in the world. This perspective is the only way in 
which researches can learn more about a person’s internal representations. 
Accordingly, adequate tools, instruments, and methodologies for the analysis of 
mental models or schemata can only be developed with a clear understanding of the 
complex processes of internalization and externalization. Although it appears to be 
possible to assess internal representations through their externalized re-
representations, we need to keep in mind that the re-representations might be biased 
through the lack of communication skills, the use of inadequate sign and symbol 
systems or the use of insufficient research instruments.  
 Therefore we argue that instruments used for the analysis of such constructs 
must have a strong theoretical foundation and be tested for reliability and validity 
(Ifenthaler & Seel, 2005; Seel, 1999a). A detailed review of methodologies for the 
assessment of graphical representations revealed a huge demand for an automated 
and computer-based tool (Ifenthaler, 2006). As a result, the SMD Technology was 
developed. 
	   26 
SMD technology 
Based on the theory of mental models (Seel, 1991) and graph theory (Bonato, 1990; 
Chartrand, 1977; Harary, 1974; Tittmann, 2003), the computer-based and automated 
SMD Technology (Surface, Matching, Deep Structure) uses (a) graphical 
representations such as concept maps or (b) natural language expressions to analyze 
individual processes in persons solving complex problems at single time points or 
multiple intervals over time. In the following, we define the externalized knowledge 
structures as a model M. 
 
FIGURE 3.3. Model M3 composed of two propositions Pi  
 
Depending on the elicitation process (e.g., using the Structure Formation Technique 
[paper and pencil]; concept mapping tools [computer-based]; natural language 
statements [computer-based or paper and pencil]), the raw data should be stored 
pairwise (as propositions Pi) including (a) the model number as an indicator of which 
model a proposition belongs to, (b) node1 as the first node of the proposition, (c) 
node2, which is connected to the first node, and (d) a link which describes the link 
between the two nodes (see Figure 3.3 and Table 3.1). 
TABLE 3.1 
Raw data of a model stored pairwise (as propositions) 
Model number Node1 Node2 Link 
003 cells animal cells consists of 
003 cells plant cells consists of 
…    
 
After the raw data has been transformed into the standardized format (see Table 3.1), 
it is stored on a SQL (structured query language) database. However, the 
transformation process of paper and pencil models (e.g., Structure Formation 
Technique) is very time consuming. Therefore, we recommend the use of computer-
based elicitation techniques which already support the standardized format (e.g., C-
Map, DEEP, MITOCAR) in order to guarantee a more economical analysis and 
additionally a highly reliable transformation process (Ifenthaler, 2006). 
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FIGURE 3.4. User interface of the SMD technology 
 
The automated analysis process of the SMD Technology will be started by the 
researcher through the User Interface, where all stored models in the SQL database 
can be selected (see Figure 3.4). After selecting the models Mi for the analysis 
process, the system will automatically calculate three numerical indicators out of all 
nodes and links - Surface, Matching, and Deep Structure - and generate standardized 
graphical re-representations for each individual model Mi (Ifenthaler, 2006). 
Surface structure 
The relational structure of each individual model Mi is represented on the Surface 
Structure. This simple and easily calculable indicator is computed as the sum of all 
propositions Pi in a model Mi. 
 
[1.1] 
 
θ is defined as a value between 0 (no proposition = no model) and n (n propositions 
Pi of a model Mi). The Surface Structure of model M3, represented in Figure 3.3, 
would result in θ = 2. According to the theory of mental models (Seel, 1991), the 
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number of nodes and links or propositions a person uses is a key indicator for the 
investigation of the progression of knowledge over time in the course of problem 
solving processes (Scandura, 1988). However, although this first indicator enables a 
rapid and economical analysis of the relational structure of a model Mi, additional 
indicators are required for a more detailed analysis. 
Matching structure 
The structural property of a model Mi is displayed on the Matching Structure. The 
second level of the SMD Technology indicates the range and complexity of a model 
Mi.  
 [1.2] 
 
μ is computed as the diameter of the spanning tree of a model Mi and can lie between 
0 (no links) and n. In accordance with graph theory, every model Mi contains a 
spanning tree. Spanning trees include all nodes of a model Mi and are acyclic 
(Tittmann, 2003). Figure 3.5 illustrates model M5 and its corresponding spanning 
tree. 
 
FIGURE 3.5. Model M5 and its corresponding spanning tree 
 
A diameter is defined as the quantity of links of the shortest path between the most 
distant nodes. For the calculation of the Matching Structure index, the spanning tree 
is transformed into a distance matrix D. 
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[1.3] 
 
The Matching Structure index is calculated as the maximum value of all entries in 
the distance matrix D. The diameter or Matching Structure of the spanning tree in 
Figure 3.5 is calculated as follows: 
 [1.4] 
 
The change in range or complexity of a person’s model Mi is our second key 
indicator for the analysis of learning and problem solving processes (Seel, et al., 
2009). Further graph theoretical such as maximum circumference (all possible 
relations), ruggedness (quantity of sub models which are independent or not linked), 
linking density (quotient of actual amount of relations and the total amount of 
possible relations), or node centrality (weight of a single node within a model) can 
be used to describe and analyze the structure of a model Mi in more detail. 
Deep structure 
The semantic composition of a model Mi is measured on the Deep Structure. The 
Deep Structure is calculated with the help of the similarity measure (Tversky, 1977) 
as the semantic similarity between an individual model Mi and a reference model Mr. 
A reference model Mr is defined as a subject domain-specific model (e.g. expert 
solution; another subject’s model; the same subject’s model constructed at a different 
time point).  
 In contrast to the graph theory-based calculation of the Surface and Matching 
Structure, model analysis on the Deep Structure is realized through a similarity 
calculation between a model Mi and a domain-dependent reference model Mr. Hence, 
a reference model Mr of high quality is a necessary precondition for a comprehensive 
analysis of the Deep Structure.  
 A similarity measure describes the degree of similarity between two objects, 
represented by a number between 0 and 1. Decisive for a similarity measure are 
objects with similar and different features. Tversky (1977) considered an object as an 
amount of features. The identification of a similarity between two objects is realized 
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through a comparison of their features. The similarity formula takes not only the 
amount of similar features into account, but also the amount of different features. Lin 
(1998) defines similarity with the following three statements:  
1. The similarity between A and B is related to their commonality. The more 
commonality they share, the more similar they are. 
2. The similarity between A and B is related to the differences between them. 
The more differences they have, the less similar they are. 
3. The maximum similarity between A and B is reached when A and B are 
identical, no matter how much commonality they share. 
Accordingly, the smallest similarity between two objects A and B is given if no 
common features exist. In this case, the two objects are completely different and the 
similarity measure is 0. The similarity measure increases with a rise in the number of 
common features. A complete similarity of all features results in a similarity measure 
of 1.  
 The similarity of models on the Deep Structure is identified through the 
feature „proposition“ – the semantic characteristic of the proposition. The Deep 
Structure index δ is defined as the Tversky (1977) similarity between a model Mi and 
a reference model Mr. In general, we calculate: 
 
[1.5] 
 
A and B are the amount of propositions of a model comparison. The function f(M) 
corresponds to the number of elements in the amount M. The parameters α and β 
control the weighting of similar and different features. Both similar and different 
features are considered in the calculation if the weighting of α and β is equal (α = β 
= 0.5). The value of the Deep Structure index δ is defined between 0 (no semantic 
similarity between the models) and 1 (absolute similarity between the models). 
 The Deep Structure or semantic similarity between model M6 and reference 
model Mr is calculated in an automated iterative process. Every proposition in model 
M6 is analysed for similarity with every proposition in the reference model Mr. The 
Deep Structure index is calculated as follows: 
 [1.6] 
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Thus, the semantic similarity between model M6 and reference model Mr is δ = 0.57 
or 57%. The quantitative measures of the Surface, Matching, and Deep Structure can 
be used for further statistical analysis. A qualitative analysis is made possible with 
the standardized re-representations of the SMD Technology. 
 
FIGURE 3.6. Model M6 and reference model Mr 
 
Standardized re-representations 
The standardized graphical re-representation of the subject’s data is constructed as an 
undirected or directed graph with named nodes and links. This automated feature of 
the SMD Technology is realized with the help of the open source graph visualization 
software GraphViz (Ellson, Gansner, Koutsofios, North, & Woodhull, 2003). For 
every single analysis, four standardized PNG (Portable Network Graphics) images 
are generated. Images (1) and (2) are the re-representations of model Mi and 
reference model Mr (for an example see Figure 3.6). Image (3) represents the 
similarity model, including only the nodes and links which are semantically similar 
between model Mi and reference model Mr (see Figure 3.7).  
 
FIGURE 3.7. Similarity re-representation of model M6 and reference model Mr 
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Image (4) is defined as the contrast model. It includes only nodes and links which 
have no semantic similarity within model Mi and reference model Mr (see Figure 
3.8). 
 
FIGURE 3.8. Contrast re-representation of model M6 and reference model Mr 
 
Validation study 
To investigate the objectivity, reliability, and validity of the computer-based and 
automated SMD Technology, we conducted three quasi-experimental studies. The 
objectivity of the SMD Technology was guaranteed by the computer-based and 
automated realization of the instrument. In the following section we report our 
results for reliability and validity of the SMD Technology. 
Subjects 
Three quasi-experimental studies (Studies 1, 2, and 3) were conducted with 106 
subjects (70 female and 36 male) at the University of Freiburg. Their mean age was 
18.3 years (SD = 4.6). The subject domain of Study 1 was geology and that of 
Studies 2 and 3 was geophysics. The subjects spent five hours on successive days 
working on complex problems with a multimedia discovery-learning environment. 
Learning environment 
The multimedia discovery-learning environment consisted of four modules. The 
modules could be divided into declarative and heuristic modules. The declarative 
modules contained all information needed to solve the phenomenon in question, 
while the heuristic modules primarily supported the model building process 
(Dummer & Ifenthaler, 2005). 
 Starting from the problem & learning task area, the subjects solve complex 
tasks from specific subject domains (Study 1: geology; Studies 2 and 3: geophysics). 
The subjects can navigate through different topics of the subject domain within the 
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curriculum module. Additional information about the subject domain is provided in 
the form of various text documents, pictures, and audio recordings in the knowledge 
archive. The Model Building Kit (MoBuKi) provides the subjects with information 
about models, model building, and analogical reasoning. It contains three levels of 
abstraction of the material provided: (1) knowledge level; (2) procedural level; and 
(3) examples level. The toolbox is used to elicit the subjects’ understanding of the 
phenomenon in question constructing open concept maps. 
Procedure 
The three quasi-experiments took place in the computer laboratory at the University 
of Freiburg. Subjects had to solve a complex problem while working with a 
multimedia discovery-learning environment. The problem solution had to be elicited 
on six subsequent measurement points as an open concept map. Every subject was 
given an introduction to the use and construction of open concept maps.  
 All subjects were randomly assigned to three types of treatments. The groups 
were distributed as (a) scaffolding-based learning, (b) self-guided learning, and (c) 
control group. The subjects in group (a) received detailed feedback concerning their 
concept map during the model building process, subjects in group (b) received no 
feedback, and subjects in group (c) received no feedback and worked within a 
multimedia discovery-learning environment whose content was not linked to the 
complex problem to be solved. The quasi-experimental procedure consisted of three 
main parts: 
1. Pretest: Before the subjects were able to access the multimedia discovery-
learning environment, a pretest was conducted which included: (a) the 
domain specific knowledge test; (b) elicitation of the preconception of the 
complex problem to be solved as an open concept map; (c) a test on cognitive 
learning strategies (LIST-Test); (d) a test on intellectual abilities (BIS-Test). 
2. Model building process: During the quasi-experimental session, the subjects 
were asked to solve a complex problem while working within the multimedia 
discovery-learning environment. At five measurement points, the subjects 
had to elicit their understanding of the complex problem in question as an 
open concept map. 
3. Posttest: The individual learning outputs were captured with: (a) a domain 
specific declarative knowledge test; (b) elicitation of the final solution to the 
complex problem as an open concept map. 
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 The primary interest of the empirical investigation in this article is the 
experimental validation of the SMD Technology. Therefore, we focus in the 
following section on reliability and validity tests. However, details on the learning-
dependent progression of externalized models and treatment effects during the three 
quasi-experiments are reported in detail by Ifenthaler (2006) and Ifenthaler, Pirnay-
Dummer, and Seel (2007).  
Reliability test 
For the computation of the test-retest reliability (Spearman’s rank correlation), the 
Surface, Matching, and Deep Structure indices of measurement points three and four 
(control group) were used. 
TABLE 3.2 
Test-Retest Reliability of the SMD Technology  
 Test-retest reliability 
Surface Structure .824** 
Matching Structure .815** 
Deep Structure .901** 
** p < .01 (two-sided significance) 
 
The results in Table 3.2 show a high significant correlation between the indices 
(Surface, Matching, and Deep Structure). Accordingly, this result is a broad hint for 
the reliability of the quasi-experimental study. On the other hand, we want to point 
out that mental models are individual ad hoc constructions (Seel, 1991), and 
therefore standard reliability tests, e.g., Test-Retest-, Split-Half- or Odd-Even-Method 
(Rost, 2005), have only limited validity as they consider the latent variable to be 
stable. However, the detailed research design of the three quasi-experimental studies 
and the applied learning environment guarantee at least an exact repeatability of the 
experiments. 
Validity test 
Especially with newly designed and developed instruments (e.g., SMD Technology), 
it is necessary to map theory based characteristics to measurable criteria. The goal of 
the construct validation is to determine from a theoretical point of view what the 
instrument really measures. For this purpose, several methodological best practices1 
are available (see Lienert & Raatz, 1994). A comprehensive analysis of the theory of 
mental models (Johnson-Laird, 1983) and available instruments for the assessment of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Correlation of a test with several outside criteria; Correlation with tests with similar validation 
requirements; correlation with tests that assess other criteria; analysis of inter- and intraindividual 
differences in test results; factorial analysis (see Lienert & Raatz, 1994). 
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models constitutes the basis for the theory-based development of the SMD 
Technology. From an empirical point of view, the validity of the SMD Technology is 
identified with the outside criterion (1) MITOCAR, and (2) domain specific 
knowledge.   
 Pirnay-Dummer (2006) developed the instrument MITOCAR (Model 
Inspection Trace Of Concepts And Relations), which enables a structural and 
conceptual analysis of natural language expressions. The raw data of the third quasi-
experimental study (N = 47) was analyzed with the MITOCAR software, which was 
tested for reliability and validity (Pirnay-Dummer, 2006). In the following, we use 
the results of the MITOCAR analysis for validity tests of the SMD Technology.  
TABLE 3.3 
Correlation between the SMD Technology and MITOCAR (N = 47) 
 MITOCAR (concept 
and structure) Surface Structure Matching Structure 
MITOCAR (concept 
and structure) - .610**
1 .527**1 
Surface Structure  - .766**1 
Matching Structure   - 
** p < .01; * p < .05 (two-sided significance) 
1 Pearson’s Correlation 
 
The results in Table 3.3 show significant correlations between the outside criterion 
MITOCAR and the Surface and Matching Structure of the SMD Technology2. After 
verifying convergent validity of the SMD Technology, we want to test the SMD 
Technology with another outside criterion. This second validity test is for divergent 
validity on the basis of a valid and reliable domain specific knowledge test consisting 
out of 19 multiple-choice questions (Couné, Hanke, Ifenthaler, & Seel, 2004). We 
assume that there is no correlation between the Surface and Matching Structure of 
the SMD Technology and the declarative knowledge measure. Further, we assume a 
correlation between the Deep Structure and the declarative knowledge.  
 The results in Table 3.4 show no correlations between the declarative 
knowledge and the Surface and Matching Structure. This is consistent with the 
theoretical and methodological assumptions of the SMD Technology - the indices of 
the Surface and Matching Structure have no direct connection to the subject domain. 
The significant correlation between the declarative knowledge and the Deep 
Structure confirms the assumptions of the SMD Technology – we assume that 
persons with high declarative knowledge in a specific subject domain will also have 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 The Deep Structure index δ of the SMD Technology compares the semantic similarity between a model and a 
reference model. This feature is not available with MITOCAR. Accordingly, the calculation of correlations 
between the Deep Structure and the MITOCAR indices is not necessary. 
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a high Deep Structure index δ. To sum up, the empirical analysis revealed 
convergent and divergent validity with regard to the outside criterion. Additionally, 
the SMD Technology was part of a series of comparative studies of different 
quantitative and qualitative methodologies conducted in order to determine the 
methodologies’ strength and unique characteristics and to report collective validity 
(see T. E. Johnson, O'Connor, Spector, Ifenthaler, & Pirnay-Dummer, 2006). 
TABLE 3.4 
Correlation between the SMD Technology and the declarative knowledge test (N = 47) 
 declarative 
knowledge Surface Structure 
Matching 
Structure Deep Structure 
declarative 
knowledge - .273
1 .1121 .355*2 
Surface 
Structure  - .766**
1 .0892 
Matching 
Structure   - .166
2 
Deep Structure    - 
** p < .01; * p < .05 (two-sided significance) 
1 Pearson’s Correlation; 2 Spearman’s Correlation 
Applications for research, learning, and instruction 
The use of different computer-based tools for re-representing knowledge structures 
(e.g. concept mapping software) has become increasingly accepted for research, 
learning, and instruction (Jonassen, Reeves, Hong, Harvey, & Peters, 1997). In 
various research projects, concept maps have been used for analyzing learning 
outcomes, learners’ knowledge structures, and for self-assessment (Eckert, 2000; 
Mansfield & Happs, 1991; Stracke, 2004). In the field of learning and instruction, 
concept maps have been used for providing feedback and advance organizers and for 
facilitating problem solving tasks (Al-Diban, 2002; Jonassen, et al., 1997; Stoyanova 
& Kommers, 2002). However, a large number of the available tools do not support 
automated feedback and analysis features. Accordingly, the development of the 
computer-based and automated SMD Technology opens up a broad field of 
applications for research, learning, and instruction. 
SMD & research 
Re-representations of knowledge structures are often analyzed by raters using diverse 
scoring approaches (see Hilbert & Renkl, 2008; Jonassen, et al., 1997; Taricani & 
Clariana, 2006). Depending on the research question, the raters focus on the quantity 
and quality of nodes and links, causal relationships, semantic content, direction and 
strength of links, hierarchy, or other visual arrangements. However, measuring the 
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diverse information of individual concept maps by hand is very time consuming, and 
almost impossible for larger sets of data. Additionally, to guarantee high reliability 
and validity, every human rater must be an expert in the subject domain in question 
and in the application of quantitative and qualitative assessment strategies (Taricani 
& Clariana, 2006). Therefore, the automated analysis procedure of the SMD 
Technology calculates quantitative indicators of concept maps, which then can be 
used for further statistical computations.   
 So far, the SMD Technology has been applied in different fields of mental 
model research. Ifenthaler (2006) investigated the trajectory of mental models 
constructed by subjects working on complex problem solving tasks. An HLM 
analysis of three quasi-experimental studies (N = 106) showed a significant increase 
of propositions when subjects worked for five hours in a multimedia learning 
environment (Surface Structure). Accordingly, as long as new information is 
subjective plausible it will be added to a person’s knowledge structure. Further 
results indicate a significant increase in the diameter of the externalized knowledge 
structures (Matching Structure). Consequently, we found not only a significant 
learning-dependent increase in the number of propositions, but also a significant 
learning-dependent increase in structural complexity.  
 In order to investigate the learning-dependent progression of novices’ mental 
models to more expert-like models, Ifenthaler (2006) compared the semantic 
similarity of externalized knowledge structures of novices with expert knowledge 
structures in different subject domains. The results of the Deep Structure indicator of 
the SMD Technology revealed a significant increase in similarity between novice and 
expert models. However, further HLM analysis indicated that the learning time of 
five hours was not long enough to integrate all information provided and 
consequently to gain higher similarity to an expert’s solution of a problem. 
Predictions about novice’s problem solving skills to become more expert like are 
also possible (e.g., Ifenthaler, et al., 2007). Additionally, the provided learning 
materials and feedback could be improved for further experiments.  
 Ifenthaler et al. (2007) investigated the role of cognitive learning strategies 
and intellectual abilities in mental model building processes using the Deep Structure 
indicator of the SMD Technology. The results indicate that the training of mental 
model building skills is a complex problem which should be investigated further with 
regard to the roles of conditions based on the theory of mental models (Seel, 1991).  
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 Additionally, the SMD Technology has been used to investigate sharedness 
among team members (T. E. Johnson, Ifenthaler, Pirnay-Dummer, & Spector, 2009). 
The focus on individually constructed concept maps and team re-representations can 
help to identify problems of team performance and lead to a better understanding of 
the complex performance processes within teams. Thanks to the flexibility of the 
SMD Technology, other indicators can be easily implemented in order to produce 
specific measures for a large number of research questions. 
SMD & learning and instruction 
In the following, we will focus on the application of the SMD Technology for 
knowledge diagnosis, self-assessment, and knowledge management. Other 
applications in the field of learning and instruction, such as analysis of navigation 
paths in learning environments (Dummer & Ifenthaler, 2005), could be discussed on 
another occasion. 
 In order to provide learners with the best possible learning materials, the 
instructor or an Intelligent Tutoring System (ITS) must be aware of their state of 
knowledge. In general, knowledge diagnosis is applied by collecting necessary 
information about the learner with the help of various tests. By integrating the SMD 
Technology or parts of it (graphical re-representation; quantitative indicators) either 
into a computer-based learning environment or other instructional settings, it can 
easily be applied for individual knowledge diagnosis. The SMD Technology has been 
implemented as a cross-platform application which enables an easy integration into a 
computer-based learning environment. Therefore, the instructional designer may 
choose which components of the SMD Technology should be applied for an adequate 
knowledge diagnosis. The quantitative indicators could provide instant longitudinal 
information about the individual learning process. The indicators (Surface, Matching, 
and Deep) provide multiple information about changes in the knowledge structure 
and domain-specific knowledge acquisition. Depending on the results of the SMD 
Technology, the learning environments will provide specific feedback or other 
instructional materials to foster future learning processes. On the other hand, the 
graphical re-representation of the SMD Technology can be easily applied for 
individual feedback on specific tasks. The instructor could use the re-representation 
at a specific point during the learning phase to discuss the strength and weaknesses 
of a learner’s learning process. Additionally, the similarity and contrast model 
provide further feedback materials. 
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 Another use of the SMD Technology in the field of learning and instruction 
could be various fields of self assessment. As self assessment has the ambitious goal 
of making judgments about a learner’s own learning process, the feedback of an 
automated system should be very sensible to changes in the learner’s knowledge 
structure. As discussed above, the quantitative indicators and/or graphical re-
representations of the SMD Technology could be applied for self assessment. A 
learner could receive quantitative information about his or her learning progress after 
working for a defined period with a computer-based learning environment. 
 Additionally, the graphical re-representation could provide descriptive 
information about the learner’s knowledge structure. Furthermore, the similarity and 
contrast representation could elicit differences between previous points during the 
learning process or other learners or experts. This feature could therefore easily help 
to avoid the construction of misconceptions during self assessment phases. The 
major advantage of the SMD Technology for self assessment is the automated and 
instant generation of desired results. When learners receive the results of self 
assessment directly, their motivation to continue with the learning environment may 
be obtained longer than with other options of self assessment. 
 Finally, the SMD Technology could be applied for analysis of knowledge 
management processes. Individuals may use the quantitative indicators and or the 
graphical re-representations to compare it with other team members while working 
on a project. Also, the affordances of a task could be compared with the individual 
understanding of the task and gaps could be identified to solve it effectively. Another 
application of the SMD Technology for knowledge management could be the 
communication of individual or group knowledge for better cooperation and 
understanding with other members or groups of a project team. Further applications 
could include knowledge identification, knowledge use, and knowledge generation 
(Tergan, 2003). 
Conclusion and future perspectives 
The new developed SMD Technology is based on the theory of mental models (Seel, 
1991) and graph theory (Tittmann, 2003) and captures key latent variables associated 
with human learning and cognition. Graphical representations such as concept maps 
or natural language expression can be analyzed on three different levels. These levels 
help to describe individual knowledge structures from a relational, structural, and 
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semantic point of view. Additionally, graphical re-representations of the SMD 
Technology provide further information regarding the externalized knowledge 
structures of a person.  
 The objectivity, reliability, and validity of the computer-based and automated 
SMD Technology were investigated in three quasi-experimental studies. The results 
show a high reliability and validity in all indicators. Based on our findings, we 
developed further ideas for developing new features for the SMD Technology. These 
developments will include a tool for constructing concept maps, new techniques for 
describing the constructed models, and automated statistical reports.  
 Nevertheless, the SMD Technology or parts of it (graphical re-representation; 
quantitative indicators) can be easily integrated into various applications. The tool 
can be used not only in mental model research, but also in various fields of learning 
and instruction. Beyond this, such computer-based and automated instruments could 
also prove to be beneficial in a wide span of other fields of research on technology 
and instructional development. 
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4 
DETERMINING STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS OF 
METHODOLOGICAL APPROACHES & 
Over the past years, several possible solutions to the analysis problems of mental models have been 
discussed. Therefore, it is worthwhile to compare analysis approaches for measuring externalized 
mental models systematically in order to test their advantages and disadvantages, strengths and 
limitations. A series of pair-wise comparative studies show strengths, unique characteristics, and 
collective viability of different assessment and analysis methods. However, the above mentioned 
study only focused on conceptual differences of the analysis approaches and did not use empirical 
data. This chapter reports an empirical case study and compares two analysis approaches - QFCA 
(Qualitative & Formal Concept Analysis) and SMD (Surface, Matching, Deep Structure) - using 
identical data. Accordingly, the aim of this comparative study is to determine conceptual and 
empirical strengths and limitations of two different approaches for analyzing externalized cognitive 
structure. 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
& This chapter is based on: Al-Diban, S., & Ifenthaler, D. (in press). Comparison of two analysis 
approaches for measuring externalized mental models: Implications for diagnostics and applications. 
Journal of Educational Technology & Society. 
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Introduction 
Mental models are a basic cognitive construct which describes complex learning and 
problem solving processes. Generally speaking, a person constructs a mental model 
in order to explain or simulate specific phenomena of objects or events if no 
sufficient schema is available. Thus, mental models organize domain specific 
knowledge in such a way that phenomena of the world become plausible for the 
individual. Compared to that of a novice, a domain expert’s mental model is 
considered to be more elaborated and complex. Therefore, we argue that mental 
models mediate between an initial state and a desired final state in the learning 
process. Accordingly, there is an immense interest on the part of researchers to 
analyze a novice’s mental model and compare it with an expert’s in order to identify 
the most appropriate ways to bridge the gap.  
 Over the past years, several possible solutions to the analysis problems of 
mental models have been discussed (e.g.,  Clariana & Wallace, 2007; Ifenthaler, 
2008; T. E. Johnson, et al., 2009). Therefore, it is worthwhile to compare analysis 
approaches for measuring externalized mental models systematically in order to test 
their advantages and disadvantages, strengths and limitations. Johnson et al. (2006) 
set up a series of pair-wise comparative studies in order to determine the strength, 
unique characteristics, and collective viability of different assessment and analysis 
methods. A total of six studies compare the methods ACSMM (Analysis Constructed 
Shared Mental Models; T. E. Johnson, et al., 2009), SMD (Surface, Matching, Deep 
Structure; Ifenthaler, 2010c), MITOCAR (Model Inspection Trace of Concepts and 
Relations; Pirnay-Dummer & Ifenthaler, 2010), and DEEP (Dynamic Evaluation of 
Enhanced Problem Solving; Spector & Koszalka, 2004). Through study of their 
methodologies, the authors hope to better quantitatively and qualitatively represent 
individual and team mental models and better understand mental model development 
by comparing individuals and experts (T. E. Johnson, et al., 2006). However, the 
above mentioned study only focused on conceptual differences of the analysis 
approaches and did not use empirical data.  
 In addition to the above described comparative study by Johnson et al. 
(2006), our current study compares two analysis approaches - QFCA (Qualitative & 
Formal Concept Analysis) and SMD (Surface, Matching, Deep Structure) - using 
identical data. Accordingly, the aim of our comparative study is to determine 
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conceptual and empirical strengths and limitations of two different approaches for 
analyzing externalized mental models. Our comparison framework is laid out as 
follows: First, both analysis approaches are introduced. Second, we present the 
empirical study. Third, we report the results analyzed with both approaches, QFCA 
and SMD. Forth, on the basis of our results, we compare both analysis approaches. 
Finally, we conclude by determining how the two approaches could be used in 
conjunction for further mental model research. 
Analysis approaches 
A mental model is always content related and the assessment (elicitation) and 
analysis (measurement of elicitation) should allow a psychological and content based 
interpretation. However, the yet unsolved question is how to accurately diagnose 
mental models. Some issues that have yet to be resolved include identifying reliable 
and valid ways to elicit mental models and the actual analysis of the externalized 
models themselves (Ifenthaler & Seel, 2005; Kalyuga, 2006a). However, the 
possibilities of assessment (elicitation) of mental models are limited to a few sets of 
sign and symbol systems (Seel, 1999b) – characterized as graphical and language-
based approaches. Graphical approaches include the structure formation technique 
(Scheele & Groeben, 1984), pathfinder networks (Schvaneveldt, 1990), mind tools 
(Jonassen & Cho, 2008), and test for causal models (Al-Diban, 2008). Language-
based approaches include thinking-aloud protocols (Ericsson & Simon, 1993), 
cognitive task analysis (Kirwan & Ainsworth, 1992), and computer linguistic 
techniques (Seel, et al., 2009). However, not all of these elicitation methods interact 
with available analysis approaches. Therefore, we identified two analysis approaches 
(QFCA and SMD) which interact well with the graphical assessment method test for 
causal models (TCM). 
Analysis I: Qualitative & formal concept analysis (QFCA) 
As a first step of the QFCA, the amount of assessed data (graphical or natural 
language-based) will be reduced semi-automatically with help of coders, which look 
for semantic similarities, synonyms, and metaphors and build hierarchies of concepts 
and propositions.  Second, the data is imported into Cernato (Navicon, 2000). This 
program is based on lattice theory (Birkhoff, 1973) and allows content based 
comparisons of individual mental model representations. Figure 4.1 shows an 
	   44 
example of the results of an analysis. The figure presents a comparison of the 
preconceptions of 12 participants on the level of generic concepts. In the third step of 
the analysis the problem of structure isomorphism occurs, which usually prevents 
content based comparisons of simple concept mapping methods (see Nägler & Stopp, 
1996). This problem consists of the possibility that any number of identical concepts 
can be connected in the factorial number of arrays. This makes it nearly impossible 
to make content based comparisons of entire model representations. With the help of 
formal concept analysis (Ganter & Wille, 1996) all objects (here participants) can be 
systematically structured according to the entirety of all true attributes (here concepts 
or propositions). 
FIGURE 4.1. QFCA analysis of the “rainbow phenomenon” 
Accordingly, the formal concept analysis follows the following procedure: (a) Since 
the data is preserved for the most part in natural language, it is possible to reconstruct 
incorrect or missing concepts in the preconceptions of the participants (e.g., 
decomposition of light instead of color dispersion; a biological reflex instead of a 
physical reflex) and then discover any exceptional concepts participants used. (b) 
The whole of semantic surface features are preserved and can be compared. This 
allows us to, e.g., distinguish between participants with a low and high amount of 
prior knowledge. (c) Since concept “volume” is defined by all objects which can be 
reached by downward lines (see Figure 4.1), we are able to reconstruct which 
participants used, e.g., the concept “raindrop” (only 9 of the 12 participants). (d) We 
are able to analyze special questions (sections) in detail, e.g. what characterized the 
preconceptions of the participants who used the concept “rainbow figure” – two used 
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“refraction” (RSS, CMA) and one also used “reflexion” (RSS). However, no one 
used “dispersion,” “perception,” “sensibility for light,” or “solar radiation.” Research 
designs with more than one point of measurement would allow very interesting 
content-based comparisons of changes. 
Analysis II: Surface, matching, deep structure (SMD) 
The advent of powerful and flexible computer technology enabled us to develop and 
implement a computer-based analysis approach which is based on the theory of 
mental models and graph theory (Chartrand, 1977). SMD uses three core measures 
for describing and analyzing externalized mental models (Ifenthaler, 2010c). 
Additional measures are applied for an in-depth analysis (Ifenthaler, et al., in press). 
SMD requires for the assessed data to be stored pairwise (vertex-edge-vertex) for 
further analysis procedures. If the required data format is available (see Table 4.1), 
the raw data can be stored on an SQL (structured query language) database and the 
automated analysis procedure can be initiated by the researcher. 
TABLE 4.1 
Example of pair-wise raw data 
ID vertex 1 vertex 2 edge subject number 
001 Licht Ausbreitung ! 912abz3 
001 Licht Spalt - 912abz3 
… … … … … 
 
As a result, SMD generates three core measures, additional measures, and 
standardized graphical re-representations of the previously externalized mental 
models. These re-representations are concept map-like images with named nodes and 
named links (e.g., Figure 4.2). 
FIGURE 4.2. SMD re-representation of data shown in Table 1 
The core measures are composed of three levels – surface, matching, and deep 
structure. The surface structure measures the size of the externalized model, 
computed as the sum of all propositions (vertex-edge-vertex). It is defined between 0 
(no propositions) and n. The computed surface structure of the re-represented model 
in Figure 4.2 would result in θ = 3. The pedagogical purpose is to identify additions 
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or removals of vertices (growth or decline of the graph) as compared to previous 
knowledge representations and track change over time. 
 In order to analyze the complexity of an externalized model, Ifenthaler 
(2010c) introduced the matching structure µ. It is computed as the diameter of the 
spanning tree of an externalized model and can lie between 0 (no links) and n. The 
complexity indicator of the re-represented model in Figure 4.2 would result in µ = 2. 
The pedagogical purpose is to identify how broad (complex) the learner’s 
understanding of the underlying subject matter is. 
 Whereas the two above described measures focus on analyzing the 
organization or structure of an externalized model, the deep structure measures its 
semantic content. It is computed with the help of the similarity measure (Tversky, 
1977) as the semantic similarity between an externalized model and a reference 
model (e.g., expert solution, conceptual model, etc.). The measure is defined between 
0 (no similarity) and 1 (full similarity). The pedagogical purpose is to identify the 
correct use of specific propositions (concept-link-concept), i.e. concepts correctly 
related to each other. Additionally, misconceptions can be identified for a specific 
subject domain by comparing known misconceptions (as propositions) to individual 
knowledge representations. 
 
FIGURE 4.3. SMD reference (1), learner (2), cutaway (3), and discrepancy (4) re-representations 
In addition to the core measures, further graph theory based indicators are applied to 
more precisely describe the externalized mental models. With regard to analyzing the 
organization of the externalized models, Ifenthaler and colleagues (in press) 
	   47 
introduced the measures connectedness, ruggedness, cyclic, average degree of 
vertices, density of vertices and structural matching.  
1. The indicator connectedness analyses how closely the nodes and links of the 
externalized model are related to each other. The connectedness measure of 
the re-represented model in Figure 2 would result in φ = 1 (it is possible to 
reach every node from every other node). From educational point of view, a 
strongly connected knowledge representation could indicate a subjective 
deeper understanding of the underlying subject matter. 
2. Ruggedness indicates whether non-linked vertices of an externalized model 
exist, and if so it computes the sum of all submodels (a submodel is part of 
the externalization but has no link to the “main” model). The pedagogical 
purpose is to identify possible non-linked concepts, subgraphs or missing 
links within the knowledge representation which could point to a lesser 
subjective understanding of the phenomenon in question.  
3. The measure cyclic is an indicator for the closeness of associations of the 
vertices and edges used. A cycle is defined as a path returning back to the 
start vertex of the starting edge of an externalized model. A cycle in the re-
represented model in Figure 4.2 would be: Licht – Ausbreitung – Spalt – 
Licht. 
4. The average degree of vertices measure is computed as the average degree of 
all incoming and outgoing edges.  
5. The density of vertices indicator describes the quotient of concepts per vertex 
within a graph. Graphs which only connect pairs of concepts can be 
considered weak models; a medium density is expected for most good 
working models.  
6. The structural matching measure compares the complete structures of two 
graphs without regard to their content. This measure is necessary for all 
hypotheses which make assumptions about general features of structure (e.g., 
assumptions which state that expert knowledge is structured differently from 
novice knowledge).  
  
The pedagogical purpose of these measures is to identify the strength of closeness of 
associations of the knowledge representation. Knowledge representations which only 
connect pairs of concepts can be considered weak; a medium density is expected for 
	   48 
most good working knowledge representations. The additional semantic indicator 
vertex matching analyzes the use of semantically correct single concepts compared to 
a reference model. This measures is also used in the classic MITOCAR analysis 
procedure (see Pirnay-Dummer & Ifenthaler, 2010). The pedagogical purpose is to 
identify the correct use of specific concepts (e.g., technical concepts). The absence of 
a great number of concepts with regard to a reference representation indicates a less 
elaborated domain specific knowledge representation. 
 For an in-depth qualitative analysis, SMD automatically generates 
standardized re-representations. Figure 4.3 shows an example of a reference (1), 
learner (2), cutaway (3), and discrepancy (4) re-representation which also function as 
feedback within learning environments (Ifenthaler, 2009). These re-representations 
highlight semantically correct vertices (compared to a reference representation) as 
circles (ellipses for dissimilar vertices). 
 Various experimental studies on different subject domains have confirmed 
the high reliability and validity of the SMD (see T. E. Johnson, et al., 2006). 
Ifenthaler (2010c) reports test-retest reliability for SMD measures as follows: surface 
structure, r = .824, matching structure, r = .815, and deep structure, r = .901. Also 
convergent and divergent validity has been successfully tested (see Ifenthaler, 
2010c). 
Comparative study 
This initial comparative study determines conceptual and empirical strengths and 
limitations of the above described approaches for analyzing externalized mental 
models – QFCA and SMD. In order to have identical data available, we conducted a 
study (pre-post design) in physics and theology with high school students. This 
section introduces briefly the study’s methodology. 
Subjects 
The 12 participants (9 female, 3 male) of the reported pilot study were students in the 
10th grade from a traditional high school in Europe. Their mean age was 15.25 years 
(SD = .45), mean score CFT 20-R intelligence test = 106.92 (SD = 9.89). There were 
nine members of religious communities among the participants. Eight are active in 
their communities and eleven have religious interests. The participants volunteered 
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in response to an advertisement posted at their school. After finishing the study each 
participant was given a reward of 20 Euros. 
Materials 
The overall design (see Figure 4.4) included an assessment of the preconceptions of 
the participants in physics and theology, which began with a free association test 
with scenic pictures of rainbows (physics) and tsunami (religion) which served as an 
“ice-breaker-function” for the topic. This was followed by word problems with 
written text protocols and a dependant measure of the same problems from the test of 
causal models (TCM, Al-Diban, 2008). The participants were assessed according to 
relevant traits like intelligence with the standardized test of intelligence CFT 20-R 
(Weiß, 2006). The culture fair test measures the fluid intelligence factor with figural 
material, which is a substantial indicator for inductive reasoning and flexibility of 
thinking. Relevant learning strategies were assessed with LIST (Wild, 2000). 
Additionally, we used the standardized Neo-FFI test (Borkenau & Ostendorf, 2006) 
to examine general self-concept, self-perceived self-efficiency (Schwarzer & 
Jerusalem, 1999), and personality. Furthermore, the assessment contained a test on 
domain specific declarative knowledge in physics and religion. Demographic data of 
the participants were documented in an informal questionnaire. 
Assessment: Test for causal models (TCM) 
This assessment instrument was developed in order to realize the postulated 
theoretical functions of mental models, such as high individuality, phenomenon 
relatedness, situational permanence, reduction of complexity, and knowledge gain 
(Al-Diban, 2008). The standardized TCM (Test for Causal Models) is a combination 
of the Structure Formation Technique (Scheele & Groeben, 1984) and Causal 
Diagrams (Funke, 1990) and is a practicable method for discovering structure which 
is in line with the theory of mental models. The participants have to transform their 
answers into subjectively relevant causal sequences of if-then relations or cause-
consequence relations of the problem and its preconditions. The connections between 
single concepts represent the subjective causal thinking in a broad sense (van der 
Meer & Schmidt, 1992). A guided practice session in which the participants 
construct an example is provided in order to improve their competence in using the 
TCM. For the data assessment phase we used the computer based software MaNET 
(Mannheim Network Elaboration Technique, Reh, 2007) to enhance the usability for 
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the participants and to allow a standardized data processing for the subsequent 
analysis process. Additionally, we used the purpose-built graph to context interface 
(GTC, Al-Diban & Stark, 2007)  to export the assessed data and make them available 
to both analysis approaches, QFCA and SMD. 
Procedure 
All participants visited a learning lab at a European university on two subsequent 
days. The assessment procedure took three hours per day. The first part of the 
assessment consisted of a free association test, a demonstration of some slides with 
photographs of rainbows and life-threatening diseases. The participants had to write 
down all concepts they were spontaneously able to remember. All concrete 
problems, three in physics and three in religion, were measured twice: first as an 
open problem with transcribed text protocols from the teach back interview and 
second as a dependant measure which was constructed around these answers with the 
TCM. This test was conducted on laptops using the software MaNET. The working 
time was limited to 20 minutes. The participants had the task of depicting their 
answers with the help of a test of causal models (TCM) comprised of concepts and 
causal relations. The other traits measured in this test are shown in Figure 4.4. 
 
FIGURE 4.4. Research design 
 
On the one hand the two different topics – light models in physics and disease 
models in biology in combination with religion – were oriented toward the 
curriculum and the courses of instruction. On the other hand, these topics should 
represent two very different knowledge domains. This allows us to compare the 
mental model representations of the same persons in very different knowledge 
domains. It should be emphasized that the results of this initial study are descriptive 
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single cases only and not valid for a greater population group and general 
educational implications. 
Results 
The data collected in our study were analyzed with QFCA and SMD separately. 
Therefore, we describe our results in two separate sections and then compare the 
results of both analysis approaches. The “expert models” and “correct model 
concepts” applied to evaluate the semantic criteria of objective plausibility were 
developed with the help of specialists in physics education and theology. The expert 
models resulted in a rainbow (11 propositions), crack experiment (12 propositions), 
light electrical effect, (10 propositions) and disease situation model (18 
propositions). The “correct model concepts” represent key concepts and are a 
precondition for understanding each phenomenon correctly. In all cases, the criteria 
of objective plausibility are dependent on the semantic correspondence of the student 
model to the propositions of the expert model.  
 As far as the measured traits are concerned, there was a negative correlation r 
= -.625* between the trait “agreeableness” (Neo-FFI) and knowledge on the level of 
concepts in physics but no significant correlation with concepts concerning the 
disease problem. The objective plausibility of all three model representations to 
physical problems together (sum of all the physic problems) and the learning strategy 
“critical thinking” shows a high and significant correlation r = .869**, such as with 
“openness for new experiences” r = .707*. This result might indicate that the 
objective plausibility of the investigated physical problems is associated with 
intensive “critical thinking” learning strategies and a high personal “openness for 
new experiences”. 
Qualitative & formal concept analysis (QFCA) 
The QFCA analysis approach includes five quantitative structural measures (count of 
concepts, count of propositions, depth of connectivity, intensity of connections, 
ruggedness) and an in-depth content-based investigation. Table 4.2 shows the results 
of the five quantitative structural measures. On a descriptive level, there are 
remarkable differences between the four problems for the measures count of 
concepts and count of propositions. The other structural measures, intensity of 
connections and ruggedness, show almost equal values with comparable standard 
deviations. The majority of the mental model representations of all problems have a 
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low depth of connectivity, a low intensity of connections, and are not rugged. 
Additionally, the standard deviations show high interindividual differences in the 
“crack experiment” (II) and the “disease problem” (IV) for the measures count of 
concepts and count of propositions. 
TABLE 4.2  
QFCA structural measures 
 DOMAIN M SD Min Max 
I 7.08 2.64 4 13 
II 5.91 3.05 3 14 
III 5.67 1.12 4 7 
count of concepts 
IV 9.09 3.02 6 15 
I 6.75 3.31 3 14 
II 5.45 4.61 1 18 
III 5.3 1.50 3 8 
count of propositions 
IV 12.36 5.68 5 22 
I 1.08 0.16 0.83 1.33 
II 1.0 0.24 0.60 1.36 
III 1.12 0.18 1.00 1.50 
depth of connectivity 
IV 1.39 0.27 1.00 1.89 
I 0.34 0.11 0.18 0.5 
II 0.39 0.16 0.19 0.67 
III 0.43 0.16 0.33 0.83 
intensity of connections 
IV 0.35 0.10 0.18 0.53 
I 1.25 0.45 1 2 
II 1.27 0.65 1 3 
III 1.00 0.16 1 1 
ruggedness 
IV 1.00 0.00 1 1 
Note: DOMAIN: I = rainbow experiment (N=12), II = crack experiment (N=10), III = electrical 
effect experiment (N=9), IV = disease situation (N=12) 
In the next step, we analyzed the results for generic conceptss and propositions and 
determined to what extent they corresponded to the expert models (see Table 4.3).  
TABLE 4.3  
Content based similarity measures between participant and expert solutions 
 DOMAIN M SD Min Max 
I 51.09 19.65 22.2 80 
II 33.70 38.22 0 100 
III 28.94 23.58 0 66.7 
relative objective 
plausibility [propositions 
in %] 
IV 45.8 26.70 5.2 100 
I 3.08 1.24 2 6 
II 1.20 1.03 0 3 
III 1.44 1.24 0 4 
abs. objective plausibility 
[prop., max.11/12/10/18] 
IV 4.50 1.45 1 6 
I 1.17 0.94 0 3 
II 1.10 0.74 0 2 
III 0.88 0.78 0 2 
correct model concepts 
[6/7/8/20] 
IV 3.50 1.17 2 5 
Note: DOMAIN: I = rainbow experiment (N=12), II = crack experiment (N=10), III = electrical 
effect experiment (N=9), IV = disease situation (N=12) 
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Focusing the averages of the match with the expert models - relative and absolute 
objective plausibility - can be called small in general. The minimum of most 
semantic criteria represents the mental models to the physic problem (III) “light 
electrical effect”. This problem seems to be most difficult for the participants. The 
solutions to the biology & theology problem “disease situation” were slightly more 
competent. The use of correct model concepts is very low for all problem solutions, 
too. This indicates that the participants did not possess sufficient concept knowledge, 
which is a precondition for mental models with high objective plausibility. 
FIGURE 4.5. Comparison of participants for domain specific problem (I) 
 
It is easy to see which of the correct model concepts from the expert model are 
present and which are absent. Basically, the preconceptions are based solely on the 
radiation model. The absent correct concepts are “diffraction,” “dispersion,” “light 
rays”, and a “constant color spectrum” in contrast to the simple concept “colors.” 
These mental model representations contain no elements to explain its color 
spectrum. Instead, some participants worked with the “figure of rainbow” and tried 
to find explanations for this. 
 In addition, QFCA allows content based comparisons of the single cases with 
small groups (see Figure 4.6). Clearly, the participants CKJ and CMA show more 
knowledge then the participants LSM and CHS. Moreover, this method displays the 
data in such a way that the content becomes obvious. In a comparison of participants 
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CHS and CMA – Figure 4.6 – there is empirical evidence, that they share all five 
concepts used by CHS. But CMA was able to supplement his preconceptions with 
adequate concepts like “intensity of light” and “refraction” and also spent time 
thinking about “figure of rainbow,” “observer,” and the colors “blue,” “green,” and 
“red.”  
	   	  
	   	  
 
FIGURE 4.6. Four single cases domain specific problem (I) 
 
In summary, QFCA can be a useful tool for making empirically based conclusions 
about mental model representations for single cases and small groups. It makes the 
content-based quality of preconceptions and special areas of interest easy to evaluate. 
With the help of data from more than one measurement point, conceptual changes 
become better and more accurately observable too. 
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Surface, matching, deep structure (SMD) 
The automated analysis procedure of SMD generates the above described 
quantitative measures. The results for the three physics domains and biology & 
religion domain are presented in Table 4.4 and 4.5. As can be seen by the frequencies 
and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov one-sample tests, we found no interindividual 
differences between the subjects, except for the measures connectedness and 
ruggedness in the first physics domain (rainbow experiment), and for the measure 
cyclic in the biology & religion domain (disease situation).  
TABLE 4.4 
Structural SMD measures 
 DOMAIN M SD Min Max KS-Z p 
I 14.25 7.26 1.00 26.00 .39 .998 
II 16.50 13.29 3.00 42.00 .53 .942 
III 5.56 1.42 3.00 8.00 .71 .692 
surface structure 
IV 12.42 6.36 5.00 27.00 .59 .872 
I 4.92 1.93 1.00 7.00 .67 .761 
II 3.90 1.52 2.00 7.00 .55 .923 
III 3.67 .71 3.00 5.00 .82 .520 
matching structure 
IV 5.00 1.95 3.00 10.00 .77 .601 
I 0.92 .29 0 1 1.84 .002*
* II 1 0 1 1 - - 
III 1 0 1 1 - - 
connectedness 
IV 1 0 1 1 - - 
I 1.08 .29 1 2 1.84 .002*
* II 1 0 1 1 - - 
III 1 0 1 1 - - 
ruggedness 
IV 1 0 1 1 - - 
I .58 .51 0 1 1.29 .070 
II .4 .52 0 1 1.20 .110 
III .44 .53 0 1 1.07 .204 
cyclic 
IV .75 .45 0 1 1.59 .013* 
I 1.89 .27 1.5 2.29 .80 .542 
II 1.73 .46 1 2.43 .38 .999 
III 1.83 .26 1.5 2.29 .69 .723 
average degree of vertices 
IV 2.29 .44 1.67 3.14 .44 .991 
I .51 .19 .22 1.00 .55 .925 
II .40 .21 .19 .78 .79 .546 
III .39 .13 .10 .50 .71 .699 
density of vertices 
IV .31 .14 .10 .50 .95 .328 
I 14.67 6.53 2.00 27.00 .57 .897 
II 11.80 6.34 5.00 26.00 .67 .761 
III 5.78 1.20 4.00 7.00 .72 .678 
structural matching 
IV 9.92 3.20 6.00 14.00 .78 .577 
Note: DOMAIN: I = rainbow experiment (N=12), II = crack experiment (N=10), III = electrical 
effect experiment (N=9); IV = disease situation (N=12);KS-Z = Kolmogorov-Smirnov one-sample 
test; * p < .05; ** p < .01 
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In order to locate differences between the four domains, we computed conservative 
Kruskal-Wallis H-Tests. The frequencies of the surface structure between the 
domains were significantly different, χ2 (3, N = 43) = 11.40, p > .05. We also found 
significant differences for the measures structural matching, χ2 (3, N = 43) = 14.80, 
p > .05, vertex matching, χ2 (3, N = 43) = 19.42, p > .001, and propositional 
matching, χ2 (3, N = 43) = 11.36, p > .01. However, we found no significant 
differences for the remaining measures.  
TABLE 4.5 
Semantic SMD measures 
 DOMAIN M SD Min Max KS-Z p 
I 12.50 5.50 1.00 21.00 .95 .330 
II 10.70 6.17 3.00 24.00 .66 .777 
III 3.00 1.32 1.00 5.00 .66 .778 
vertex matching 
IV 6.50 3.12 3.00 11.00 .71 .693 
I 14.00 7.09 1.00 25.00 .48 .974 
II 15.80 12.84 3.00 40.00 .64 .811 
III 5.11 1.62 3.00 8.00 .54 .932 
deep structure (propositional 
matching) 
IV 10.83 4.78 4.00 18.00 .78 .579 
Note: DOMAIN: I = rainbow experiment (N=12), II = crack experiment (N=10), III = electrical 
effect experiment (N=9); IV = disease situation (N=12);KS-Z = Kolmogorov-Smirnov one-sample 
test; * p < .05; ** p < .01 
 
Besides the descriptive measures (see Table 4.4 and 4.5), SMD compares the 
individual representations with an expert representation (see Table 4.6 and 4.7).  
TABLE 4.6 
SMD similarity measures (structure) between participant and expert solutions 
 DOMAIN M SD Min Max KS-Z p 
I .682 .260 .06 1.00 .550 .923 
II .546 .244 .21 .93 .758 .614 
III .427 .109 .23 .62 .711 .692 
surface structure 
IV .388 .199 .16 .84 .594 .872 
I .729 .239 .25 1.00 .706 .701 
II .711 .213 .40 1.00 .510 .958 
III .844 .155 .60 1.00 .860 .450 
matching structure 
IV .654 .166 .43 .86 .670 .760 
I .778 .160 .41 .93 .797 .548 
II .687 .204 .36 .99 .698 .714 
III .622 .209 .16 .79 .708 .699 
density of vertices 
IV .715 .214 .36 1.00 .551 .922 
I .564 .142 .29 .86 .556 .917 
II .731 .143 .50 1.00 .547 .926 
III .871 .113 .67 1.00 .645 .799 
structural matching 
IV .592 .099 .40 .80 1.039 .230 
Note: DOMAIN: I = rainbow experiment, II = crack experiment, III = electrical effect experiment; 
IV = disease situation; KS-Z = Kolmogorov-Smirnov one-sample test; * p < .05; ** p < .01 
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The comparisons are described with the help of the Tversky similarity (0 = no 
similarity; 1 = total similarity). Our analysis revealed interindividual differences in 
the three physics domains for the measure propositional matching. For all other 
measures, we found no interindividual differences between our subjects (see Table 
4.6 and 4.7). Regarding the differences between the subject domains, the Kruskal-
Wallis H-Test revealed significant differences between the measures surface 
structure, χ2 (3, N = 43) = 10.26, p > .05, structural matching, χ2 (3, N = 43) = 20.53, 
p > .001, and vertex matching, χ2 (3, N = 43) = 19.37, p > .001. 
TABLE 4.7 
SMD similarity measures (semantics) between participant and expert solutions 
 DOMAIN M SD Min Max KS-Z p 
I .096 .076 .00 .27 .781 .575 
II .104 .077 .00 .27 .837 .486 
III .243 .080 .17 .42 .570 .901 
vertex matching 
IV .159 .050 .05 .23 .629 .824 
I .010 .024 .00 .07 1.720 .005*
* II .011 .035 .00 .11 1.657 .008*
* III .024 .049 .00 .12 1.409 .038* 
deep structure (propositional 
matching) 
IV .035 .042 .00 .11 1.029 .240 
Note: DOMAIN: I = rainbow experiment, II = crack experiment, III = electrical effect experiment; 
IV = disease situation; KS-Z = Kolmogorov-Smirnov one-sample test; * p < .05; ** p < .01 
 
In addition to the above reported quantitative measures, SMD enables us to 
automatically create cutaway and discrepancy re-representations for qualitative 
analysis. These standardized re-representations could be used for an in-depth 
analysis of the individual re-representations (see Figure 4.3).  
 The quite elaborated cutaway re-representation in Figure 4.7 includes all 
vertices and edges of the subject. Compared to the reference re-representation (expert 
solution of the crack experiment question) seven vertices are semantically correct 
(vertices as circles). However, there are also seven vertices which are incorrect 
compared to the expert solution. Additionally, the cutaway re-representation reveals 
that the student’s understanding of the phenomenon in question is not fully 
connected (2 submodels). Furthermore, the re-representation includes three circles. 
However, these circles include incorrect vertices (e.g. farben-rot-regenbogen-grün-
farben). 
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FIGURE 4.7. SMD cutaway re-representation, domain II (crack experiment)  
Pedagogical implications 
The primary purpose of this initial study was to compare the methodological range of 
QFCA and SMD. However, we briefly discuss the results from an educational point 
of view. Results from both analysis approaches show that the structural and semantic 
measures highlight important changes of the assessed knowledge representations. 
The structural measures of QFCA (e.g., count of concepts) and SMD (e.g., surface 
structure) show remarkable differences between the four subject domains. For the 
electrical effect experiment, we found significant less concepts in the subjects’ 
representations. The semantic measures (QFCA: correct model concepts; SMD: 
vertex matching, deep structure) show that the learners are far from using correct 
concepts compared to experts. Hence, the subjects of this initial study are still in their 
initial stage of the learning process. An instructional intervention would now focus 
on missing concepts or misconceptions found in the individual re-representation 
(e.g., Figure 4.7) and/or structural conspicuities (e.g., many submodels).  
Comparison of QFCA and SMD analysis approaches 
Using the same set of data, we were able to conduct an in-depth investigation of both 
analysis approaches. Minor differences in the results are caused by the 
transformation of the participant’s data into a raw data file. Hence, further studies 
should also focus on various assessment techniques and available interfaces to 
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analysis approaches to identify their strength and weaknesses as well. Although both 
analysis methods work quite well and produce a lot of indicators, there are several 
difficulties and differences to report.  
 The first point concerns the placement (classification) of the indicators in 
relation to the mental model results. This is essential not only to compare the 
empirical results of different indicators but also to compare results of different 
studies. A precondition for this point is to find arithmetic similarities between the 
analysis indicators (see Table 4.8). Although the quantitative measures should be 
equal, the values differ. After intensive checking we found that the export function of 
the assessment technique was not accurately exporting the raw data. Therefore, the 
quantitative measures differ minimally. The QFCA method uses the assessed data 
directly; for SMD we used the imprecise exported data.  
TABLE 4.8 
Comparison of indicators, scientific quality, and exploratory power of both analysis 
approaches 
 QFCA SMD 
Quantitative 
measures 
count of concepts & propositions 
ruggedness 
structural measures 
semantic measures 
various graph theory measures (e.g., 
ruggedness, cyclic) 
Qualitative 
measures 
relative objective plausibility 
absolute objective plausibility 
 correct model concepts 
standardized re-representations 
cutaway- and discrepancy re-
representations 
Objectivity semi-automated analysis raw data based algorithms  
automated analysis of predefined 
raw data structure 
Reliability partly tested (see Al-Diban, 2002) tested (see Ifenthaler, 2010c) 
Validity not tested  tested (see Ifenthaler, 2010c) 
Areas of 
application 
limited comparisons 
single case analysis 
small group analysis 
unlimited comparisons 
single case analysis 
large group analysis 
stochastic analysis 
Advantages and 
limitations 
semi-automated analysis 
structural decomposition into 5 
formal categories 
recomposition into 3 content-based 
criteria 
automated analysis 
structural decomposition into 3 key 
categories 
recomposition into “re- 
representations”  
 
Second, the scientific quality criteria objectivity, reliability, and validity should be 
checked and reported. The analysis step of qualitative restructuring of data in QFCA 
to find generic concepts and propositions is not wholly objective and characterized 
by degrees of freedom. 
 A third point is concerned with the areas of application for research and 
practice. These areas are limited in QFCA and almost unlimited in SMD. This great 
advantage of SMD is bought at the price of limitations in precision and the 
pedagogical information value of the highly aggregated criteria. Due to its automated 
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analysis, SMD is especially at an advantage for applications in pedagogical practice, 
where results are needed as quickly as possible. The QFCA results were analyzed 
with the help of coders, which is time consuming. 
Conclusions and future developments 
Basic questions of a reliable and valid diagnosis of mental models are not solved 
completely (see Ifenthaler, 2008). This article focuses on the quality of two analysis 
approaches, a matter in which there is a major lack of systematic research, and in 
which one seldom finds scientific criteria like objectivity, reliability, and validity (T. 
E. Johnson, et al., 2006). Actually, there is a lack of stochastic modelling concerning 
the analysis methods of the mental models approach, especially for content-based 
data. 
 Future research with bigger samples should focus on (a) the comparison of 
available assessment and analysis approaches, and (b) on the observation of 
processes of learning-dependent change (e.g., Ifenthaler, et al., in press). In this way, 
different types of subjective mental models could be identified and classified. When 
more is known about the modes by which mental model representations change, it 
will become possible to increase the individual specificity and efficiency of 
instructional designs (see Ifenthaler, 2008). Both described analysis approaches, 
QFCA and SMD, are applicable to different knowledge domains. Disadvantages of 
QFCA might be its capacity for no more than about small groups, or its inability to 
analyze complex knowledge representation contents. Hence, the approach is labor 
intensive and there is a need for further service interfaces. In contrast, SMD proved 
to be highly economical due to its automated process. The integration of the SMD 
analysis features into a new web-based research platform, HIMATT (Highly 
Integrated Model Assessment Technology and Tools) with graphical and text-based 
assessment and analysis techniques is a consequent and forward-looking approach 
(see Pirnay-Dummer, et al., 2010). A further development of HIMATT could also 
include the QFCA approach. These future developments will open up new 
opportunities for continuing research on mental models and lead to new instructional 
implications. 
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5 
HIGHLY INTEGRATED MODEL ASSESSMENT 
TECHNOLOGY AND TOOLS & 
There has been little progress in the area of practical measurement and assessment, due in part to the 
lack of automated tools that are appropriate for assessing the acquisition and development of complex 
cognitive skills and structures. In the last two years, an international team of researchers has 
developed and validated an integrated set of assessment tools called HIMATT (Highly Integrated 
Model Assessment Technology and Tools) which addresses this deficiency. HIMATT is Web-based 
and has been shown to scale up for practical use in educational and workplace settings, unlike many 
of the research tools developed solely to study basic issues in human learning and performance. In this 
chapter, the functions of HIMATT are described and several applications for its use are demonstrated. 
Additionally, two studies on the quality and usability of HIMATT are presented. The chapter 
concludes with research suggestions for the use of HIMATT and for its further development. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
& This chapter is based on: Pirnay-Dummer, P., Ifenthaler, D., & Spector, J. M. (2010). Highly 
integrated model assessment technology and tools. Educational Technology Research and 
Development, 58(1), 3-18. doi: 10.1007/s11423-009-9119-8 
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Introduction 
Knowledge is at the center of all cognition. Knowledge is constructed by internal 
representation processes (e.g., mental models, schemata). Knowledge is activated 
and deployed through the use of external re-representation processes (e.g., concept 
maps, diagrams, verbal discourse). This means that models used for representation 
and re-representation are critical in nearly all decision making and problem solving 
activities. Moreover, representation and re-presentation processes are critical for 
learning and instruction.  However, how models can be developed and deployed 
effectively and efficiently to support learning, performance, and instruction is not 
well understood. One impediment to progress has been the lack of appropriate 
assessment tools that establish meaningful inferential links between external re-
presentations and internal representations.  
 Previously, tools to support research into mental model development and the 
acquisition of skilled performance required a great deal of time and effort on the part 
of highly trained researchers (e.g., think-aloud protocol analysis). As a result, such 
assessment tools have been limited to basic research and have not had an impact on 
practical issues such as the design of effective instructional systems and learning 
environments. The desire to have practical assessment tools that are useful for 
improving learning, performance, and instruction has motivated significant 
developments in the last several years (Ifenthaler, 2008). Techniques such as the 
structure formation technique (Bonato, 1990; Scheele & Groeben, 1984), concept 
mapping (Cañas, et al., 2004; Novak, 1998; Nückles, Gurlitt, Pabst, & Renkl, 2004; 
Spector, 2006; Spector, Dennen, & Koszalka, 2006), or the test for causal diagrams 
(Al-Diban, 2008) use graphical representations for assessment purposes. For 
language-oriented assessment, the thinking aloud protocol (Ericsson & Simon, 1993, 
1998) and MITOCAR (Pirnay-Dummer & Ifenthaler, 2010) have been developed for 
quantifying verbal data. Other assessment tools have been automated, such as 
Pathfinder (Schvaneveldt, 1990), but only a few of these tools are fully automated, 
including automation of both the elicitation and the analysis processes involved in 
assessing learning and performance. One tool that is fully automated is the SMD 
Technology: Structure, Matching, Deep Structure (Ifenthaler, 2010c), which is 
included together with several compatible tools in HIMATT (Highly Integrated 
Model Assessment Technology and Tools). The HIMATT tools have been 
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developed, implemented, studied, and systematically validated within numerous 
international research collaboration studies (T. E. Johnson, et al., 2006). After the 
cross-validation of the different individual tools that are now integrated in HIMATT, 
the researchers involved noted that these various tools were based on different but 
compatible methodologies; furthermore, they were implemented differently on 
diverse platforms. However, the underlying approach was quite similar and the 
notion of using external representations to determine how well internal 
representations were being developed ran through all these tools. The idea was then 
born to create a comprehensive toolset which combines and further automates these 
state-of-the-art model-based assessment methodologies.  
 Automation is particularly important when we think about applications in the 
field. As long as the tools are not automated and accessible to practitioners (e.g., 
teachers, instructional designers, trainers), they will only be used in prototype and 
research settings but not in the real-world applications. Feasible instruments that can 
help track the development of knowledge and skill of many individuals without 
excessive cost and effort are especially important when we apply the methodologies 
to time series experiments to systematically track changes over time (Ifenthaler, 
2008; Ifenthaler & Seel, 2005) or if we use them to show effects within a series of 
interventions (Ifenthaler, 2010d; T. E. Johnson, et al., 2009).  
 HIMATT (Highly Integrated Model Assessment Technology and Tools) is a 
new combined toolset which accounts for all of these constraints. It was developed to 
convey the benefits of each methodological approach into one environment which 
can be used by researchers with only little prior training. It is implemented to run on 
the Web, thus presenting all content on a standard Web browser to both the 
researchers and the subjects. 
Theoretical foundation 
Every implemented technology in HIMATT has its own theoretical background. This 
was one of the most important criteria in the decision as to which methodology 
should be used for HIMATT.  
 DEEP (Dynamic Enhanced Evaluation of Problem Solving) was developed 
specifically to assess progress of learning towards expert-like performance in 
domains involving complex and ill-structured problems, such as engineering design, 
environmental planning, and medical diagnosis (Spector & Koszalka, 2004). DEEP 
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was inspired by causal influence diagrams – a knowledge elicitation technique used 
by system dynamicists when developing simulation models for complex systems. In 
DEEP, a variation of causal influence diagrams called annotated causal concept maps 
is used to elicit a conceptualization of how an individual (or small group of persons) 
is thinking about a problem situation. The method involves identifying representative 
problems and then presenting them to respondents who are first asked to identify and 
describe the five or ten key factors influencing the problem situation. Problem 
respondents are then asked to identify and describe the relationships that exist among 
these key factors. These external representations can be compared with those of 
experts in a number of ways to see if learners are improving their representations 
over time and through instruction and beginning to think more like domain experts. 
DEEP only automated the process of eliciting the representation; in its first 
incarnation it did not automate the analysis, although the analytical methods used by 
Spector and Koszalka (2004) are completely compatible with those of the next two 
tools we describe (one of the motivations for integrating these tools). 
 MITOCAR (Model Inspection Trace of Concepts and Relations) and T-
MITOCAR (Text-MITOCAR) have a background in mental model theory (Johnson-
Laird, 1983; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991; Seel, 1991), association psychology 
(Davis, 1990; Lewin, 1922; McCoon & Ratcliff, 1992; McNamara, 1992, 1994; 
Stachowiak, 1979), and linguistics (Frazier, 1999; Pollio, 1966; Russel & Jenkins, 
1954). Both MITOCAR and T-MITOCAR rely on the dependence of syntax and 
semantics within natural language and use the associative features of text as a 
methodological heuristic to represent knowledge from text sources. Unlike tools 
from Web ontologies and the semantic Web (Ding, 2001), MITOCAR and T-
MITOCAR can work on a comparably small amount of text (350 words +). 
 SMD and MITOCAR both combine analysis and comparison functions based 
on graph theory (Bollobàs, 1998; Tutte, 2001), set theory (Jech, 2007), model theory 
(Rothmaler, 2000), and similarity distribution measures (Kruskal, 1964; Tversky, 
1977). SMD also contains foundations for the measurement of change (e.g., Collins 
& Sayer, 2001; Harris, 1963; Ifenthaler, 2008; Ifenthaler & Seel, 2005). 
 Methodologically, the tools integrated into HIMATT touch the boundaries of 
qualitative and quantitative research methods and provide bridges between them. On 
the one hand, text can be analyzed very quickly without loosening the associative 
strength of natural language (MITOCAR and T-MITOCAR). Furthermore, 
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conceptual graphs can be annotated by experts (DEEP). All of the data, regardless of 
how it is assessed, can be analyzed quantitatively with the same comparison 
functions for all built-in tools without further manual effort or recoding. 
Additionally, HIMATT generates standardized images of text and graphical 
representations. 
HIMATT architecture 
The HIMATT architecture consists of two major platforms: a) HIMATT Research 
Engine and b) HIMATT Subject Environment. Functions for conducting and 
analyzing experiments are implemented within the HIMATT Research Engine. 
These functions include 1) Experiment Management, 2) Researcher Management, 3) 
Subjects Management, 4) View Function, and 5) Analysis and Compare Function. 
The HIMATT Subject Environment dynamically provides assigned experiments to 
individual subjects. 
 HIMATT has been implemented and runs on a Web server using Apache, 
MySQL (MY Sequential Query Language), and PERL (Practical Extraction and 
Report Language), plus additional packages such as GraphViz (Ellson, et al., 2003). 
Experiment management 
The core unit in HIMATT is the experiment, which can be laid out flexibly by the 
researcher. Experiments in HIMATT consist of three assessment modules: (1) DEEP, 
(2) T-MITOCAR, and (3) MITOCAR as well as an INSTRUCTION module which 
is used to give the subject instructions and explanations (see Figure 5.1). The 
instructions are texts which may contain HTML code (e.g., to link pictures, videos, 
or other objects). Thus, they may also be used to present simple interventions to the 
subjects between the assessments, although this option is not very well developed. 
Besides mandatory labels and names for experiments, the researcher can add meta-
information about them. This helps to identify the purpose of the experiment and 
quickly select from a large number of experiments with the help of a search function. 
Figure 5.1 shows an experiment in which three modules have been laid out. The 
sequence of this sample experiment is as follows: 1) introduction to the subject, 
where the purpose of the experiment and additional information is presented; 2) the 
T-MITOCAR module, where the subject is asked to write a statement of at least 350 
words; 3) an “outro,” where the subject gets further information after completing the 
experiment. The number and sequence of modules and the content of all subject 
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information can be changed any time. Once an experiment is laid out completely, 
subjects may be assigned to the experiments with the subject management function. 
 
 
FIGURE 5.1. HIMATT Experiment Management 
 
Subject management 
The subject management function includes multiple options. First, a researcher can 
add subjects to the HIMATT database. Subject information includes at least a 
username and a password. If a researcher wants to add a large number of subjects, 
HIMATT can automatically generate a specified number of subjects with individual 
usernames and passwords. Additionally, the user can include a prefix to all 
usernames or passwords in order to more easily identify them later on during 
experimentation and analysis procedures. 
 Another important option within the subject management is the assignment of 
subjects to experiments. Once an experiment has been laid out completely and 
subjects have been added to the database, researchers can assign subjects to 
experiments. HIMATT also contains an export function which enables the researcher 
to export all assigned subjects from an experiment onto a spreadsheet. Naturally, all 
subject information can be deleted and changed whenever the researcher wishes. 
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Researcher management 
As scientific experiments are very rarely conducted only by a single researcher, 
HIMATT supports research teams with members assigned to these roles: a) 
HIMATT Administrator, b) HIMATT Researcher, and c) HIMATT Research 
Assistant. Each role comes with permission to use different functions (see Table 5.1). 
TABLE 5.1 
HIMATT roles (X indicates permission) 
Role Sponsor Researchers 
Experiment 
Management 
Subjects 
Management 
View 
Function 
Analysis and 
Compare 
Function 
HIMATT 
Administrator X X X X X 
HIMATT 
Researcher  X X X X 
HIMATT 
Research 
Assistant 
  X X X 
 
Only the HIMATT Administrator can sponsor other researchers and give them 
access to the HIMATT Research Engine and HIMATT Subject Environment. So far, 
the three HIMATT Administrators are the authors of this article. A sponsored 
HIMATT Researcher has permission to create new experiments, add subjects, and 
view and analyze the results of the experiments. 
View function 
The view function presents the knowledge graph as a picture to the researcher. This 
function allows the researcher to choose from specific experiments and knowledge 
graphs, which are then available as PNG (Portable Network Graphics) images for 
download. 
  Depending on the underlying module (DEEP, T-MITOCAR, or MITOCAR) 
the graphs will have different features: annotations for DEEP concept maps, 
associative strengths at the links for T-MITOCAR, and pairwise rated strengths for 
MITOCAR. 
 Essentially, the standardized re-representation is done in the same way for all 
three modules using the pairwise stored information from the database and GraphViz 
(Ellson, et al., 2003). 
 
	   68 
 
FIGURE 5.2. HIMATT sample graph 
 
Analysis and compare function 
The analysis function mainly calculates descriptive measures for the stored 
knowledge representations. These descriptive measures include various structural 
indicators derived from graph theory (Harary, 1974; Hietaniemi, 2008).   
• Connectedness (SMD). Computed as the possibility to reach every node from 
every other node in the knowledge representation (Ifenthaler, et al., in press). 
• Ruggedness (SMD). Computed as the sum of subgraphs which are 
independent or not linked (Ifenthaler, et al., in press). 
• Average degree of vertices (SMD). Computed as the average degree of all 
incoming and outgoing edges of the knowledge representation (Ifenthaler, et 
al., in press). 
• Number of Cycles (SMD). Computed as the sum of all cycles (a path 
returning back to the start node of the starting link) within a knowledge 
representation (Ifenthaler, et al., in press). 
• Vertices, Nodes (SMD). Computed as the sum of all nodes within a 
knowledge representation (Ifenthaler, et al., in press). 
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• Edges, Links (SMD). Computed as the sum of all links within a knowledge 
representation (Ifenthaler, et al., in press). 
 
The measures for comparison can be applied to any undirected graph, not only to re-
representations from MITOCAR and T-MITOCAR. There are six core measures for 
the comparison of conceptual graphs from the SMD Technology (Ifenthaler, 2006, 
2010c) and from MITOCAR (Pirnay-Dummer, 2006). Some of the measures count 
specific features of a given graph. For a given pair of frequencies f1 and f2, the 
similarity is generally derived by this function: 
 
Which results in a measure of 0 ≤ s ≤ 1, where s=0 is complete exclusion and s=1 is 
identity. The other measures collect sets of properties from the graph (e.g., the 
vertices = concepts or the edges = relations). In this case, the Tversky similarity 
(Tversky, 1977) applies for the given sets A and B: 
 
α and β are weights for the difference quantities which separate A and B. They are 
usually equal (α = β = 0.5) when the sources of data are equal. However, they can be 
used to balance different sources systematically (e.g., comparing a learner model 
which was constructed within five minutes to an expert model, which may be an 
illustration of the result of a conference or of a whole book). 
• Surface (SMD). The surface measure (Ifenthaler, 2006, 2010c) compares the 
number of vertices within two graphs. It is a simple and easy way to calculate 
values for surface complexity. 
• Graphical Matching (SMD). The graphical matching (Ifenthaler, 2006, 
2010c) compares the diameters of the spanning trees of the graphs, which is 
an indicator for the range of conceptual knowledge. It corresponds with 
structural matching as it is also a measure for complexity only. 
• Concept Matching (MITOCAR). Concept matching (Pirnay-Dummer & 
Ifenthaler, 2010) compares the sets of concepts (vertices) within a graph to 
determine the use of terms. This measure is especially important for different 
groups which operate in the same domain (e.g., using the same textbook). It 
determines differences in language use between the models. 
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• Density of Vertices (MITOCAR). The density of vertices (Pirnay-Dummer & 
Ifenthaler, 2010) describes the quotient of terms per vertex within a graph. 
Since both graphs which connect every term with each other term (everything 
with everything) and graphs which only connect pairs of terms can be 
considered weak models, a medium density is expected for most good 
working models. 
• Structural Matching (MITOCAR). The structural matching (Pirnay-Dummer 
& Ifenthaler, 2010) compares the complete structures of two graphs without 
regard to their content. This measure is necessary for all hypotheses which 
make assumptions about general features of structure (e.g., assumptions 
which state that expert knowledge is structured differently from novice 
knowledge). 
• Propositional Matching (SMD). The propositional matching (Ifenthaler, 
2006, 2010c) value compares only fully identical propositions between two 
graphs. It is a good measure for quantifying semantic similarity between two 
graphs.  
• Balanced Semantic Matching. The balanced semantic matching uses both 
concepts and propositions to match the semantic potential between two model 
representations. 
 
 
FIGURE 5.3. Compare function including all six HIMATT core measures 
 
The measures are calculated automatically within seconds and are then displayed as 
pairwise sets including the six core measures described above (see Figure 5.3). 
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Additionally, the researcher can download a spreadsheet containing all measures for 
further statistical analysis. 
Subject environment 
Subjects login to another part of the software – the HIMATT Subject Environment. 
If they are only assigned to one experiment, they will be led directly to that 
experiment. If they are assigned to more than one experiment, they choose from a list 
of assigned experiments. In the experiment all instructions and modules are 
presented as laid out by the researcher in the HIMATT Experiment Management 
function. A final screen with a thank you statement marks the end of an experiment 
for the subject. Re-Login is of course possible if further experiments are available for 
the subject. 
 
FIGURE 5.4. Subject environment with DEEP module 
 
Figure 5.4 illustrates the HIMATT Subject Environment, where the subjects create a 
concept map within the DEEP module. Within this module, the subjects can add 
nodes and links to the concept map and annotate them with additional information.  
HIMATT test quality 
Objectivity 
As with all reactive instruments, all assessment parts of HIMATT measure behavior 
previously induced by an intervention, such as instructions to help the subject create 
a concept map or write a text on a given topic. In HIMATT all parts of an experiment 
are standardized for all subjects. The same holds true for all parts of the analysis and 
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comparison. Therefore, HIMATT is completely objective as long as experiments are 
carried out in the designed way. 
Reliability 
HIMATT supports an approximate representation of semantic and symbolic 
cognitive structures, such as schemata and mental models. Reliability will always 
depend on the theoretical construct under investigation. For schemata high reliability 
measures should always be expected because the construct is meant to be stable. 
With mental models, it is a different story. Mental models are on-the-fly 
constructions used to explain unexpected or complex phenomena in the outside 
world; they are believed to be discarded by the system after usage and may be 
involved in the construction of a schema if applied frequently and successfully. 
 However, promising reliability indices exist for most of the instruments 
integrated into HIMATT. For the SMD indices the reliability is reported as r = .82 
for surface structure, r = .82 for graphical matching, and r = .90 for propositional 
matching (Ifenthaler, 2006). For MITOCAR indices the retest reliability is reported 
to be between r = .94 (strength of connectedness measures) and r = .79 (contrast 
measures) for the proximity vector leading to the output graph (Pirnay-Dummer, 
2006). As already mentioned for objectivity, the measurements used to construct the 
graph from a text are not dependent on any interpretation. Therefore, reliability 
comes down to the question as to whether one is able to write the same text twice in 
response to the same task. From an experimental point of view, it is as easy to test 
this as it is to test classic items. Finding the right trade-off between memory effects, 
expressivity of language, and uncertainty of outputs which rely on the same 
constructs (e.g., for mental models) is not an easy task and should be handled with 
outmost methodological care. Critics would certainly address the memory problem 
with natural language and issues with learning during assessment while supporters 
would argue in the direction of expressivity and the problem of construct shifts if the 
reasoning processes are too far away from one other. 
Validity 
The comparison indices built into HIMATT using the SMD-MITOCAR 
methodologies address either the structure or the semantics of an assessed construct. 
They can be equally applied to natural language analysis and concept mapping. All 
of the indices make measurements of the graphs. Convergence is expected to be 
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different between the structural and the semantic indices. The correlation matrix 
shows the convergent validity within each area and the divergent validity between 
them. Validity was tested on N = 1,849,926 individual pairwise model comparisons. 
Each pair of models belongs to the same subject domain. 
TABLE 5.2 
HIMATT validity measures 
  BSMatch CMatch PMatch Surface GMatch SMatch Gamma 
BSMatch 1.00             
CMatch 0.71 1.00           
PMatch 0.91 0.68 1.00         
Surface 0.20 0.26 0.18 1.00       
GMatch 0.17 0.21 0.16 0.79 1.00     
SMatch -0.24 0.36 0.53 0.63 0.48 1.00   
Gamma 0.18 0.24 0.15 0.37 0.38 0.08 1.00 
 
Balanced semantic matching (BSMatch), concept matching (CMatch), and 
propositional matching (PMatch) are the semantic indices of HIMATT. Surface 
matching (Surface), graphical matching (GMatch), structural matching (SMatch), 
and gamma are structural indices. All convergent validity measures are reported in 
italics; the others are divergent validity measures (see Table 5.2). High validity 
measures can be reported throughout all of the semantic indices. The three structural 
indices aiming at the complexity (Surface, GMatch) or the full structure (SMatch) of 
the models are also aligned quite well. Gamma, however, is different. It accounts for 
the density of the model rather than for its complexity, which may be a reason why it 
does not correlate very well with the other structural indices. This may be a hint that 
gamma should be treated differently in the future. The surprisingly high correlation 
between propositional matching and structural matching is another interesting point 
to discuss and investigate further. At the moment we do not have a complete 
theoretical explanation for this effect throughout all of the models and investigated 
domains; but since both are more complex indices for addressing either structure or 
semantics, this may point to an interconnectedness between structure and semantics 
which might not be visible on a more cursory level of comparison (Jackendoff, 
1983). 
HIMATT usability 
We applied a usability test which included 26 items (see Appendix A, Table 5.4, for 
a translation of the items) which had to be answered on a Likert scale ranging from 1 
(highly disagree) to 5 (highly agree). Seventy-four students (66 female and 8 male) 
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from the University of Freiburg, Germany, participated in the usability study. Their 
average age was 21.9 years (SD = 2.3). 
 First, an explorative factorial analysis (varimax rotation) was carried out by 
means of selected variables (see Appendix A, Table 5.4). The eight extracted factors 
represent 72.8 % of the variance. The first factor is determined by six items (Nr. 4, 
14, 15, 17, 18, 21). Consequently, the first factor represents colors and screen design 
(Cronbach’s α = .843). The second factor is determined by five items (Nr. 3, 19, 20, 
23, 24) and represents the coherence of the HIMATT software (Cronbach’s α = 
.794). Factor three represents the learnability of HIMATT functions (Cronbach’s α = 
.725) and is determined by four items (Nr. 1, 2, 6, 8). The fourth factor is determined 
by four items (Nr. 7, 9, 10, 22). They represent the reliability and handling of 
HIMATT (Cronbach’s α = .733). The fifth factor is determined by three items (Nr. 5, 
11, 12) and represents the complexity of HIMATT functions (Cronbach’s α = .594). 
Factor six represents the character set of HIMATT (Cronbach’s α = .687), 
determined by two items (Nr. 25, 26). The seventh factor is determined by one item 
(Nr. 16) and represents use of colors for instructions. The eighth and last factor is 
also determined by one item (Nr. 13). It represents directions at the start of 
HIMATT. 
 Secondly, the eight factors were used to investigate the usability of HIMATT. 
Table 5.3 shows the descriptive statistics of the eight factors. 
TABLE 5.3 
Usability test results 
Factor Nr. M SD Min Max 
I 3.42 .64 1 5 
II 4.16 .45 3 5 
III 4.31 .48 3 5 
IV 3.86 .51 2 5 
V 4.23 .39 3 5 
VI 3.99 .56 2 5 
VII 3.51 .57 1 5 
VIII 4.15 .66 2 5 
 
The results of our usability test show that HIMATT and its features are widely 
accepted among the users. Particularly well accepted is the easy learnability of 
HIMATT functions (factor 3). This is also expressed by the high acceptance of 
factors five (complexity of HIMATT functions) and two (coherence of HIMATT). 
The usability test also revealed a high level of acceptance of the instructions at the 
start of HIMATT (factor 8).  
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HIMATT applications 
Basically, with HIMATT it is possible to investigate anything which addresses states 
and changes, analysis and comparison within the methodological boundaries of 
concept mapping, and the annotation of association networks on the basis of different 
kinds of text sources. Both groups and individuals can be assessed within classical 
experimental settings and field applications, for example, in learning and instruction 
or schooling and education. So far, individual tools from HIMATT have been used 
successfully in navigation tracking (Dummer & Ifenthaler, 2005), measurement of 
learning-dependent progression (Ifenthaler, et al., in press; Ifenthaler & Seel, 2005), 
cognitive learning strategies and intellectual abilities (Ifenthaler, et al., 2007), 
research on the quantitative comparison of expertise, reading comprehension 
(Pirnay-Dummer & Ifenthaler, in press), needs assessment, ontology oriented data 
mining, and organizational knowledge management. The comprehensive toolset will 
enable researchers to continue working on all of these research interests. It will also 
be possible to address additional fields due to the combination of the assessment and 
analysis tools. Not only will this make things easier and more integrated but also 
faster since the data will not have to be transferred from one tool to another anymore. 
Future development and directions 
While the current version of HIMATT represents a state-of-the-art assessment tool 
suite. HIMATT features such as arrows that reflect relative weights through thick 
and thin lines, nested diagrams that allow layers of a complex problem to be 
developed, elicited, and explored could be added. A significant direction for future 
development would be to take HIMATT and other sophisticated assessment tools 
and transform them into teaching tools. Since the earliest development of DEEP, 
users have commented that such assessment tools would make excellent teaching 
tools as well. Progress in the design of instruction for complex tasks requires tools 
such as HIMATT. Progress in developing personalized learning systems requires an 
extended version of HIMATT and other tools that can support formative feedback 
and self-regulatory behaviors. Just as science is cumulative, the tools used by 
scientists are cumulative. In this case, perhaps HIMATT represents a contribution to 
the development of cumulative knowledge and tools for both scientists (i.e., 
educational researchers) as well as for practitioners (i.e., teachers and instructional 
designers). 
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Appendix A 
TABLE 5.4 
Original items of the usability questionnaire and corresponding translations 
Item 
Nr. 
Factor 
Nr. 
Item 
load-
ing 
Original item Item translation 
1 III .795 Die Bedienung der Software ist leicht erlernbar. 
It is easy to learn how to work with 
the software. 
2 III .449 Ohne Unterstützung sind alle Funktionen zu bedienen. 
All functions can be used without 
support. 
3 II .611 Die Navigation innerhalb der Software ist mir leicht gefallen. 
I found it easy to navigate through 
the software. 
4 I .512 Optisch ist die Software ansprechend gestaltet. 
The design of the software is 
optically appealing. 
5 V .529 
Alle Buchstaben und 
Sonderzeichen erscheinen in 
üblicher Form auf dem Bildschirm. 
All letters and special characters 
appear as they should on the 
screen. 
6 III .403 Die Mausbedienung ist einfach. It is easy to use the mouse with the software. 
7 IV .645 Die Tastaturbedienung ist einfach, z.B. bei der Steuerung des Cursors. 
It is easy to use the keyboard, e.g., 
to move the cursor. 
8 III .842 Tippfehler können vor Ausführen einer Eingabe korrigiert werden. 
Typos can be corrected before 
making an entry. 
9 IV .848 
Die Software reagiert robust und 
informierend auf Bedienungsfehler. 
The software provides reliable and 
informative support in the case of 
operating errors. 
10 IV .459 
Die Software arbeitet fehlerfrei, 
zuverlässig und kontrollierbar, 
auch bei falschen Befehls- oder 
Antworteingaben. 
The software is error-free, reliable, 
and controllable, even when 
incorrect commands or answers are 
entered. 
11 V .556 Der Befehlsumfang für die Benutzung ist einfach. 
It is easy to learn the commands 
necessary to operate the software. 
12 V .805 
Befehle, Begriffe und Symbole für 
gleiche Sachverhalte und 
Bedienungsfunktionen werden 
einheitlich verwendet. 
Commands, terms, and symbols for 
the same item or operating function 
are uniform. 
13 VIII .729 
Die Benutzungshinweise, die am 
Anfang gegeben werden, sind klar 
und verständlich. 
The instructions provided at the 
beginning are clear and 
understandable. 
14 I .820 Die Qualität der Farben ist gut, z.B. durch klare Kontraste. 
The quality of the colors is good, 
e.g., clear contrast. 
15 I .671 
Durch farbliche Hinweise wird die 
Bedienung der Software erleichtert 
und erklärt. 
The color codes serve to simplify 
and explain the operation of the 
software. 
16 VII .810 
Die Farben zur Verdeutlichung der 
Bedienung werden einheitlich 
eingesetzt. 
The colors used to simplify the 
operation of the software are 
applied uniformly. 
17 I .616 
Die Farbgestaltung trägt sinnvoll 
zur Erleichterung und Erklärung 
der Bedienung der Software bei. 
The colors are a useful aid for 
explaining how to operate the 
software. 
18 I .914 
Insgesamt sind die Farben effektiv, 
sinnvoll und motivierend 
eingesetzt. 
In general, the use of color is 
effective, sensible, and motivating. 	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TABLE 5.4 continued 
Original items of the usability questionnaire and corresponding translations 
Item 
Nr. 
Factor 
Nr. 
Item 
load-
ing 
Original item Item translation 
19 II .793 Der Bildschirmaufbau ist übersichtlich und verständlich. 
The screen layout is clear and 
comprehensible. 
20 II .776 Die Textgestaltung ist sinnvoll, übersichtlich und gut lesbar. 
The text layout is sensible, clear, 
and easy to read. 
21 I .844 Die Farben sind effektiv, sinnvoll und motivierend eingesetzt. 
The use of color is effective, 
sensible, and motivating. 
22 IV .731 Die Anpassungsmöglichkeiten der Software sind umfangreich. 
There are many options for 
customizing the software. 
23 II .732 Die Navigation der Software ist benutzerfreundlich. 
The navigation of the software is 
user-friendly. 
24 II .444 
Die Qualität der Grafiken ist gut, d. 
h. klare Linien, Formen, Kontraste 
und verständliche Darstellungen. 
The quality of the graphics is good, 
i.e. they have clear lines, forms, 
and contrast and are well designed. 
25 VI .641 
Insgesamt ist die Textgestaltung 
sinnvoll, übersichtlich und gut 
lesbar. 
In general, the text layout is well 
designed and organized and is 
easy to read. 
26 VI .865 
Der Zeichensatz ist in seiner Form 
und Größe geeignet und gut lesbar, 
vor allem unter Berücksichtigung 
der Darstellung am Bildschirm. 
The font is suitable in form and 
size and is easy to read, particularly 
with regard to its appearance on the 
screen. 
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6 
MYSTERY OF COGNITIVE STRUCTURE? & 
Many research studies have clearly demonstrated the importance of cognitive structures as the 
building blocks of meaningful learning and retention of instructional materials. Identifying the 
learners’ cognitive structures will help instructors to organize materials, identify knowledge gaps, and 
relate new materials to existing slots or anchors within the learners’ cognitive structures. The purpose 
of this empirical investigation is to track the development of cognitive structures over time. 
Accordingly, it is demonstrated how various indicators derived from graph theory can be used for a 
precise description and analysis of cognitive structures. Results revealed several patterns that help to 
better understand the construction and development of cognitive structures over time. The chapter 
concludes by identifying applications for learning and instruction and proposing possibilities for the 
further development of the research approach. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
& This chapter is based on: Ifenthaler, D., Masduki, I., & Seel, N. M. (in press). The mystery of 
cognitive structure and how we can detect it. Tracking the development of cognitive structures over 
time. Instructional Science. doi: 10.1007/s11251-009-9097-6 
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Introduction 
Many research studies have clearly demonstrated the importance of cognitive 
structures, which refer to how concepts within a domain are organized and 
interrelated within a person’s mind as the building blocks of meaningful learning and 
retention of instructional materials (Shavelson, 1974; Snow & Lohman, 1989). 
Ausubel (1963) highlighted the importance of this hypothetical construct as the 
principal factor in the accumulation of knowledge: “If existing cognitive structure is 
clear, stable, and suitably organized, it facilitates the learning and retention of new 
subject matter. If it is unstable, ambiguous, disorganized, or chaotically organized; it 
inhibits learning and retention” (p. 217).  
 As pointed out by Jonassen (1987), identifying the learners’ cognitive 
structures will help instructors to organize materials, identify knowledge gaps, and 
relate new materials to existing slots or anchors within the learners’ cognitive 
structures. In the process, misconceptions and preconceptions can also be identified 
and rectified (Seel, 1999a). The diagnosis of cognitive structures can act as a 
“topographic map” to identify key areas of learning difficulties and facilitate 
instructional interventions (Snow, 1989).  
 This approach can lead to the most suitable methods of instruction being 
utilized since different instructional strategies can lead to different cognitive 
structures and therefore to different learning outcomes (Mayer & Greeno, 1972). It 
can also be used to assess the effectiveness of learning by comparing the students’ 
cognitive structures to those of instructors, domain experts, and even to the 
knowledge structures of other outstanding students (Acton, Johnson, & Goldsmith, 
1994; Herl, Baker, & Niemi, 1996; Jonassen, 1987). 
 Numerous researchers have explored techniques for assessing and analyzing 
cognitive structures (Clariana & Wallace, 2007; Ifenthaler, 2006; Jonassen, 1987; 
Kalyuga, 2006a, 2006b; Koubek & Mountjoy, 1991; Pirnay-Dummer, 2006; Preece, 
1976; Young, 1998). Some of these methods, however, can be too time consuming 
and unsuitable as an assessment tool within instructional environments such as a 
classroom or work setting (Kalyuga, 2006b; Spector, et al., 2006). Additionally, 
some of the techniques may have questionable reliability and validity in terms of 
assessment outcomes (Seel, 1999a). 
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 The purpose of this empirical investigation is to track the development of 
cognitive structures over time. Accordingly, it is demonstrated how various 
indicators derived from graph theory can be used for a precise description and 
analysis of cognitive structures. The following section focuses on various definitions 
of cognitive structures. In the next section the perennial question of how to 
accurately diagnose cognitive structures is discussed. Then, the experimental study 
and the results are presented; followed by a discussion of how the research approach 
can be used to assess and analyze cognitive structures in various instructional 
settings. Finally, suggestions for further development of research approach are 
presented. 
Cognitive structure 
 The advent of adaptive learning environments with its emphasis on learners’ 
variable proficiency levels and cognitive preferences places greater urgency on the 
need for reliable and valid methods of diagnosing learners’ cognitive structures 
(Kalyuga, 2006a; Snow, 1990). The term “cognitive structures,” however, has many 
interpretations and since the definition of “cognitive structures” as a construct has 
strong implications on how it will be measured (Shavelson & Stanton, 1975), it is 
imperative that various definitions by researchers be examined for a better 
understanding of the term. 
 Many researchers conceive of cognitive structures, also known as knowledge 
structures or structural knowledge (Jonassen, et al., 1993), as the manner in which an 
individual arranges facts, concepts, propositions, theories, and raw data at any point 
in time (Taber, 2000), or more specifically as “a hypothetical construct referring to 
the organization of the relationships of concepts in memory” (Shavelson, 1972, p. 
226). It is assumed that the order in which information is retrieved from long-term 
memory will reflect in part the individual’s cognitive structure within and between 
concepts. By assessing the structure, even partially, the educator comes closer to 
influencing it in the student’s memory so that it corresponds with the structure of 
instructional materials. In other words, learning requires students to reorganize their 
cognitive structures, which are made up of a collection of ideas in semantic memory 
(Jonassen, 1988). These ideas are also known as “schema” and can be an object, 
event, or proposition with a set of attributes that the individual perceives as being 
associated with the idea. For example, the schema for a pencil can include attributes 
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such as its shape and also its function as a writing tool that occasionally needs 
sharpening. 
 According to Seel (1991) new information can be assimilated by a learner 
through the activation of an existing schema. In other words, an individual utilizes an 
existing schema in order to makes sense of the new information. In instances where 
the new information does not exactly fit into the schema, the schema undergoes 
adjustments by means of accretion, tuning, or reorganization (see Rumelhart & 
Norman, 1978). Accretion is the process of fitting in the new information into the 
existing areas within a schema. Tuning is defined as the process of changing certain 
parts of a schema to accommodate the new information. The outcome of the 
accretion and tuning process is the comprehension of the new information or as 
subjective plausible solutions to a problem. However, if accretion and tuning are 
unsuccessful, or in situations where no schema existed in the first place; new 
information is accommodated by means of the reorganization process. In other 
words, the individual uses the new information to create a new schema. 
  The accommodation process often leads to the development of mental 
models, which are dynamic ad hoc representations of reality to help the individual 
understand or simplify a phenomenon (see Gentner & Stevens, 1983; Johnson-Laird, 
1983; Seel, 1991, 2001). 
 Hence, an individual’s cognitive structure is made up of various schemata and 
mental models that can be embedded within one another within a hierarchy. A 
schema provides a framework that is used to interrelate various components of 
information about a topic into one conceptual unit. A schema is also made up of 
statements about important attributes of the conceptual unit, its purpose, and rules for 
selecting as well as using it (Norman, Gentner, & Stevens, 1976). These concepts are 
all organized within an interrelated network known as a semantic network which 
represents our cognitive structures. Since the schemata in our semantic network are 
interrelated based on various associations, an accepted method for representing such 
networks is through active structural networks (see Quillian, 1968). These structural 
networks are represented by nodes (schemata) and labeled links that connect nodes to 
one another – making it possible to represent what a learner knows through these 
networks.  Learning thus takes place when we create new nodes that are then linked 
to the existing ones and to each other. In other words, new cognitive structures are 
built upon pre-existing structures (Norman, et al., 1976). 
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 Koubek and colleagues (1994; 1991) expanded upon the attributes of 
knowledge structures as “the structure of interrelationships between elements, 
concepts and procedures in a particular domain, organized into a unified body of 
knowledge.” Within a given domain, elements refer to unique units of information 
which can be declarative elements such as concepts or facts; or procedural elements 
pertaining to how to do things within the domain. An individual’s knowledge 
structure is made up of the interrelationships between these elements. In this regard, 
cognitive structures can also be viewed as conceptual knowledge which transcends 
the mere storage of declarative knowledge. It is “an understanding of a concept's 
operational structure within itself and between associated concepts.” Through 
knowledge of the interrelationships between concepts, conceptual knowledge can be 
used to develop procedural knowledge for problem solving purposes within a 
specific domain (Tennyson & Cocchiarella, 1986). 
 Therefore, cognitive structure has major implications for comprehension, 
integration of new information, and the ability to solve domain-specific problems 
(Jonassen, et al., 1993; Shavelson, 1974). When compared to that of a novice, a 
domain expert’s cognitive structure is considered to be more tightly integrated and 
has a greater number of linkages among interrelated concepts. There is thus immense 
interest on the part of researchers to assess a novice’s cognitive structure and 
compare it with an expert’s in order to identify the most appropriate ways to bridge 
the gap. 
Diagnosis of cognitive structures 
Given the relevance of cognitive structures as a construct for assessing knowledge 
organization, assimilation, and accommodation, the perennial question is how to 
accurately diagnose them. Some issues that have yet to be resolved include 
identifying reliable and valid tools to elicit the external representation of such 
internal structures and the actual analysis of the structures themselves (Ifenthaler, 
2008; Jonassen, et al., 1993; Kalyuga, 2006a). However, as it is not possible to 
measure cognitive structures directly, individuals have to elicit or externalize them 
before researchers can analyze and interpret them (see Ifenthaler, 2008). 
Elicitation of cognitive structure 
A variety of techniques have been developed which can be classified as (a) natural 
language and as (b) graphical approaches. Prominent natural language approaches 
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are (1) Thinking Aloud Protocols (e.g., Ericsson & Simon, 1993, 1998), (2) Word 
Association (e.g., Gunstone, 1980; Shavelson, 1972), (3) Structure Formation 
Technique (Scheele & Groeben, 1984), and (4) MITOCAR, which stands for Model 
Inspection Trace of Concepts and Relations (Pirnay-Dummer, 2006). These and 
other natural language-based approaches utilize the most automated and natural 
means by which humans externalize their cognitive structures. They enable the 
verbalization of individual cognitive processes. However, Nisbett and Wilson (1977) 
question the quantification of the collected data and the explicit relation to cognitive 
processes as well validity and reliability of such techniques. On the other hand, it is 
argued that natural language approaches are less biased than graphical approaches, 
because natural language is more trained and highly automated (Pirnay-Dummer, 
2006). However, graphical approaches such as (1) Concept Mapping Tools (Cañas, 
et al., 2004; Nückles, et al., 2004), (2) Test for Causal Diagrams (Al-Diban, 2002), 
(3) DEEP, which stands for Dynamic Evaluation of Enhanced Problem-solving 
(Pirnay-Dummer, et al., 2010; Spector & Koszalka, 2004), and (4) Pathfinder 
(Schvaneveldt, 1990) also provide a sound basis for the elicitation of cognitive 
structures. Undeniably, the application of graphical approaches must always include 
extensive training on how to use these tools. Nevertheless and regardless of the type 
of approach, we claim that tools which are used for the elicitation and analysis of 
cognitive structure must have a strong theoretical foundation and need to be tested 
for reliability and validity accordingly (Ifenthaler, 2010c). 
Tracking changes in cognitive structure 
Equally important are the issues of tracking the progression of cognitive structures, 
which captures the transition of learners from the initial state to the desired state 
(Snow, 1989, 1990); and for repetitive measurements of change over an extended 
period of time for a more accurate diagnosis (Ifenthaler & Seel, 2005; Seel, 1999a). 
Accordingly, research on cognitive structures needs to move beyond the traditional 
two-wave design in order to capture changes more precisely (Spada, 1983; Willett, 
1988). As individuals reinstate and modify their cognitive structures when 
interacting with the environment (Jonassen, et al., 1993; Piaget, 1976; Seel, 1991), 
the necessity of conducting multiwave longitudinal experiments is evident. However, 
the collection and analysis of longitudinal data implicates various methodological 
dilemmas which should not be neglected (see Ifenthaler, 2008; Seel, 1999a). Besides 
general concerns about quantitative studies over time (Collins & Sayer, 2001; 
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Moskowitz & Hershberger, 2002), tracking changes in cognitive structures requires 
valid and reliable assessment techniques, adequate statistical procedures, and specific 
situations which enable the activation of such cognitive structures (Ifenthaler, 2008). 
Measures of analyzing cognitive structure 
As mentioned above, different approaches and tools can be applied to elicit cognitive 
structures. Accordingly, there are also various possibilities to measure cognitive 
structures (Koubek & Mountjoy, 1991). However, available methods are often very 
time consuming and sometimes limited in their ability to precisely measure cognitive 
structures (see Kalyuga, 2006a).  
 Therefore, our measurement technique is computer-based and highly 
automated, which enables us to analyze even larger sets of data within a few seconds. 
The foundation for analyzing cognitive structures is based on indicators derived from 
graph theory (Diestel, 2000; Harary, 1974). Graph theory is a promising approach 
and its fundamentals have been applied in various fields of research and practice, e.g. 
decision making, project management, network problems, etc. (Chartrand, 1977). A 
graph is constructed from a set of vertices whose relationships are represented by 
edges. Basics of graph theory are necessary to describe externalized cognitive 
structures as graphs (Bonato, 1990). 
A graph G(V,E) is composed of vertices V and edges E. If the relationship between 
vertices V is directional, a graph is called a directed graph or digraph D. A graph 
which contains no directions is called an undirected graph.  
The position of vertices V and edges E on a graph G are examined with regard to 
their proximity to one another. Two vertices x, y of G are adjacent if they are joined 
by an edge e. Two edges e≠f are adjacent if they have a common end or vertex x.  
A path P is a graph G where the vertices xi are all distinct. The length of a path P is 
calculated by the number of its edges ej. The vertices x0 and xk are called the ends of 
the path P.  
A graph G is indexed when single vertices V and edges E are distinguished by their 
names or content.  
Every connected graph G contains a spanning tree. A spanning tree is acyclic and 
includes all vertices of G. Spanning trees can be used for numerous descriptions and 
calculations concerning the structure of a graph.  
By describing externalized cognitive structures as graphs, including associated 
vertices and edges, we are able to apply various measures from graph theory to 
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analyze individual cognitive structures and, in addition, to track the development of 
cognitive structures over time (see Table 6.1).  
TABLE 6.1 
Measures for analyzing the organization of cognitive structures 
Measure Operationalization Computation 
Surface 
Structure 
The overall number of propositions 
(node-link-node) is an indicator for 
the development of a cognitive 
structure.  
Computed as the sum of all propositions 
(node-link-node) of a cognitive structure. 
Defined as a value between 0 (no 
proposition) and N (N propositions of the 
cognitive structure). 
Matching 
Structure 
The complexity of a cognitive 
structure indicates how broad the 
understanding of the underlying 
subject matter is. 
Computed as the quantity of edges of the 
shortest path between the most distant 
nodes (diameter) of the spanning tree of a 
cognitive structure. Defined as a value 
between 0 (no edges) and N. 
Connectedness 
A connected cognitive structure 
indicates a deeper understanding of 
the underlying subject matter. 
Computed as the possibility to reach every 
vertex from every other vertex in the 
cognitive structure. Defined as a value 
between 0 (not connected) and 1 
(connected). 
Ruggedness 
Non-linked vertices of a cognitive 
structure point to a lesser 
understanding of the phenomenon in 
question. 
Computed as the sum of subgraphs which 
are independent or not linked. Defined as 
a value between 1 (all vertices are linked) 
and N. 
Average 
degree of 
Vertices 
As the number of incoming and 
outgoing edges grows, the 
complexity of the cognitive structure 
is taken as more complex. 
Computed as the average degree of all 
incoming and outgoing edges of the 
cognitive structure. Defined as a value 
between 0 and N. 
Cyclic A non-cyclic cognitive structure is considered less sophisticated. 
A cyclic cognitive structure contains a 
path returning back to the start vertex of 
the starting edge. Defined as a value 
between 0 (no cycles) and 1 (is cyclic). 
Number of 
Cycles 
A cognitive structure with many 
cycles is an indicator for a close 
association of the vertices and edges 
used. 
Computed as the sum of all cycles within 
a cognitive structure. Defined as a value 
between 0 (no cycles) and N. 
Vertices A simple indicator for the size of the underlying cognitive structure. 
Computed as the sum of all vertices 
within a cognitive structure. Defined as a 
value between 0 (no vertices) and N. 
Edges A simple indicator for the size of the underlying cognitive structure. 
Computed as the sum of all edges within a 
cognitive structure. Defined as a value 
between 0 (no edges) and N. 
 
Table 6.2 provides additional measures for analyzing and comparing the semantic 
content of the cognitive structures. 
 Besides the three core measures (surface structure, graphical structure, 
propositional matching), we implemented the graph theory based measures as 
supplementary indicators into our computer-based analysis tool SMD Technology 
(Surface, Matching, Deep Structure). In an automated iterative process, the SMD 
Technology (Ifenthaler, 2010c) calculates numerical indicators for all measures 
described in Tables 6.1 and 6.2 and stores them in a database.  
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TABLE 6.2 
Measures for analyzing the semantic content of cognitive structures 
Measure Operationalization Computation 
Vertex 
Matching 
The use of semantically correct 
concepts (vertices) is a general 
indicator of an accurate 
understanding of the given subject 
domain. 
Computed as the sum of vertices of a 
cognitive structure which are semantically 
similar to a domain specific reference 
cognitive structure (e.g. expert structure). 
Defined as a value between 0 (no semantic 
similar vertices) and N. 
Propositional 
Structure 
The use of semantically correct 
propositions (vertex-edge-vertex) 
indicates a correct and deeper 
understanding of the given subject 
domain. 
Calculated as the semantic similarity of a 
cognitive structure and a domain specific 
reference cognitive structure. Defined as a 
value between 0 (no similarity) and 1 
(complete similarity). 
 
Additionally, standardized graphical re-representations of the externalized cognitive 
structures are generated. Figures 6.1 and 6.2 show two standardized re-
representations constructed by a participant at time points 1 and 5 of our experiment. 
In the following, we will briefly expound on the above described measures for 
analyzing the organization and semantic content of cognitive structures using the 
examples in Figure 6.1 and 6.2. 
 
FIGURE 6.1. Standardized re-representation of a participant’s cognitive structure at time point 1 
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FIGURE 6.2. Standardized re-representation of a participant’s cognitive structure at time point 5 
 
Table 6.3 shows the calculated measures for quantitatively describing the 
organization and semantic content of the two examples. The surface structure more 
than doubles during the learning process. This is also indicated by the measure 
vertices, which increases from 13 to 29. We conclude that the cognitive structure of 
the participant develops during the learning process. With the help of the measure 
graphical structure, we are able to find out whether the complexity of the cognitive 
structure also increases. In order to calculate the graphical structure of the two 
examples, a spanning tree is generated first. A spanning tree of Figure 6.1 or 6.2 
contains all vertices but no cycles. Then, the diameter of the spanning tree (shortest 
longest path) is calculated. As shown in Table 6.3, the diameter increases from 6 to 9 
in our two examples. Corresponding to this result, the measures connectedness and 
ruggedness give further information about the complexity of the cognitive structure. 
In both cases, the re-representations are connected – every vertex can be reached 
from every other vertex. This means that the participant has a deep understanding of 
the underlying subject matter and is able to connect various concepts (vertices) 
together. Accordingly, the measure ruggedness is 1. If this indicator were greater 
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than 1 it would indicate that the cognitive structure is divided into subsections 
(subgraphs). Thus, a less connected cognitive structure points to a poorer 
understanding of the subject matter. Furthermore, the measures cyclic and number of 
cycles point to an interesting difference between the two examples. The re-
representation in Figure 1 has no cycles; our example in Figure 6.2 has three cycles. 
This means that our participant added more associations of concepts to her cognitive 
structure while studying the subject matter. The average degree of vertices in both 
examples indicates that most concept have an incoming and an outgoing link.  
TABLE 6.3 
Measures calculated for the example re-representations in Figures 1 and 2 
Measure Result Figure 1 Result Figure 2 
Surface Structure 14 31 
Graphical Structure 6 9 
Connectedness 1 1 
Ruggedness 1 1 
Average degree of Vertices 2.11 2.14 
Cyclic 0 1 
Number of Cycles 0 3 
Vertices 13 29 
Vertex Matching 0.12 0.52 
Propositional Matching 0.04 0.19 
 
However, not all organizational indicators include information about the correctness 
of the concepts and links within the re-representation. Our measures vertex and 
propositional matching provide this information about the semantic content. The 
number of semantically correct vertices and propositions (compared to an expert re-
representation) increases during the learning process. Accordingly, not only does the 
organization of the cognitive structure grow more complex, it also becomes more 
correct in comparison with that of an expert. 
Assumptions and hypotheses 
As they are able to automatically describe and analyze large sets of data, we assume 
that these indicators are applicable for tracking the development of externalized 
cognitive structures over time. This leads to the following assumptions and 
hypotheses, which were tested in our experimental study.  
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H1.1: The organization of the externalized cognitive structures changes during the 
learning process.  
H1.0: The organization of the externalized cognitive structures does not change 
during the learning process.  
H2.1a: The numbers of semantic correct vertices of the externalized cognitive 
structures become more similar to the expert structure during the learning process. 
H2.0a: The numbers of semantic correct vertices of the externalized cognitive 
structures have no or only little similarity to the expert structure. 
H2.1b: The numbers of semantic correct propositions of the externalized cognitive 
structures become more similar to the expert structure during the learning process. 
H2.0b: The numbers of semantic correct propositions of the externalized cognitive 
structures have no or only little similarity to the expert structure. 
H3.1: The development of the organization of the externalized cognitive structures 
influences the course learning outcomes.  
H3.0: The development of the organization of the externalized cognitive structures has 
no or only little influence on the course learning outcomes. 
 
The (a) organization and (b) semantic nature of the cognitive structures changes 
during the learning process. Further, we assume (c) a correlation between the course 
learning outcome and the organization / semantics of the externalized cognitive 
structures. 
Method 
Participants 
Twenty-five students (18 female and 7 male) from the University of Freiburg, 
Germany, participated in the study. Their average age was 24.7 years (SD = 1.9). All 
students attended an introductory course on research methods in the winter semester 
2007. A total of 125 concept maps were collected at 5 measurement points during the 
semester. 
Procedure 
Data were collected through concept maps using the software CmapTools (Cañas, et 
al., 2004). According to Novak (1998), a concept map is a graphical two-dimensional 
representation of communicated knowledge and its underlying structure. A concept 
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map consists of concepts (graph theory: vertices) and relations (graph theory: edges). 
Research studies on the application of CmapTools indicate a wide acceptance of our 
theoretical assumptions on using this software (e.g. Coffey, et al., 2003; 
Derbentseva, Safayeni, & Cañas, 2004). Since our research study focuses on the 
development of cognitive structures, our longitudinal procedure included five 
measurement points. The main parts of our study were as follows: 
In a 60 minute introductory lesson, the subjects were introduced to the concept 
mapping technique and taught how to use the CmapTools software. Additionally, the 
instructor collected demographic data and delivered documentation on concept maps 
and the software, including examples. 
At five measurement points (MP, see Figure 3) during the course on research 
methods, the subjects were asked to create an open concept map relating to her or his 
understanding of research skills. Every subject needed to upload the concept map at 
a specified date and time during the course. 
The course learning outcome was measured through (1) five written assignments, (2) 
a written exam, and (3) a written research proposal. The score of the course learning 
outcome was rated between 0 and 100 points (Spearman-Brown-Coefficient, r = 
.902). 
 
 
FIGURE 6.3. Longitudinal research design 
 
After uploading the concept maps, the instructor gave the students a brief feedback to 
notify them that their maps had been successfully uploaded and that they should 
carry on with their studies in the course. As we used open concept maps in our 
research study, the subjects were not limited to specific words while annotating the 
concepts and relations. 
Analysis procedure 
Using the export function of CmapTools, we were able to store the subjects’ concept 
maps pairwise (as propositions) in a raw data table, including the (a) subject number, 
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(b) measurement point, (c) vertex 1, (d) vertex 2, and (e) edge connecting the two 
vertices. Having the raw data at hand, we uploaded all information onto the SQL 
database of our own SMD Technology (Ifenthaler, 2010c). We used the computer-
based analysis tool SMD Technology to calculate the above described graph theory 
based measures. Accordingly, the automated analysis process provides 11 indicators 
(see Table 1) for each subject representation. The SMD Technology has been tested 
extensively for reliability (e.g., test-retest reliability for rsurface = .824*; rgraphical = 
.815*; rpropositional = 901*) and validity (convergent and divergent validity 
rsurfaceXmitocar = .610**; rgraphicalXmitocar = .527**).  
 However, the statistical analysis of such longitudinal data requires a 
sharpened awareness of the problems involved in the measurement of change (e.g., 
Collins & Sayer, 2001; Harris, 1963; Ifenthaler, 2008). Accordingly, besides 
standard statistical procedures, we used HLM (Hierarchical Linear Models), which 
offers a wide spectrum of data analysis for longitudinal data (Raudenbush & Bryk, 
2002). The HLM analysis is realized in two analysis steps. The first growth model 
(Level 1; equation 1.1) tests the intraindividual change of the dependent variables. 
 
[1.1] 	  
The second growth model (Level 2; equation 1.2) tests for possible effects of 
additional variables (e.g., student performance). 
 
 
[1.2] 
 
 
Results 
Our in-depth analysis of N=125 cognitive structures (5 re-representation of each of 
the 25 participants) revealed several patterns that helped us to better understand the 
construction and development of these constructs over time. To describe our results, 
we will first present descriptive results and corresponding figures (see Figures 6.4 
and 6.5). We will then show the outcomes of our HLM and correlation analysis.  
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Descriptive analysis 
The average course learning outcome of all subjects was M=84.68 (SD=10.53, 
Min=46, Max=96). The results of our cognitive structure measures (organization and 
semantic content) are described in Tables 6.4 and 6.5. 
  The sum of propositions (Surface Structure) increases throughout the five 
measurement points (Min=1, Max=247). Equally, the sum of vertices increases from 
MP1 to MP5. A total of n=57 (45.6 %) cognitive structures were fully connected (the 
possibility to reach every vertex from every other vertex). However, the average 
number of sub graphs (Ruggedness) nearly doubled from MP1 (Min=1, Max=3) to 
MP5 (Min=1, Max=8). 
TABLE 6.4 
Average scores (standard deviations in parenthesis) of graph theory based measures 
(organization) for measurement points 1 – 5 (N=25)  
  MP1 MP2 MP3 MP4 MP5 
Surface Structure M  (SD) 
14.64 
(7.99) 
27.34 
(14.13) 
45.84 
(23.85) 
67.72 
(48.94) 
71.80 
(46.71) 
Graphical Structure M  (SD) 
5.52 
(2.83) 
7.62 
(3.57) 
9.48 
(3.42) 
12.08 
(4.91) 
11.72 
(4.19) 
Connectedness M  (SD) 
.68    
(.48) 
.80    
(.41) 
.44    
(.51) 
.44    
(.51) 
.36    
(.49) 
Ruggedness M  (SD) 
1.44  
(.71) 
1.32   
(.74) 
2.12 
(1.42) 
2.28 
(1.49) 
2.72 
(2.01) 
Average Degree of Vertices M  (SD) 
1.93  
(.43) 
2.06  
(.53) 
2.12  
(.39) 
2.11  
(.24) 
2.09  
(.26) 
Number of Cycles M  (SD) 
2.52 
(2.37) 
3.38 
(2.59) 
4.12 
(2.68) 
4.76 
(3.95) 
4.48 
(3.00) 
Number of Vertices M  (SD) 
14.40 
(6.69) 
24.65 
(11.76) 
42.24 
(22.60) 
63.96 
(45.85) 
68.16 
(44.33) 
 
Additionally, the increase in complexity of the cognitive structures is described by 
the Graphical Structure (Min=1, Max=24) and the Degree of Vertices (Min=1, 
Max=3.44). 76.8 % (n= 96) of all cognitive structures contained a cycle (a path 
returning back to the start vertex of the starting edge). We found also an increase in 
the average number of cycles from MP1 (Min=0, Max=8) to MP5 (Min=0, Max=12).  
TABLE 6.5 
Average scores (standard deviations in parenthesis) of graph theory based measures 
(semantic content ) for measurement points 1 – 5 (N=25)  
  MP1 MP2 MP3 MP4 MP5 
Vertex Matching M 7.00 (3.97) 
12.76 
(6.11) 
17.16 
(7.33) 
21.00 
(8.12) 
21.24 
(8.19) 
Propositional Matching M .0099 (.0186) 
.0288 
(.0363) 
.0247 
(.0316) 
.0379 
(.0370) 
.0383 
(.0399) 
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FIGURE 6.4. Development of cognitive structures over time 
 
The Vertex Matching (semantically similar vertices) increases throughout the five 
measurement points (Min=0, Max=34). The Propositional Matching, which 
describes the semantically similar propositions between an individual cognitive 
structure and an expert representation, also increases, but the overall similarity to the 
expert representation is rather low. 
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FIGURE 6.5. Development of cognitive structures over time 
HLM analysis 
To test our hypothesis we computed several HLM analyses. According to Hox 
(2002), the sample size of our study is just adequate. However, in order to validate 
our initial findings we suggest further studies with larger sample size. The results of 
our Level-1 HLM analysis (intraindividual change of cognitive structures over time) 
are described in Tables 6.6 and 6.7. The Mean Initial Status π0i indicates that all 
corresponding measures are significantly higher than 0. Although this is a rather 
trivial effect (see Renkl & Gruber, 1995), we think it is useful to examine all  HLM 
results. Except for Average Degree of Vertices, all other measures reveal a 
significant positive linear Mean Growth Rate π1i per measurement point (e.g. Surface 
Structure = 15.36). 
 Therefore, we accept H1.1: The organization (Surface Structure, Graphical 
Structure, Ruggedness, Number of Cycles, and Number of Vertices) of the 
externalized cognitive structures changes during the learning process, except for the 
measure Average Degree of Vertices. The Average Degree of Vertices indicates the 
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average number of incoming and outgoing edges. Accordingly, as most of the 
externalized cognitive structures are very broad and do not center in one vertex, each 
vertex takes two edges in average (see Table 6.4). This does not change during the 
learning process, as the subject domain (research skills) does not change and does 
not seem to be organized around one central vertex.  
 Likewise, our HLM analysis revealed a significant positive linear Mean 
Growth Rate π1i per measurement point for the measure Vertex Matching (3.67). This 
means that the subjects used more and more correct concepts (vertices) compared to 
the expert cognitive structure.  
TABLE 6.6 
Level-1 linear growth models of cognitive structures (organizational measures) 
  Coefficient SE t df p 
Mean Initial 
Status π0i 
14.95 1.95 7.64 24 <.001 
Surface Structure Mean Growth 
Rate π1i 
15.36 2.72 5.65 123 <.001 
Mean Initial 
Status π0i 
6.02 0.49 12.09 24 <.001 
Graphiical Structure Mean Growth 
Rate π1i 
1.66 0.29 5.62 123 <.001 
Mean Initial 
Status π0i 
1.27 0.11 11.48 24 <.001 
Ruggedness Mean Growth 
Rate π1i 
0.35 0.11 3.32 123 .002 
Mean Initial 
Status π0i 
2.01 0.08 24.19 24 <.001 Average Degree of 
Vertices Mean Growth 
Rate π1i 
0.03 0.03 1.32 123 .189 
Mean Initial 
Status π0i 
2.85 0.44 6.49 24 <.001 
Number of Cycles Mean Growth 
Rate π1i 
0.52 0.19 2.69 123 .008 
Mean Initial 
Status π0i 
13.68 1.79 7.65 24 <.001 
Number of Vertices Mean Growth 
Rate π1i 
14.59 2.63 5.56 123 <.001 
 
Therefore, we accept H2.1a: The numbers of semantic correct vertices of the 
externalized cognitive structures become more similar to the expert structure during 
the learning process. 
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TABLE 6.7 
Level-1 linear growth models of cognitive structures (semantic measures) 
  Coefficient SE t df p 
Mean Initial 
Status π0i 
8.49 0.85 9.94 24 <.001 
Vertex Matching Mean Growth 
Rate π1i 
3.67 0.41 8.99 123 <.001 
Mean Initial 
Status π0i 
0.0317 0.0056 5.63 24 <.001 Propositional 
Matching Mean Growth 
Rate π1i 
-0.0019 0.0016 -1.15 123 0.253 
 
Contrary to our expectations, we found no significant growth (Mean Growth Rate 
π1i) for the semantic measures Propositional Matching (see Table 6.7). The cognitive 
structures became only slightly more similar to the expert structure during the five 
measurement points. 
 Therefore, H2.1b had to be rejected in favor of H2.0b: The numbers of semantic 
correct propositions of the externalized cognitive structures had no or only little 
semantic similarity with the expert structure. 
 For all graph theory based measures, we computed a Level-2 HLM analysis 
for the predictor learning (course learning outcome; median split: 0 = low learning 
outcome, 1 = high learning outcome). We found no significant difference between 
subjects with low learning outcomes and high learning outcomes in an analysis of the 
development of their cognitive structures using the graph theory based measures. The 
general Level-2 equation results through substitution as follows (e.g., Surface 
Structure): 
 
[1.3] 
The Surface Structure of subjects with low learning outcomes scores an average of 
11.98. Subjects with high learning outcomes score an average of 18.16 (11.98+6.18). 
However, this difference is not significant. Additionally, the Surface Structure of 
subjects with low learning outcomes increases significantly by 13.00 per 
measurement points. However, the higher increase of the Surface Structure of 
subjects with higher learning outcomes by 17.93 (13.00+4.93) is not significantly 
different from that of the subjects with lower learning outcomes. Details for all graph 
theory based measures of the Level-2 HLM analysis are reported in Appendix A 
(Tables 6.9 and 6.10). Therefore, H3.1 had to be rejected in favor of H3.0: The 
development of the organization of the externalized cognitive structures has no or 
only little influence on the course learning outcomes. 
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Correlational analysis 
Table 6.8 shows the correlations for the course learning outcomes and the 
characteristics of the cognitive structures at the fifth measurement point. We found 
no significant correlation between the measures surface structure, graphical 
structure, connectedness, ruggedness, number of vertices, and propositional 
matching. However, the higher the learners’ course learning outcome was, the higher 
was the average degree of vertices, r = .58, p = .002. Equally, the higher the course 
learning outcome was, the higher were the number of cycles measured in the 
cognitive structures, r = .51, p = .009. 
 Additionally, our analysis revealed a significant correlation between the 
course learning outcomes and the measure vertex matching, r = .41, p = .038 (i.e., the 
higher the course learning outcome was, the higher was the number of similar 
vertices between the subject and expert externalization). 
TABLE 6.8 
Pearson’s correlations between cognitive structure (organization and semantic content) 
characteristics (MP 5) and course learning outcomes (N=25) 
 r p 
Surface Structure .22 .291 
Graphical Structure .31 .127 
Connectedness .31 .137 
Ruggedness -.34 .102 
Average Degree of Vertices .58** .002 
Number of Cycles .51** .009 
Number of Vertices .16 .438 
Vertex Matching .42* .038 
Propositional Matching .23 .270 
Note: * p < .05; ** p < .01 
Discussion 
The aim of this study was to diagnose the development of cognitive structures over 
time. For this purpose, we applied different measures derived from graph theory to 
precisely score the changes in the externalized cognitive structures.  
 According to the subjects, the software CmapTools applied to externalize the 
cognitive structures was user-friendly and motivated them to continue using it. 
Additionally, the export function of CmapTools enabled us to automatically include 
all assessed individual cognitive structures in our SQL database. Therefore, we 
conclude that the data transformation process from the CmapTools to our analysis 
database has a very high reliability. 
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 Contrary to other non-automated and time-consuming techniques for scoring 
open-ended concept maps (e.g., Al-Diban, 2002), our automated analysis procedure 
is expeditious and computes the different measures within seconds. As shown in 
previous experiments, the core measures of the SMD Technology have a high 
reliability and validity (see Ifenthaler, 2006, 2010c). The additionally implemented 
graph theory based measures allow us to more precisely diagnose changes in the 
externalized cognitive structures.  
 The in-depth analysis of all 125 cognitive structures revealed several patterns 
that help us to better understand their construction and development during learning 
processes. We distinguish between two types of measures: The (1) organizational 
measures (Surface Structure, Graphical Structure, Ruggedness, Number of Cycles, 
and Number of Vertices) help us to exactly locate changes in the composition of the 
externalized cognitive structure. On the other hand, the (2) semantic measures 
(Vertex Matching, Propositional Matching) indicate whether the content of the 
vertices and propositions used by an individual is correct compared to an expert’s 
cognitive structure. 
 The result of our HLM analysis revealed a significant growth in the 
organizational measures between measurement points one and five. The overall size 
of the cognitive structures (Surface Structure) increased many times over. 
Accordingly, this is an indicator for an accommodation process (see Piaget, 1976; 
Seel, 1991), i.e. the individuals continuously added new concepts (Number of 
Vertices) and links between concepts (Surface Structure) to their cognitive structures 
while learning. As a consequence, the complexity of the externalized cognitive 
structures also increased, which is indicated by the growth of the measure Graphical 
Structure and Number of Cycles. Therefore, we conclude that while learning and 
understanding more and more of a given subject matter, individuals are able to more 
tightly integrate single concepts and links. However, we also found a significant 
growth in the measure Ruggedness (i.e., non-linked concepts within the entire 
cognitive structure). The significant decrease in the measure Connectedness supports 
this result. This indicates that newly learned concepts are not immediately integrated 
into the cognitive structure. This delay of integrating concepts into the cognitive 
structure should be kept in mind when constructing instructional materials and 
learning environments. We also suggest analyzing this phenomenon in a future study 
more precisely. 
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 Contrary to the results of the organizational measures, our HLM analysis 
revealed only a significant growth in the semantic measure Vertex Matching. The 
individuals use more and more semantic correct concepts (vertices) during the 
learning process. As individuals become more familiar with the terminology of the 
subject domain (in our study research methods), they use these concepts more 
frequently. This learning process enables individuals to communicate their cognitive 
structures more precisely and more expert like. To reaffirm our assumptions, we also 
found a significant positive correlation between the course learning outcomes and the 
number of semantically correct concepts (Vertex Matching).  
 However, we found no significant growth in the semantic measure 
Propositional Matching. This result indicates that the individuals in our experiment 
were far from using the same proposition for describing the phenomenon in question. 
Nevertheless, the semantic analysis of cognitive structures is still a challenging 
endeavor. Therefore, we suggest improving the validity of the semantic measures 
using other heuristics (e.g., Pirnay-Dummer, et al., 2010). 
 Besides the quantitative measures, our own SMD Technology generates 
standardized graphical re-representations of all assessed cognitive structures as well 
as similarity and contrast re-representations. A similarity re-representation includes 
only the semantically correct concepts (vertices) and links (edges). On the other 
hand, the contrast re-representation includes all concepts (vertices) and links (edges) 
which are semantically incorrect (Ifenthaler, 2010c).  
 The quantitative measures and graphical re-representations generated by SMD 
Technology have various potential applications within a learning environment, such 
as knowledge diagnosis, self-assessments, rich feedback, prediction of performance 
on tasks, and knowledge sharing. 
 In order to provide effective instruction, it is important for students’ prior 
knowledge to be identified since the subsequent construction and organization of 
knowledge structures as well as mental models in a particular situation depends on 
the students’ preconceptions and naïve theories (Seel, 1999a). Knowing where the 
students are in terms of their initial cognitive states and the eventual progression of 
learning enables the teacher to make adjustments at the right time to enhance 
instructional effectiveness (Ifenthaler & Seel, 2005) or to make necessary changes to 
the instructional materials as part of a formative feedback process (Shute & Zapata-
Rivera, 2008). 
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 Automated knowledge diagnosis can also play an important role in an 
adaptive learning environment or intelligent tutoring systems (ITS) by integrating 
student performance data (using the abovementioned quantitative measures or 
graphical re-representations) into the student model of an ITS, thus enabling the 
system to tailor instructions to students’ individual needs. The system could identify 
gaps or discrepancies between the students’ and the experts’ re-representations; then 
provide the appropriate instructional content to overcome the deficiencies. 
 Another advantage of knowledge diagnosis is in relation to the possibility of 
self-assessment within an adaptive learning system (Ifenthaler, 2010c). The various 
quantitative indicators provide immediate information in terms of the range and 
complexity of the students’ knowledge structures. Then by comparing their 
structures to an expert or other students’, learners can make judgments about their 
own learning progress and identify areas of self-improvement. The immediacy of 
such comparisons can increase motivation by suggesting a course of action for the 
learners as well as the provision of constructive feedback (see Ifenthaler, 2009). 
 If the assessment of knowledge is carefully synchronized with specific tasks 
to be performed by the students, the SMD Technology can also be applied to provide 
detailed and individualized feedback for the execution of those tasks (Ifenthaler, 
2010c). This would be more helpful for student performance compared to a general 
feedback indicating success or failure since the teacher or the computer system can 
not only point out the errors but also provide suggestions on how to correct them 
(Shute & Zapata-Rivera, 2008). 
 Additionally, a person’s performance on a cognitive-oriented task can be 
predicted based on the characteristics of his or her knowledge structure (Koubek & 
Mountjoy, 1991). For example, a student with more complex knowledge structures 
may be ready for (and thus perform better) in higher-level problem solving tasks 
involving abstract domain-specific content, compared to a student whose knowledge 
structure is simpler. This can help the teacher or learning system allocate the 
appropriate level of assignment or the grouping of students as team members 
according to similar abilities. 
 In relation to team dynamics, the quantitative indicators and graphical re-
representations could also be used to facilitate knowledge sharing among team 
members (Ifenthaler, 2010c). Team understanding for the completion of a task could 
be compared with each individual’s understanding, thus differences can be identified 
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and the task completed in an effective manner. SMD Technology outputs can also be 
used to identify tacit knowledge that exist within individuals so that it can then be 
communicated and integrated into the team knowledge structures. Such an 
application is especially useful when you have new group members who need to get 
up to speed quickly within team projects. 
 In summary, a precise and stepwise diagnosis of cognitive structures helps us 
to better understand the differences within and between individuals as they develop 
over time. This will enable us to identify the most appropriate instructional materials 
and instructor feedback to be provided at suitable times during the learning process. 
We also suggest diagnosis of developing cognitive structures in different subject 
domains in order to detect variations in terms of how cognitive structures develop 
between different content areas. 
Conclusion and Future Work 
Our future work will involve validating our results in various subject domains and 
larger sample sizes. The core measures and the newly developed graph theory based 
measures of the SMD Technology will be further developed and implemented as a 
standard analysis tool for web applications. We will mainly concentrate on 
developing a new alternative for analyzing the semantic content of the externalized 
cognitive structures. Additionally, we are highly motivated to combine our tool with 
other existing analysis techniques in order to increase the reliability and validity of 
the diagnosis of changing cognitive structures. 
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Appendix A 
TABLE 6.9 
Level-2 linear growth models of cognitive structures (organization) and course learning outcomes 
  Coefficient SE t df p 
Mean Initial 
Status π0i 
11.98 1.54 7.77 23 <.001 
learning 6.18 3.82 1.62 23 0.119 
Mean Growth 
Rate π1i 
13.00 2.49 5.21 23 <.001 
Surface 
Structure 
learning 4.93 5.47 0.90 23 0.378 
Mean Initial 
Status π0i 
5.28 0.53 9.82 23 <.001 
learning 1.54 0.96 1.61 23 0.122 
Mean Growth 
Rate π1i 
1.76 0.41 4.28 23 <.001 
Graphical 
Structure 
learning -0.21 0.59 -0.36 23 0.723 
Mean Initial 
Status π0i 
1.48 0.15 10.17 23 <.001 
learning -0.43 0.20 -2.09 23 0.048 
Mean Growth 
Rate π1i 
0.29 0.14 2.04 23 0.053 
Ruggedness 
learning 0.12 0.21 0.59 23 0.562 
Mean Initial 
Status π0i 
1.79 0.09 18.00 23 <.001 
learning 0.46 0.14 3.29 23 0.004 
Mean Growth 
Rate π1i 
0.07 0.03 2.43 23 0.023 
Average Degree 
of Vertices 
learning -0.07 0.05 -1.48 23 0.153 
Mean Initial 
Status π0i 
1.68 0.54 3.12 23 0.005 
learning 2.44 0.73 3.36 23 0.003 
Mean Growth 
Rate π1i 
0.77 0.28 2.77 23 0.011 
Number of 
Cycles 
learning -0.53 0.37 -1.44 23 0.162 
Mean Initial 
Status π0i 
12.35 1.23 10.09 23 <.001 
learning 2.76 3.65 0.76 23 0.456 
Mean Growth 
Rate π1i 
12.42 2.25 5.51 23 <.001 
Number of 
Vertices 
learning 4.53 5.31 0.86 23 0.402 
 
TABLE 6.10 
Level-2 linear growth models of cognitive structures (semantics) and course learning outcomes 
  Coefficient SE t df p 
Mean Initial 
Status π0i 
6.89 0.89 7.75 23 <.001 
learning 3.32 1.59 2.08 23 0.048 
Mean Growth 
Rate π1i 
3.84 0.63 6.07 23 <.001 
Vertex 
Matching 
learning -0.36 0.81 -0.45 23 0.656 
Mean Initial 
Status π0i 
0.0291 0.0082 3.52 23 0.002 
learning 0.0053 0.0111 0.48 23 0.635 
Mean Growth 
Rate π1i 
-0.0023 0.0023 -1.01 23 0.323 
Propositional 
Matching 
learning 0.0011 0.0032 0.33 23 0.741 
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7 
BETWEEN-DOMAIN DISTINGUISHING FEATURES 
OF COGNITIVE STRUCTURE &  
This research aims to identify domain-specific similarities and differences of externalized cognitive 
structures. Cognitive structure, also known as knowledge structure or structural knowledge, is 
conceived as the manner in which an individual organizes the relationships of concepts in memory. 
By diagnosing these structures precisely, even partially, the educator comes closer to influencing them 
through instructional settings and materials. The assessment and analysis of cognitive structures is 
realized within the HIMATT tool, which automatically generates four quantitative indicators for the 
structural entities of written text or causal maps. Participants worked on the subject domains biology, 
history, and mathematics. Results clearly indicate different structural and semantic features across the 
three subject domains.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
& This chapter is based on: Ifenthaler, D. (accepted). Identifying between-domain distinguishing 
features of cognitive structures. Educational Technology Research and Development. 
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Introduction 
Knowledge representation is a key concept in psychological and educational 
diagnostics. Existing models for describing the fundamentals of knowledge 
representation are multifaceted. The distinction which has received the most critical 
attention is that between declarative (“knowing that”) and procedural (“knowing 
how”) forms of knowledge (see Anderson, 1983; Ryle, 1949). Closely associated 
with these concepts is the term cognitive structure, also known as knowledge 
structure or structural knowledge (Jonassen, et al., 1993). It refers to the manner in 
which an individual organizes the relationships between concepts in memory 
(Shavelson, 1972). Hence, an individual’s cognitive structure is made up of the 
interrelationships between concepts or facts and procedural elements. Furthermore, it 
is argued that the order in which information is retrieved from long-term memory 
and externalized will reflect in part the individual’s cognitive structure within and 
between concepts or domains (e.g., Strasser, 2010). Researchers and educators thus 
have immense interest in assessing and analyzing cognitive structures and comparing 
them with others in order to identify the most appropriate ways to facilitate learning 
and problem solving (Ifenthaler, et al., in press). By diagnosing cognitive structure 
precisely, or even partially, the educator can come closer to influencing it through 
instruction. It will help to organize materials, identify knowledge gaps as well as 
misconceptions, and relate new materials to existing slots or anchors within the 
learners’ cognitive structures (Jonassen, 1987). 
 Characteristics of cognitive structures have been researched and described for 
various subject domains. The majority of this research is concerned with domains in 
the natural sciences, e.g., physics (Chi, Glaser, & Rees, 1982) and biology (Baird & 
White, 1982). Other empirical studies have focused on within-domain specific 
features and the learning-dependent development of cognitive structure (e.g., 
Clariana & Wallace, 2007; Ifenthaler, et al., in press; Koubek, et al., 1994). 
However, as interdisciplinary learning and teaching is becoming more important 
(e.g., Nikitina, 2005), a comprehensive understanding of cognitive structures across 
different subject domains is inevitable. 
 In this chapter, an empirical study in which similarities and differences in 
externalized cognitive structure across three domains is reported: biology, history, 
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and mathematics. It is also intended to show an automated, reliable, and valid 
measurement technique that would make this identification possible. 
Background 
Researchers in the field of cognitive and developmental psychology have proposed a 
logic-based universal cognitive structure (e.g., Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991; Rips, 
1994), and there is hardly any doubt that the concept of cognitive structure is 
applicable to every domain of knowledge (Jonassen, et al., 1993). In addition, 
educational researchers have described the characteristics of cognitive structure for 
different domains, e.g. physics (Chi, et al., 1982) or biology (Baird & White, 1982). 
During the 1980s and 1990s, educational and cognitive psychology focused on 
domain specificity within cognitive structure. The objective was to identify the 
meaning or impact of different knowledge structures for specific domains of 
knowledge. Ennis (1989, 1990) and McPeck (1990) debated on and described 
domain specificity in their discussion on critical thinking. As a result, three 
principles of domain specificity have been developed: (1) It needs prior knowledge, 
(2) it cannot be transferred to other domains without explicit instructions focusing on 
transfer, and (3) it cannot be deduced from general critical thinking instructions. 
These principles constitute the foundation for ongoing research on domain specificity 
of cognitive structure.  
 Based on the above-described assumptions, many studies published in the 
past decades have focused on domain-specific knowledge, prior knowledge, and the 
structure of knowledge in various fields, such as physics (Clement, 1981; Moeira, 
1983), chemistry (Taber, 1995), science in general (Bliss, 1996; Watts, 1988), logic 
(Chase & Simon, 1973), and the social sciences (Voss, Greece, Post, & Penner, 
1983). Other studies have indentified the development of cross-domain scientific 
reasoning processes (Kuhn, Schauble, & Garcia-Mila, 1992), complex mathematical 
problem solving (Vye, Goldman, Voss, Hmelo, & Williams, 1997), and text 
processing in history (Wolfe & Goldman, 2005). However, our extensive literature 
review shows that previous studies focused primarily on knowledge structures in 
specific domains.  
 Furthermore, many insights about the nature of cognitive structure in 
different domains are influenced by research on expertise (e.g., Chi, Feltovich, & 
Glaser, 1981). Here, the objective is to identify the essential differences in cognitive 
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structures between novices and experts in a specific domain (Gruber & Ziegler, 
1996). Some approaches see expertise as being caused by giftedness (Sternberg, 
1993), others see it as a general, learnable phenomenon (Glaser, 1999). However, 
there is general agreement on the point that expertise is usually restricted to one 
domain (e.g., Gruber, 1994). This is mainly explained by the large amount of time a 
person needs to become an expert (Gruber, 1994). Empirical results show that a well-
organized cognitive structure is an essential factor for expertise (Gruber, 1994). 
Moreover, experts recognize meaningful patterns and relevant information for a 
problem faster than novices and spend a lot more time representing the core problem. 
Another characteristic is fast information processing, which can be explained by 
multifaceted elaboration supported by experience (Gruber & Ziegler, 1996). 
Accordingly, these findings confirm the assumption that cognitive structure may be 
context bound. 
 In contrast, interdisciplinary learning and teaching is widely discussed and 
claimed (e.g., Holley, 2009; Woods, 2007). Still, we were not able to identify 
empirical studies that compared cognitive structure across different subject domains. 
Therefore, our current research goes beyond the focus on cognitive structure within a 
single domain. More specifically, we aim to identify similarities and differences in 
externalized cognitive structure between three distinct subject domains: biology, 
history, and mathematics. These three domains represent different types of domains. 
History is regarded as ‘soft’ domain that lacks a central body of theory (Biglan, 
1973). On the other hand, mathematics is regarded as ‘hard’ domain with a central 
body of theory (Biglan, 1973). Biology can be classified in between the hard and soft 
domains. Additionally, these three subject domains were chosen due to their different 
instructional methods and because they are taught in nearly every grade. In the 
following sections we discuss unique features of these three domains and suggest 
possible cross-domain distinguishing features. 
Biology 
Biology, a natural science, is concerned with the study of life and includes 
interdisciplinary fields such as zoology, botany, physiology, medicine, and 
psychology (Nason & Goldstein, 1969). The scientific methods used in biology are 
multifaceted, including physical, mathematical, sociological, and psychological 
techniques. Empirical research on learning in biology has dealt with motivation, and 
interest as well as cognitive structure (Baalmann, 1997; Bayrhuber, 2001; Mintzes, 
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Yen, & Barney, 2008). Findings show that wide generalization of facts in biology 
has negative effects on highly elaborated knowledge structure (Eschenhagen, 
Kattmann, & Rodi, 2008). Additionally, knowledge in biology has strong 
correlations with the specific attitudes and interests of learners (Trumper, 2006).  
 Thompson and Mintzes (2002) showed that affective learning and teaching 
objectives are very important for biology education. This is evident in the large 
amount of topics involving ethical issues, like sexuality, the natural environment, and 
health education (Eschenhagen, et al., 2008). Domain-dependent learning objectives 
include issues involving plants, animals, and human beings, e.g., the variety of 
ecosystems, changes in populations, ecological sequencing, and interactions between 
the climate and living organisms (Tamir & Jungwirth, 1972). Additionally, basic 
concepts and techniques of the natural sciences are also elements in biology 
education. Hence, biology instruction focuses on transferring already existing 
(preschool) prior and general knowledge to a scientifically correct hierarchical order 
and specifying it during the learning process. In summary, knowledge structure in 
biology can be characterized as hierarchical, well-connected, but not very fine-
grained. 
History  
Methodologically speaking, history moved from pure descriptive historicism to a 
social science perspective to meet the requirements of modern society (Iggers, 1996). 
Empirical studies in history learning focus on the analysis of attitudes and affective 
dispositions towards specific events or people, e.g.: “Who is responsible for WWII?” 
(Hasberg, 2001). However, empirical research on cognitive structure in history is 
rare (von Borries, 2001). The few existing empirical investigations concerned with 
cognitive structure are limited to qualitative methods (Mirow, 1991; Pape, 2006). 
According to Mirow (1991), cognitive structure in history consists of unconnected 
knowledge islands developed from different sources. Moreover, there are fatal 
misinterpretations or misconceptions concerning the importance or the historical 
background of events (Donovan & Bransford, 2005; Mirow, 1991). For example, 
learners do not seem to be oriented towards canonized content; rather, they mobilize 
different content and situation-dependent memorizations, which leads to different 
“histories” (Rüsen, Fröhlich, Horstkötter, & Schmidt, 1991, p. 343). 
 From an instructional point of view, the overall learning and teaching 
objective of history is to cultivate a critical historical consciousness, e.g., a sense of 
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time, a sense of reality, moral sense, and a sense of history and politics (Pandel, 
1987). To sum up, cognitive structure in history can be characterized as linear, 
unconnected, and oversimplified.  
Mathematics 
Mathematics is one of the oldest sciences and is organized around many branches. 
Numbers, logic, geometry, algebra, and statistics are just a small part of the broad 
spectrum (Courant & Robbins, 2000). Mathematics is used as an ancillary science in 
nearly all other sciences. In contrast to biology and history, research in mathematics 
has long been focused on the cognitive structure of learners (de Corte, Greer, & 
Verschaffel, 1996). Findings concerning cognitive structure in mathematics have 
been discussed in research on psychology (Piaget, 1972) and artificial intelligence (J. 
Johnson, McKee, & Vella, 1994) as well as in other branches. They suggest that 
mathematical knowledge develops when coping with real world problems. These real 
world problems are abstracted to mathematical problems in a step-by-step process 
through assimilation and accommodation (Piaget, 1972). However, most of these 
studies analyze deterministic skills like counting (de Corte, et al., 1996). Empirical 
findings focusing on the cognitive structure of complex mathematical phenomena 
(e.g., differential and integral calculus) are not available. Overall, it is assumed that 
mathematical knowledge is strongly connected to a person’s mathematical reality, 
i.e. personal perceptions and experiences (Kitcher, 1983). Cognitive structures for 
mathematics may be very complex and have rich connections. Additionally, 
hierarchical as well as linear principles play a fundamental role in mathematical 
thinking (de Corte, et al., 1996; Kleinert, 2005). 
 From an instructional point of view, learning and teaching objectives have 
been a cause for controversy due to the wide range of available instructional methods 
and for ideological reasons. Still, general learning and teaching objectives include, 
e.g., the application of mathematics to other fields, creativity, and rational 
argumentation (Winter, 1975). As in biology, visual demonstration and application to 
the real-life situations of learners are typical instructional methods. To sum up, 
cognitive structure in mathematics can be characterized as linear and hierarchical, 
well-connected, and very specific. 
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Cross-domain distinguishing features 
The above-described theoretical and empirical assumptions of the three subject 
domains allow us to describe possible cross-domain distinguishing features: (1) 
Students’ knowledge in the domain biology is well structured and is ordered in 
hierarchical fashion. However, general knowledge and specific details are not well 
developed. (2) Historical knowledge is characterized by separate knowledge islands, 
is less structured, and oversimplified. Additionally, it often includes misconceptions, 
e.g., historical events are dated incorrectly. (3) Mathematical knowledge tends to be 
very complex and rich in relations. Moreover, it has a strong hierarchical 
organization and is characterized by everyday mathematical experiences.  
The clear structural organization in biology and mathematical knowledge leads us to 
the assumption that it might be significantly different from the fragmented 
knowledge in history. Hence, one might expect a more complex cognitive structure 
in biology and mathematics. However, biology includes less abstracted cognitive 
structure, whereas mathematics is characterized by more specified and complex 
cognitive structure. 
Our research 
Our research builds on the verdict that cognitive and educational researchers use 
theoretical constructs, e.g., mental models, schemata, etc., to explain complex 
cognitive structure and procedures for learning, reasoning, and problem solving (e.g., 
Gentner & Stevens, 1983; Johnson-Laird, 1983; Jonassen, et al., 1993; Lehrer & 
Romberg, 1996; Schauble, Klopfer, & Raghavan, 1991; Seel, et al., 2009; Snow, 
1989, 1990). However, these internal cognitive structures and functions are not 
directly observable. 
 Accordingly, the assessment and analysis of internal cognitive structure and 
functions requires that they be externalized. Therefore, we argue that it is essential to 
identify economic, fast, reliable, and valid techniques to elicit and analyze these 
cognitive structures (see Ifenthaler, 2008, 2010d). Methodologies include 
standardized questionnaires and interviews, think-aloud protocols (e.g., Ericsson & 
Simon, 1993), the assessment of log files or click streams (e.g., Chung & Baker, 
2003; Dummer & Ifenthaler, 2005), eye-tracking measures (e.g., Mikkilä-Erdmann, 
Penttinen, Anto, & Olkinuora, 2008), and Pathfinder networks (Durso & Coggins, 
1990; Schvaneveldt, 1990), as well as mind tools (e.g., Jonassen & Cho, 2008; 
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Spector, et al., 2006). Accordingly, the possibilities for externalizing cognitive 
structure are limited to a few sets of sign and symbol systems (Seel, 1999b) – 
characterized as graphical- and language-based approaches (Ifenthaler, 2010d). A 
widely accepted application for the assessment and analysis of cognitive structure is 
a concept, causal, or knowledge map which can be automatically scored and 
compared to an expert’s solution (Herl, et al., 1996; Spector, et al., 2006; Spector & 
Koszalka, 2004). On the other hand, there are convincing arguments indicating that 
natural language representations (e.g., written texts) are a good basis for assessing 
and analyzing cognitive structure (Ifenthaler & Pirnay-Dummer, 2009). 
As not every available methodology is suitable for this research (e.g., lack of 
reliability and validity, too labor intensive, etc.), we utilize the web-based assessment 
and analysis platform HIMATT (Highly Integrated Model Assessment Technology 
and Tools; Pirnay-Dummer, et al., 2010). 
 HIMATT is a combined toolset which was developed to convey the benefits 
of various methodological approaches in a single environment and which can be used 
by researchers with only little prior training (Pirnay-Dummer & Ifenthaler, 2010). 
Methodologically, the tools integrated into HIMATT touch the boundaries between 
qualitative and quantitative research methods and build bridges between them. First 
of all, written text can be analyzed very quickly without loosening the associative 
strength of natural language. Furthermore, causal maps can be annotated by experts 
and compared to other solutions. The automated analysis function produces measures 
which range from surface-oriented structural comparisons (e.g., number of used 
concepts, complexity of representation) to integrated semantic (e.g., correctness of 
concepts or propositions) similarity measures. There are four structural (surface, 
graphical, structural, and gamma matching) and three semantic (concept, 
propositional, and balanced propositional matching) measures available (see the 
Method section for a detailed description of them). All of the data, regardless of how 
it is assessed, can be analyzed quantitatively using the same comparison functions 
without further manual effort or recoding. 
 The central research objective in this study is to identify cross-domain 
distinguishing features of externalized cognitive structures. First, we look at two 
specific sources of externalization of cognitive structure, written text and causal 
maps. We expect these different forms of externalization to represent the same 
structural and semantic content within each subject domain (Hypothesis 1). More 
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specifically, due to the short time between writing texts and constructing causal 
maps, we expect a close match between the structural and semantic HIMATT 
measures (Pirnay-Dummer, et al., 2010; a description of all of the applied measures 
will be provided in the following section).  
 Secondly, previous empirical studies have focused on domain-specific 
features and the learning-dependent development of cognitive structure (e.g., 
Clariana & Wallace, 2007; Ifenthaler, et al., in press; Koubek, et al., 1994). 
However, an empirical analysis and comparison of the organization of cognitive 
structures across different domains has not been conducted so far. Accordingly, this 
study will identify similarities and differences in externalized cognitive structures 
between three different subject domains: biology, history, and mathematics. These 
three subject domains were chosen due to their different instructional methods and 
because they are taught in nearly every grade. Based on prior research (de Corte, et 
al., 1996; Kleinert, 2005; Mirow, 1991; Thompson & Mintzes, 2002), we 
hypothesize that the externalizations of the three subject domains have different 
structural features (Hypothesis 2.1). Additionally, we assume that the 
externalizations of biology knowledge are strongly organized in a hierarchy 
(Hypothesis 2.2), that the externalizations of mathematics knowledge are also 
strongly organized in hierarchical order (Hypothesis 2.3), and that the organization 
of externalizations of historical knowledge are less hierarchical (Hypothesis 2.4). We 
also assume that the externalizations in the history domain are less connected than 
those in biology and mathematics (Hypothesis 2.5). Last, on the basis of equal 
difficulty level of the learning material, we expect that the declarative knowledge 
(assessed with a domain-specific knowledge test) does not differ across the three 
domains (Hypothesis 2.6). 
 Finally, previous research studies on cognitive structure have found 
contradictory results concerning learners’ cognitive abilities in association with 
learning outcomes (e.g., Hilbert & Renkl, 2008; Ifenthaler, et al., 2007; O'Donnell, 
Dansereau, & Hall, 2002). Hence, our final research question will contribute to this 
vague empirical basis. We assume that learners with higher mathematical abilities 
will outperform those with lower mathematical abilities with regard to their learning 
outcomes in the mathematics domains (Hypothesis 3.1). Additionally, we assume 
that verbal and spatial abilities will have no effect on learning outcomes in the three 
subject domains biology, history, and mathematics (Hypothesis 3.2). 
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Method 
Participants 
Seventy-one students (61 female and 10 male) from a European university 
participated in the study. Their average age was 22.2 years (SD = 2.3). They were all 
enrolled in an advanced course on diagnostics in schools and further education and 
had studied for an average of 2.5 semesters (SD = 2.1). The first language of 85% of 
the participants was German. 15% of the participants spoke German as their second 
language. None of the participants were specially trained in the three subject 
domains biology, history, or mathematics. 
Materials 
The materials consisted of three domain-specific articles for the domains biology, 
history, and mathematics. Additional materials included knowledge tests for each 
domain, a test for experience with causal maps, three subscales of an intelligence 
test, and tools for eliciting the participants’ understanding of the phenomenon in 
question. 
Domain-specific articles 
Selection of the three domain-specific articles was based on (a) an equal difficulty 
level, (b) a similar text length, and (c) the integration into the high school 
curriculum. A German-language article on the human brain with 546 words was 
used as the first learning material for the biology domain. A German-language article 
on the European boarders with 720 words was used for the history domain. For the 
mathematics domain, a German-language article on the statistical procedures of the 
t-test with 500 words was used. 
Domain-specific knowledge tests 
Each knowledge test (biology, history, mathematics) included 10 multiple-choice 
questions with four possible solutions each (1 correct, 3 incorrect). They were 
developed on the basis of the domain-specific articles. In a pilot study (N = 5 
participants, independent from the participants of the main study), we tested the 
average difficulty level to account for ceiling effects. All participants had low prior 
knowledge in the three domains. They scored M = 3.2 correct answers (SD = 1.2) on 
the biology test, M = 3.4 correct answers (SD = 1.7) on the history test, and M = 2.1 
correct answers (SD = .9) on the mathematics test. In our experiment we 
administered two equivalent versions (in which the 10 multiple-choice questions 
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appeared in a different order) of the domain-specific knowledge tests (pre- and 
posttest). Participants did not receive feedback on the scores or on the correctness of 
their answers for the pre- and posttest. It took about five minutes to complete each 
test. 
Experience with causal maps test 
The participants’ experience with causal maps was tested with a questionnaire 
including eight items (Ifenthaler, 2009; Cronbach’s alpha = .87). The questions were 
answered on a five-point Likert scale (1 = totally disagree; 2 = disagree; 3 = partially 
agree; 4 = agree; 5 = totally agree), e.g., “I used causal maps to structure learning 
content”, “The construction of causal maps is easy.” (translated from German). 
Mathematical, spatial, and verbal abilities 
Three subscales of the I-S-T 2000 R (Amthauer, Brocke, Liepmann, & Beauducel, 
2001) were used to test the participants’ mathematical, spatial, and verbal abilities. 
This test is a widely used intelligence test in Germany with high reliability (r = .88 to 
r = .96; split-half reliability). 
 The first subscale was used to test the participants’ mathematical abilities. A 
total of 20 arithmetic problems (+, -, *, /) had to be completed. Participants had ten 
minutes to complete this subscale. The second subscale tested spatial abilities. The 
participants had nine minutes to choose similar cubes from a set of five by rotating 
them. Subset two included 20 cube problems. The third subscale we used tested 
verbal abilities. A total of 20 sentences with a missing word had to be completed 
using a set of five words. The participants had six minutes to complete this subset.  
HIMATT causal maps and text input tools 
The causal maps tool, which is part of the HIMATT (Pirnay-Dummer, et al., 2010) 
environment, was used to assess the participants’ understanding of the domain-
specific phenomenon in question. The intuitive web-based tool allows participants to 
create causal maps with only little training (Pirnay-Dummer & Ifenthaler, 2010). 
Once created, all causal maps are automatically stored on the HIMATT database for 
further analysis. The HIMATT text input tool was also used to assess the 
participants’ understanding of the domain-specific learning content. Participants’ 
written texts are automatically parsed and stored on the HIMATT database for 
further analysis. Written and on-screen instructions in form of questions were 
provided for each subject domain. 
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Procedure 
First, the participants completed a demographic data questionnaire and the 
experience with causal maps test. Secondly, they completed the test on verbal, 
mathematical, and spatial abilities. Next, the participants were given an introduction 
to causal maps and were shown how to use the HIMATT software. After a short 
relaxation phase, they completed the domain-specific knowledge test on history. 
Then they received the text on European borders. The participants had 15 minutes to 
read the text. Then they logged in to the HIMATT system, where they constructed a 
causal map on their understanding of European borders (ten minutes). Immediately 
afterwards, they wrote a text about their understanding of European borders (ten 
minutes). After another short relaxation phase, the procedure was repeated with the 
domains mathematics and biology (1. domain specific knowledge test, 2. reading of 
text, 3. construction of a causal map, 4. writing of text). In total, the experiment took 
approximately two hours. 
Data analysis 
During our experiment, the participants used the web-based platform HIMATT to 
externalize their understanding of the three subject domains in the form of a causal 
map and a written text. The automatically stored data were analyzed using the 
HIMATT analysis function (see Pirnay-Dummer, et al., 2010). Additionally, we used 
a qualitative scoring rubric to classify the hierarchical structure of the graphical 
externalizations. 
HIMATT 
In order to analyze the participants’ understanding of the phenomena in question 
(biology, history, mathematics), we used the seven measures implemented in 
HIMATT (see Table 7.1; Ifenthaler, 2010d; Pirnay-Dummer, et al., 2010).  
 Both written texts and causal maps were analyzed using the seven HIMATT 
measures. Before the written text can be analyzed, a parsing algorithm must be 
applied. The written text is tokenized, tagged, and stemmed, and the most frequent 
concepts and pairwise associations between concepts are determined (Pirnay-
Dummer & Ifenthaler, 2010). Accordingly, concepts from the written text are stored 
pairwise on the HIMATT database along with the strength of association. 
Additionally, the causal maps are stored on the HIMATT database directly. . 
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Each of the participants’ written texts and causal maps can be compared 
automatically against each other, across domains, or against a reference map (e.g., an 
expert representation). The automated analysis generates seven measures of 
HIMATT (see Table 7.1). They include four structural and three semantic measures 
(Ifenthaler, 2010c, 2010d; Pirnay-Dummer & Ifenthaler, 2010; Pirnay-Dummer, et 
al., 2010). 
TABLE 7.1 
Description of the seven HIMATT measures 
Measure 
[abbreviation]  and 
type 
Short description 
Surface matching  
[SFM] 
Structural indicator 
The surface matching (Ifenthaler, 2010c) compares the number of vertices 
within two graphs. It is a simple and easy way to calculate values for surface 
complexity. 
Graphical matching 
[GRM] 
Structural indicator 
The graphical matching (Ifenthaler, 2010c) compares the diameters of the 
spanning trees of the graphs, which is an indicator for the range of conceptual 
knowledge. It corresponds to structural matching as it is also a measure for 
structural complexity only. 
Structural matching 
[STM]  
Structural indicator 
The structural matching (Pirnay-Dummer & Ifenthaler, 2010) compares the 
complete structures of two graphs without regard to their content. This 
measure is necessary for all hypotheses which make assumptions about 
general features of structure (e.g. assumptions which state that expert 
knowledge is structured differently from novice knowledge). 
Gamma matching  
[GAM] 
Structural indicator 
The gamma or density of vertices (Pirnay-Dummer & Ifenthaler, 2010) 
describes the quotient of terms per vertex within a graph. Since both graphs 
which connect every term with each other term (everything with everything) 
and graphs which only connect pairs of terms can be considered weak 
models, a medium density is expected for most good working models. 
Concept matching  
[CCM]  
Semantic indicator 
Concept matching (Pirnay-Dummer & Ifenthaler, 2010) compares the sets of 
concepts (vertices) within a graph to determine the use of terms. This 
measure is especially important for different groups which operate in the 
same domain (e.g. use the same textbook). It determines differences in 
language use between the models. 
Propositional 
matching [PPM]  
Semantic indicator 
The propositional matching (Ifenthaler, 2010c) value compares only fully 
identical propositions between two graphs. It is a good measure for 
quantifying semantic similarity between two graphs. 
Balanced 
propositional 
matching  
[BPM] 
Semantic indicator 
The balanced propositional matching (Pirnay-Dummer & Ifenthaler, 2010) is 
the quotient of propositional matching and concept matching. Especially 
when both indices are being interpreted, balanced propositional matching 
should be preferred over propositional matching. 
 
HIMATT uses specific automated comparison algorithms to calculate similarities 
between a given pair of frequencies f1 (e.g., expert solution) and f2 (e.g., participant 
solution), which results in a measure of 0 ≤ s ≤ 1, where s = 0 is complete exclusion 
and s = 1 is identity. The other measures collect sets of properties using the Tversky 
similarity (Tversky, 1977). The Tversky similarity also results in a measure of 0 ≤ s 
≤ 1, where s = 0 is complete exclusion and s = 1 is identity. Please refer to Prinay-
Dummer and Ifenthaler (2010) for a detailed discussion of the comparison 
algorithms. 
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Every single measure integrated into HIMATT are tested for reliability. The 
reliability scores range from r = .79 to r = .94 and are tested for the structural and 
semantic measures separately and across different knowledge domains (Pirnay-
Dummer, et al., 2010). Validity scores are also reported separately for the structural 
and semantic measures. Convergent validity lies between r = .71 and r = .91 for 
semantic comparison measures and between r = .48 and r = .79 for structural 
comparison measures (see Pirnay-Dummer, et al., 2010). 
Structural classification 
Qualitative classification of the structure of the causal maps was based on the four 
categories introduced by Ku (2007): (1) hierarchy map, (2) spider map, (3) flowchart 
map, (4) system map. For each subject domain (biology, history, mathematics), we 
generated standardized graphical outputs using the HIMATT platform (see Figure 
7.1). 
FIGURE 7.1. Standardized graphical output of the domain history (hierarchical structure) 
 
All standardized graphical outputs (causal maps; N = 213) were coded using the 
above-described categories (1 = hierarchy structure; 2 = spider structure; 3 = 
flowchart structure; 4 = system structure; 5 = other structure). Each coder received a 
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printed set of the standardized graphical outputs (including a subject and domain 
code; N = 213) and a coding sheet, where they had to enter the subject and domain 
code and in which of the five categories it belonged to. Three independent 
researchers found an average interrater reliability of κ = .85 (Fleiss' kappa; Fleiss, 
1971). 
Results 
Initial data checks showed that the distributions of ratings and scores satisfied our 
assumptions concerning the analysis procedures. All effects were assessed at the .05 
level. As effect size measures, we used Cohen’s d (small effect: d < .50, medium 
effect .50 ≤ d ≤ .80, strong effect d > .80) and partial ƞ2 (small effect: ƞ2 < .06, 
medium effect .06 ≤ ƞ2 ≤ .13, strong effect ƞ2 > .13).  
 More than two-thirds of the participants (77%) did not use causal maps to 
structure their own learning materials before our experiment. Only 19% used 
software to create their own causal maps beforehand. 45% of the participants 
answered that they did not find it difficult to create a causal map, 55% had 
difficulties in creating causal maps. 
 On each domain-specific knowledge test (biology, history, mathematics), 
participants could score a maximum of 10 correct answers. ANOVA was used to test 
for differences among the three subject domains (Hypothesis 2.6). The correct 
answers differed significantly across the three subject domains, F(2, 210) = 5.51, p = 
.005, η2 = .05. Tukey HSD post-hoc comparisons of the three subject domains 
indicate that participants had significantly better scores on the biology test (M = 5.01, 
SD = 1.69, 95% CI [4.62, 5.41]) than on the history test (M = 3.93, SD = 1.78, 95% 
CI [3.51, 4.35]), p = .003. Comparisons between the correct answers on the 
mathematics test (M = 4.34; SD = 2.37) and the biology and history tests were not 
statistically significant at p < .05.  
Written text and causal maps 
For all three subject domains (biology, history, mathematics), the written texts and 
causal maps constructed by the participants were automatically compared to domain-
specific expert representations by the HIMATT analysis feature (see Table 7.1). 
Hence, for both written texts and causal maps, seven similarity scores (0 = no 
similarity; 1 = total similarity; for the measures surface, graphical, structural, 
gamma, concept, propositional, and balanced propositional matching) were available 
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for further statistical analysis. In order to identify possible expert-novice differences 
between written text and causal maps, we computed paired-sample t-tests for the 
seven HIMATT similarity scores between experts’ and participants’ representations 
for the three subject domains. (see Table 7.2). 
Table 7.2 
HIMATT similarity scores (standard deviations in parentheses) between causal maps, texts 
and expert representations for the three subject domains 
Subject domain 
Biology History Mathematics HIMATT similarity 
measure Causal map Text 
Causal 
map Text 
Causal 
map Text 
Surface	  
matching	  
[SFM] 
.527 (.298) .474 (.262) .314 (.234) .304 (.246) .460 (.234) .434 (.233) 
Graphical	  
matching	  
[GRM] 
.639 (.244) .522 (.184) .461 (.261) .538 (.271) .597 (.231) .670 (.230) 
Structural	  
matching	  
[STM] 
.659 (.210) .681 (.168) .551 (.171) .501 (.186) .576 (.153) .489 (.167) 
Gamma	  
matching	  
[GAM] 
.682 (.244) .730 (.286) .547 (.187) .518 (.246) .601 (.181) .448 (.227) 
Concept	  
matching	  
[CCM] 
.324 (.131) .052 (.079) .078 (.105) .141 (.083) .064 (.078) .097 (.081) 
Propositional	  
matching	  
[PPM] 
.023 (.052) .007 (.030) .008 (.021) .018 (.029) .005 (.020) .012 (.026) 
Balanced	  
propositional	  
matching	  
[BPM] 
.062 (.133) .032 (.112) .034 (.089) .088 (.136) .023 (.082) .058 (.115) 
Note. HIMATT similarity measures, 0 = no similarity; 1 = total similarity; SFM, GRM, STM, and 
GAM are structural measures; CCM, PPM, and BPM are semantic measures 
 
Interestingly, written text and causal maps seem to represent different structures and 
content across the three subject domains when compared to an expert’s 
representation. In the biology domain, the participants’ causal maps were 
significantly more similar to the expert’s representation than their written texts were 
with regard to the graphical matching (GRM) measure, t(70) = 3.25, p = .002, d = 
.54. Additionally, we found higher similarities between the participants’ causal maps 
and expert representations for the semantic HIMATT measures CCM, t(70) = 16.14, 
p < .001, d = 2.51, and PPM, t(70) = 2.27, p = .026, d = .38. In the history domain, 
analysis revealed significant differences for the semantic HIMATT measures. Here, 
the written texts of the participants were more similar to the expert’s representation 
with regard to CCM, t(67) = 3.41, p = .001, d = .67, PPM, t(67) = 2.27, p = .026, d = 
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.39, and BPM, t(67) = 2.52, p = .014, d = .47. In the mathematics domain, the 
participants’ written texts were significantly more similar to the expert’s 
representation than their causal maps were with regard to the GRM measure, t(67) = 
1.99, p = .050, d = .32. On the other hand, the participants’ causal maps were 
significantly more similar to the expert’s representation than their written texts were 
with regard to the STM measure, t(67) = 3.09, p = .003, d = .54, and the GAM 
measure, t(67) = 4.62, p < .001, d = .75. Additionally, we found higher similarities 
between the participants’ written texts and expert representations for the semantic 
HIMATT measure CCM, t(67) = 2.24, p < .028, d = .42.   
 Therefore, we had to reject Hypothesis 1. The causal maps and text did not 
represent the same structural and semantic content within the three subject domains. 
Cross-domain distinguishing features 
In order to identify the hypothesized cross-domain distinguishing features, we 
computed a MANOVA with the seven descriptive HIMATT measures (SFM, GRM, 
STM, GAM, CCM, PPM, BPM) as within-subject factors (see Table 7.3). The 
following between-subject factors were applied for the seven separate analyses: 1. 
Subject domain (biology, history, mathematics); 2. Elicitation  method (causal map, 
written text).  
 MANOVA showed a significant main effect of the subject domain on the 
descriptive HIMATT measures, Wilks’ Lambda = .749, F(14, 814) = 9.048, p < .001, 
η2 = .135. Univariate ANOVA’s revealed that the effect was caused by the dependent 
variables SFM, F(2, 413) = 5.561, p = .004, η2 = .026, GRM, F(2, 413) = 7.983, p < 
.001, η2 = .037, STM, F(2, 413) = 12.420, p < .001, η2 = .057, GAM, F(2, 413) = 
11.075, p < .001, η2 = .051, and CCM, F(2, 413) = 17.634, p < .001, η2 = .079. Post-
hoc comparisons using Tukey’s HSD revealed that the re-representations in the 
biology domain contained a larger surface (SFM) than did those in the history (p = 
.007) and mathematics (p = .022) domains. Additionally, the re-representations in the 
history domain were less complex (GRM) than those in the biology (p = .001) and 
mathematics (p = .004) domains. The complete structure (STM) of the re-
representations was larger in the biology domain than in the history (p < .001) and 
mathematics (p = .001) domains. The connectedness (GAM) of the re-representations 
in the biology (p = .002) and history (p < .001) domains was higher than in the 
mathematics domain. Finally, the number of semantically correct concepts in the 
biology domain was higher than in the history (p = .022) and mathematics (p < .001) 
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domains. Additionally, the number of semantically correct concepts in the history 
domain was higher than in the mathematics (p = .003) domain. 
Table 7.3  
HIMATT descriptive measures (standard deviations in parentheses) of participants’ causal 
maps and written texts for the three subject domains 
Subject domain 
Biology History Mathematics HIMATT descriptive 
measure Causal map Text 
Causal 
map Text 
Causal 
map Text 
Surface	  
matching	  
[SFM] 
13.704 
(4.086) 
24.409 
(32.656) 
9.294   
(3.516) 
16.543 
(19.880) 
10.268 
(3.517) 
17.471 
(11.742) 
Graphical	  
matching	  
[GRM] 
5.592   
(1.769) 
4.296   
(3.240) 
4.368   
(1.789) 
3.429   
(2.801) 
5.070    
(1.799) 
4.500 
(2.282) 
Structural	  
matching	  
[STM] 
13.831 
(3.676) 
11.803 
(9.746) 
9.324   
(2.985) 
9.429   
(7.866) 
9.972    
(3.052) 
10.677 
(4.952) 
Gamma	  
matching	  
[GAM] 
.468        
(.080) 
.469        
(.329) 
.457        
(.130) 
.537        
(.376) 
.429        
(.106) 
.312    
(.216) 
Concept	  
matching	  
[CCM] 
2.225   
(2.349) 
2.127   
(1.971) 
1.206   
(1.356) 
2.086   
(1.726) 
.563        
(.788) 
1.466 
(1.165) 
Propositional	  
matching	  
[PPM] 
.127        
(.375) 
.296        
(.595) 
.132        
(.420) 
.500        
(.737) 
.056        
(.232) 
.368    
(.710) 
Balanced	  
propositional	  
matching	  
[BPM] 
.026        
(.076) 
.091        
(.179) 
.042        
(.139) 
.154        
(.220) 
.026        
(.108) 
.123    
(.230) 
Note. SFM, GRM, STM, and GAM are structural measures; CCM, PPM, and BPM are semantic 
measures (compared to the domain specific expert representation) 
 
In addition, MANOVA revealed a significant main effect of the elicitation method 
on the descriptive HIMATT measures, Wilks’ Lambda = .667, F(7, 407) = 29.073, p 
< .001, η2 = .333. Univariate ANOVA’s revealed that the effect was caused by the 
dependent variables SFM, F(1, 413) = 26.669, p < .001, η2 = .061, GRM, F(1, 413) = 
16.552, p < .001, η2 = .039, CCM, F(1, 413) = 12.006, p = .001, η2 = .028, and PPM, 
F(1, 413) = 1.251, p = .016, η2 = .020. Written texts (M = 19.47, SD = 1.15) had a 
larger surface (SFM) than causal maps (M = 11.09, SD = 1.15). Additionally, the 
written texts contained more semantically correct concepts and propositions (M = 
1.89, SD = .11 for CCM, and M = .39, SD = .04 for PPM) than the causal maps (M = 
1.33, SD = .11, and M = .11, SD = .04, respectively).  
 Finally, MANOVA revealed a significant interaction effect of the subject 
domain and elicitation method on the descriptive HIMATT measures, Wilks’ 
Lambda = .888, F(14, 814) = 3.562, p < .001, η2 = .058. According to univariate 
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ANOVA’s this effect was caused by the dependent variables GAM, F(2, 413) = 
6.139, p = .002, η2 = .029, and CCM, F(2, 413) = 4.192, p = .016, η2 = .020. Figure 
2a shows the interaction effect on GAM. The connectedness of the re-representation 
in the history domain is higher for causal maps than for written texts. In contrast, the 
connectedness of the re-representations in the mathematics domain is higher for 
written texts than for causal maps. Figure 7.2b shows the interaction effect on CCM. 
Accordingly, the number of semantically correct concepts is higher for written texts 
than for causal maps in the subject domains history and mathematics. 
 Therefore, we accept Hypothesis 2.1. Externalizations of the three subject 
domains have different structural features. 
 
FIGURE 7.2. Interactions of subject domain x elicitation method on the descriptive HIMATT 
measures GAM (part A) and CCM (part B) 
 
Furthermore, a 5 x 3 (structural classification by subject domain) chi-square test was 
conducted to assess whether the structural classification (hierarchy, spider, flowchart, 
system, other) is different in the three subject domains (biology, history, 
mathematics). The results of the chi-square test were significant, χ2 (8, N = 71) = 
61.29, p = < .001.  Additionally, detailed analysis of standardized residuals was 
conducted in order to find out which structural classifications of the causal maps 
revealed significant differences (see Table 7.4). The hierarchical structure was the 
most frequent classification within the domains history and mathematics. In contrast, 
the spider structure was the most frequent classification in the biology domain. In the 
biology domain, the proportion of spider structure was much greater than 
hypothesized, while the proportion of hierarchy structure was lower than 
hypothesized. In the history domain, the proportion of spider structure was lower 
than hypothesized. In the mathematics domain, the proportion of hierarchical 
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structure was greater than hypothesized, while the proportion of spider structure was 
lower than hypothesized.  
 Therefore, we had to reject Hypothesis 2.2. The causal maps of the biology 
domain were less organized in hierarchical order than expected. However, we accept 
Hypothesis 2.3, as the causal maps of the mathematics domain were organized in a 
strongly hierarchical order. Furthermore, we had to reject Hypothesis 2.4, as the 
causal maps of the history domain were more strongly hierarchical in structure than 
expected.  
Table 7.4  
Frequency (% in parentheses) and standardized residuals of subject domain by structural 
classification 
Subject domain Structural 
classification Biology Standard residual History 
Standard 
residual Mathematics 
Standard 
residual 
Hierarchy 21 (29.6 %) - 3.1 
47 (66.2 
%) .9 55 (77.5 %) 2.2 
Spider 40 (56.3 %) 5.3 8 (11.3 %) - 2.3 5 (7 %) -3.0 
Flowchart 0 (0 %) - .8 1 (1.4 %) .4 1 (1.4 %) .4 
System 0 (0 %) - .8 1 (1.4 %) .4 1 (1.4 %) .4 
Other 10 (14.1%) - .3 14 (19.7 %) .9 9 (12.7 %) - .6 
Note. Standardized residuals equal to or higher than |1.96| indicate significant differences. 
 
Cognitive abilities 
Participants could score a maximum of 20 points on the three subscales of the I-S-T 
2000 R on mathematical, spatial, and verbal abilities. On the test for mathematical 
abilities the participants scored M = 10.46 points (SD = 4.03), on the test for spatial 
abilities they scored M = 10.65 points (SD = 3.10), and on the test for verbal abilities 
they scored M = 12.87 points (SD = 3.70). An analysis using Pearson’s correlation 
coefficient was performed to identify correlations between the participants’ cognitive 
abilities (mathematical, spatial, verbal), prior domain knowledge (biology, history, 
mathematics), and the HIMATT similarity measures. Analysis revealed the 
following correlations: Mathematical abilities and SFM (written texts) in the history 
domain, r(69) = -.30, p = .013; spatial abilities and PPM (causal maps) in the biology 
domain, r(71) = .23, p = .05; spatial abilities and GAM (written texts) in the history 
domain, r(69) = .28, p = .02; verbal abilities and prior knowledge in the history 
domain, r(71) = .37, p = .001; verbal abilities and SFM (causal maps) in the 
mathematics domain, r(70) = .30, p = .013; verbal abilities and SFM (written texts) 
in the mathematics domain, r(69) = -.29, p = .016; verbal abilities and GAM (causal 
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maps) in the mathematics domain, r(70) = .30, p = .014; verbal abilities and GAM 
(written texts) in the mathematics domain, r(69) = -.24, p = .044; verbal abilities and 
CCM (written texts) in the mathematics domain, r(69) = -.39, p = .001; verbal 
abilities and BPM (written texts) in the mathematics domain, r(69) = -.31, p = .01.  
 Therefore, our findings do not support Hypothesis 3.1. Mathematical abilities 
had no systematic effect on the externalized cognitive structures in the mathematics 
domain. Additionally, our findings do not completely support Hypothesis 3.2, as we 
found only non-systematic correlations between the HIMATT similarity measures 
and cognitive abilities across the subject domains. 
General discussion 
The aim of our study was to identify cross-domain distinguishing features of 
cognitive structures. Our experimental design included tasks in three different 
subject domains: biology, history, and mathematics. Participants were asked to 
externalize their understanding of the phenomenon in question in the form of causal 
maps and written texts. The participants’ re-representations (causal maps and written 
texts) were automatically analyzed with the HIMATT analysis features. Accordingly, 
not only do these automated process have very high objectivity, reliability, and 
validity (Pirnay-Dummer, et al., 2010), they are also very economical, especially 
when large data sets need to be analyzed within a short period of time (Ifenthaler, 
2010c). 
 First, we compared the causal maps and written texts to domain-specific 
expert representations. Due to the short time between the construction of the causal 
maps and written texts, we expected a close match between the structural and 
semantic features of the participants’ re-representations. However, we found that the 
written text and concept maps seem to represent different structure and content 
across the three subject domains when compared to an expert’s representation. 
Participants’ causal maps in the biology domain showed higher similarity to the 
expert representation than the written texts with regard to complexity and 
semantically correct concepts as well as propositions. In contrast, participants’ 
written texts showed higher similarities to the expert representation than the causal 
maps with regard to complexity (mathematics domain) and semantically correct 
concepts (history and mathematics domain). Hence, the type of externalization 
strategy also influences the knowledge which is represented (structurally and 
	   124 
semantically). These findings suggest that instructional approaches, grading, and 
feedback is highly dependent on the externalization strategy used by learners. 
Consequently, more empirical research is needed to provide a valid framework for 
suitable domain-dependent externalization strategies.   
 Based on these initial findings, we then investigated cross-domain 
distinguishing features of the participants’ re-representations across the subject 
domains biology, history, and mathematics. As expected, the results of our HIMATT 
analysis clearly indicate different structural and semantic features across the three 
subject domains. For example, participants were able to externalize larger cognitive 
structure (i.e. more concepts and relations) in the biology domain. Furthermore, the 
externalizations in the history domain were less complex than those in the biology 
and mathematics domains. Additionally, externalized cognitive structure in the 
biology domain was more integrated than in the other two domains. As far as 
semantically correct concepts are concerned, the externalizations in the biology 
domain included more correct terms than the other two domains. On the other hand, 
analysis revealed that cognitive structure externalized as written texts had a larger 
surface and contained more semantically correct concepts than causal maps. 
 Additionally, the structural classification by subject domain of the 
externalized cognitive structure revealed that hierarchical structure was the most 
frequent classification in the history and mathematics domains. In contrast, we found 
that externalizations in the biology domain were for the most part classified as spider 
structures.  
 Furthermore, we looked at the influence of mathematical, spatial, and verbal 
abilities on the learning outcomes. On the basis of previous studies (Hilbert & Renkl, 
2008; Ifenthaler, et al., 2007), we expected no correlation between cognitive abilities 
and learning outcomes. Indeed, we did not find systematic influences of cognitive 
abilities on learning outcomes. However, some results suggest that cognitive abilities 
might have some influence. Accordingly, we recommend for future experimental 
studies to concentrate on the influence of cognitive abilities on cognitive structure 
during learning processes. 
Instructional implications 
Our results indicate that cognitive structures are organized in different ways 
depending on the subject domain (Johnson-Laird, 1989). Accordingly, identifying 
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the learner’s cognitive structure will help to organize instructional materials, 
discover knowledge gaps, and relate new materials to existing slots or anchors within 
the learner’s cognitive structure (Jonassen, 1987). Hence, the classification of 
cognitive structure can act as a “topographical map” for identifying key areas of 
learning difficulties and facilitating instructional interventions (Ifenthaler, et al., in 
press; Snow, 1989). This might lead to the design of new learning materials which 
consider the unique features of specific subject domains and their related cognitive 
structure. Further it might help to design effective feedback methods to facilitate 
individual learning in a more effective and personalized way (Ifenthaler, 2009; 
Shute, 2008). 
 In addition, as the applied elicitation techniques seem to be highly domain-
specific, validating results using outside criteria seems unavoidable. These findings 
may have a major impact on future research and knowledge diagnosis. We strongly 
suggest investigating these initial findings further in future experimental studies 
(e.g., Ifenthaler & Pirnay-Dummer, 2009). 
 To sum up, the findings of our study suggest that a diagnostics of learner’s 
external representations always requires different elicitation techniques, e.g., written 
texts, verbal communication, or graphical drawings (de Vries, 2006). Clearly, a 
cognitive structure is internal to the mind, and for obvious reasons not directly 
observable (Seel, 1999a). Such representations are widely viewed as having a 
language-like syntax, and a compositional semantic (Spector, 2010; Strasser, 2010). 
A mental model is a representation of a thing, ideas or more generally, an ideational 
framework. It relies on language and uses symbolic pieces and processes of 
knowledge to construct a heuristic for a situation, which is instantiated by the world, 
or an internal process resembling the world, e.g., a mental simulation (Johnson-
Laird, 1983; Schnotz & Bannert, 2003). Its purpose is heuristic reasoning, which 
leads either to intention, planning, behavior, or to a reconstruction of cognitive 
processes (Piaget, 1976). The facilitation of model-building processes may lead to 
enhanced problem-solving strategies and better transfers to near and far subject 
domains (Anzai & Yokoyama, 1984; Gick & Holyoak, 1980; Ifenthaler, et al., 2007). 
Limitations and future research directions 
Despite the promising results of this study, some critical remarks are in order. First, 
our results are limited to three very specific topics within the subject domains 
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biology, history, and mathematics. Since cognitive structure seem to be highly 
domain dependent, we might also expect contradictory results within a single subject 
domain. Secondly, to gain more insight into the functions of cognitive structure and 
their domain-distinguishing features, a comparison across three subject domains is 
not sufficient by far. We thus suggest expanding our research question to other 
subject domains and including some topics which are closely related and others 
which are very different. An advanced research design of this kind would enable us 
to validate the findings of this initial study. Additionally, we recommend for 
researchers to reflect on possible elicitation techniques critically when investigating 
cognitive structure and knowledge in general. Further, in order to validate the 
structural and semantic measures of HIMATT, we recommend additional validation 
studies using outside criterions like the categories introduced by Ku (2007). 
However, in order to gain acceptable validation results, such an outside criterion 
needs to exactly match the HIMATT measures. 
 In summary, further studies will be needed to investigate the influence of 
externalization methodologies on learning and instruction. Also, additional studies 
concerning domain-distinguishing features are needed across and within various 
subject domains. This will give us more detailed insight into the functions of 
cognitive structure and help us to design more effective learning environments and 
apply more precise diagnosis strategies. The design and development of instruction is 
not only a matter of the applied methods and technologies; it is also highly dependent 
on the subject domain and last but not least on the cognitive structure learners 
already have developed prior to newly implemented instruction. 
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8 
A LONGITUDINAL PERSPECTIVE &  
Cognitive scientists have studied internal cognitive structures, processes, and systems for decades in 
order to understand how they function in human learning. Nevertheless, questions concerning the 
diagnosis of changes in these cognitive structures while solving logical problems are still being 
scrutinized. This chapter reports findings from an experimental study in which 73 participants in three 
experimental groups solved logical word problems at ten measurement points. Changes of cognitive 
structures are illuminated and significant differences between the treatments are reported. The results 
also indicate that supportive information is an important aid for developing cognitive structures while 
solving logical problems. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
& This chapter is based on: Ifenthaler, D., & Seel, N. M. (in press). A longitudinal perspective on 
inductive reasoning tasks. Illuminating the probability of change. Learning and Instruction. doi: 
10.1016/j.learninstruc.2010.08.004 
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Introduction 
Learning, discussed in terms of constructivist theories, occurs when learners actively 
construct meaningful mental representations closely related to presented information. 
In general, a distinction is made between several forms of mental representations 
such as concepts, images, schemata, and mental models. As a result of the so-called 
cognitive revolution in cognitive psychology, schemata and mental models emerged 
as central theoretical constructs which have enriched the psychological knowledge 
about information processing, logical reasoning, and problem solving (Gick & 
Holyoak, 1980; Rumelhart, 1980; Rumelhart, Smolensky, McClelland, & Hinton, 
1986). The idea that human cognition operates with mental models in thinking and 
reasoning can be traced back to “picture theories” of British empiricists of the 17th 
and 18th centuries, and can also be found in epistemology and psychology of the first 
half of the 20th century as Wittgenstein’s (1922) picture theory in his Tractatus as 
well as Craik’s (1943) epistemology of the nature of explanation demonstrate. 
Mental models returned as a powerful theoretical construct when Johnson-Laird 
(1983) as well as Gentner and Stevens (1983) published their works in the same year. 
Since then, study after study demonstrates that human reasoning exhibits particular 
features predicted by mental models which, therefore, emerged as important concept 
of logical reasoning and of creating plausibility in subject matter learning in various 
academic disciplines (e.g., Bonatti, 1994a, 1994b; Kalyuga, 2006c; Magnani & 
Nersessian, 2002; Rasch & Schnotz, 2009; Rumelhart, et al., 1986; Schaeken, 
Vandierendonck, Schroyens, d'Ydewalle, & Klauer, 2006; Schnotz & Bannert, 2003; 
Seel, 1991, 2003).  
 However, the construction of mental models presupposes semantic 
knowledge which is organized as schemata. Cognitive schemata can be conceived as 
the building blocks of mental models. As a consequence, some cognitive scientists 
argue that reasoning is regularly performed by means of pragmatic reasoning 
schemas (e.g., Cheng & Holyoak, 1985). Advocates of schema-based reasoning 
argue that generalizable knowledge is “stored” in reasoning schemas which contain 
the records of single cases of past successful reasoning and problem solving. Thus, 
schema-based reasoning extends the idea of case-based reasoning by referring to 
generalized “cases” (= schemata) rather than single cases and thus relies on the 
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effective use of generic contextual knowledge to be transferred onto a current 
problem (Turner, 1994). 
 In our research we operate with a cognitive architecture which integrates both 
kinds of reasoning into a comprehensive framework which operates on the learning-
dependent progression of mental models and their transition to (pragmatic reasoning) 
schemata. Thus, the present study was conducted to explore solution strategies of 
inductive reasoning tasks at ten measurement points.  
Cognitive architecture of reasoning 
A central assumption of cognitive psychology is that mental representations enable 
individuals to understand and explain experience and events, process information, 
and solve problems (Johnson-Laird, 1989). More specifically, Rumelhart et al. 
(1986) argue that these internal functions of the human mind are dependent on two 
interacting modules or sets of units: (1) schemata and (2) mental models. The 
resulting cognitive architecture corresponds to a great extent with Piaget’s 
epistemology (Piaget, 1943, 1976) and its basic mechanisms of assimilation and 
accommodation. 
 Clearly, assimilation is dependent on the availability and activation of 
schemata, which allow new information to be integrated immediately into pre-
existing cognitive structures. As soon as a schema can be activated, it runs 
automatically and regulates information processing in a “top down” manner. This 
allows information to be processed very quickly, a function which is vital for humans 
as it enables them to adapt to their environment spontaneously. If a schema does not 
fit immediately with the requirements of a new task it can be adjusted to meet them 
by means of accretion, tuning, or reorganization (Seel, et al., 2009). Accordingly, if a 
schema for any problem type is available, the schema is mapped onto the problem to 
be solved promptly (Jonassen, 2000). If assimilation is not successful, 
accommodation must take place in order to reorganized or restructure an individual’s 
knowledge. However, when no schema is available or its reorganization fails, the 
human mind switches to the construction of a mental model which is defined as a 
dynamic ad hoc representation of a phenomenon or problem that aims at creating 
subjective plausibility through simplifying and envisioning the situation, or through 
analogical reasoning (see Figure 8.1). 
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FIGURE 8.1. Cognitive functions of assimilation and accommodation 
  
In accordance with Johnson-Laird’s (1983) idea of “fleshing out,” we argue that an 
individual constructs a mental model by integrating relevant bits of domain-specific 
knowledge into a coherent structure step by step in order to meet the requirements of 
a phenomenon to be explained or a problem to be solved (Seel, 1991). Understanding 
this step-by-step process more precisely will help instructors to organize learning 
materials, identify knowledge gaps, and relate new learning materials to existing 
slots or anchors within the learners’ cognitive structures (Jonassen, 1987, 2000). 
Learning-dependent progression of mental models 
When humans are confronted with a problem, they can apply either a schema or a 
mental model that hypothesize mechanisms, either structures or processes, that 
account for the problem to be solved. However, in order to understand the 
continuous progression of learning, thinking, reasoning, and problem solving, the 
underlying mental representations must be assessed carefully at the various stages of 
the learning process. Evidently, measuring cognitive structures continuously or 
repeatedly during transitional stages is more effective than only measuring them 
before and after instruction. 
 In our current research, we characterize the learning-dependent progression of 
cognitive structures as a specific kind of transition which mediates between mental 
models, which describe the initial states of the learning process, and schemata, which 
are described as the desired end state of learning. Exempli gratia, a novice may not 
be able to activate a well-developed schema to solve a specific task. Hence, this 
novice will rely on general schemata and in all probability will fail to successfully 
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solve the task immediately (Jonassen, 2000). Accordingly, the novice will create, 
through an iterative process, various types of mental models in order to successfully 
(judged under subjective plausibility) solve the task. In contrast, an expert will 
recognize the type of task and map an existing schema onto the specific task to solve 
it (Jonassen, 2000). Therefore, our research focuses on the long-term perspective of 
changes in mental models and schemata along with the transition of mental 
representations from mental models to schemata. Specifically, we aim to identify 
transition points within a learning progression at which the shift of cognitive 
structures from mental model (fluctuation in probability of change) to schemata 
(decrease in probability of change) occur (see Figure 8.2). 
 
 
FIGURE 8.2. Transition of cognitive structures 
 
Feedback and cognitive structures 
Feedback is considered to be any type of information provided to learners with 
regard to their learning progress (Wagner & Wagner, 1985). Accordingly, feedback 
can take on many forms depending on a particular theoretical perspective, the 
purpose it is intended to serve, research goals, and methodological approaches. 
Moreover, feedback is considered an elementary component for supporting and 
regulating learning processes. Especially in computer-based and self-regulated 
learning environments, the nature of feedback is of fundamental importance (Simons 
& de Jong, 1992). Unlike this initial general understanding of feedback, the term 
informative feedback refers to all kinds of external post-response information used to 
inform the learner of his or her current state of learning or performance (Narciss, 
2006, 2008). Widely accepted forms of feedback include (a) knowledge of result, (b) 
knowledge of correct result, (c) knowledge of performance, (d) answer until correct, 
(e) knowledge of task constraints, (f) knowledge about concepts, (g) knowledge 
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about mistakes, (h) knowledge about how to proceed, and (i) knowledge about 
metacognition (Narciss, 2008). Feedback on cognitive structures, such as the use of 
conceptual models (i.e. explicit and consistent causal explanations of a given 
phenomenon) to help persons to build mental models or schemata of the system 
being studied, has also been investigated and discussed (e.g., Mayer, 1989; Norman, 
1983; Seel & Dinter, 1995). Further, new forms of automated and individualized 
feedback have been successfully implemented in self-regulated learning 
environments (e.g., Ifenthaler, 2009). 
 From an instructional point of view feedback can be provided by internal 
(individual cognitive monitoring processes) or external (various types of correction 
variables) sources of information. Internal feedback may validate the externally 
provided feedback, or it may lead to resistance against it (Narciss, 2008). However, 
the empirical evidence of effects of different types of feedback is rather inconsistent 
and contradictory in parts (e.g., Bangert-Drowns, Kulik, Kulik, & Morgan, 1991; 
Clariana, 1993; Kluger & DeNisi, 1996; Kulhavy, 1977; Mory, 2004).  
 While solving problems of the world, cognitive structures provide 
subjectively plausible explanations on the basis of restricted domain-specific 
information (see Ifenthaler, 2010c). Accordingly, such cognitive structures are in 
many cases resistant to changes as they have a high subjective plausibility which 
requires special types of feedback. Indeed, various research studies have shown that 
it is very difficult but possible to influence the generation of plausible mental models 
by providing specific information (see Anzai & Yokoyama, 1984; Ifenthaler & Seel, 
2005; Mayer, 1989; Seel, 1995; Seel & Dinter, 1995). Ifenthaler and Seel (2005) 
argue that it is important to consider how such feedback is provided to the learner at 
specific times during the learning process and how it is structured. 
Learning experiences and problem solving 
Individual differences in problem solving depend on the characteristics of the 
problem, i.e. its scope, degree of structuredness, and complexity, which correlates 
with the cognitive operations necessary for solving a problem (Funke, 1991). 
Problems can be well-structured or ill-structured: well-structured problems, like 
textbook problems, are composed of few variables, while ill-structured problems 
may include many factors or variables that may interact in unpredictable ways 
(Funke & Frensch, 1995). For many people, inductive reasoning tasks are not easy to 
solve and actually produce a problem (Holland, Holyoak, Nisbett, & Thagard, 1986). 
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From the perspective of research on problem solving, inductive reasoning tasks may 
be considered as well-structured problems for which a solution exists and can be 
found (Feeney & Heit, 2007).  
 Cognitive psychologists propose that the first thing a person does when 
confronted with a problem is to try to construct a mental representation of its relevant 
features (Dörner & Wearing, 1995). Accordingly, problem solving presupposes that 
people either activate appropriate schemata or actively construct meaningful 
representations, such as mental models, which represent and communicate subjective 
experiences, ideas, thoughts, and feelings. By means of such representations an 
individual is able to simulate real actions in imagination (in the sense of thought 
experiments) in order to solve problems (Seel, et al., 2009). In this context, a mental 
model fulfills several functions: (1) It guides the comprehension of the system as 
well as the concrete operations with it; (2) it allows the system’s states to be 
explained; and (3) it allows predictions about the system’s behavior and the effects 
of intervention in the system to be derived (Greeno, 1989; Young, 1993). As shown 
above, solving a task requires iterative steps of hypothesis testing as well as an 
increased time for constructing appropriate cognitive structures (Funke, 1992). This 
constitutes a problem in itself because cognitive structures are regularly incomplete 
and constantly evolving. They are usually not an accurate representation of a 
phenomenon but rather typically contain errors and contradictions. However, 
especially mental models are parsimonious and provide simplified explanations of 
complex phenomena. Additionally, they often contain measures of uncertainty 
concerning their plausibility. This allows mental models to be used even if they are 
incorrect from an expert’s perspective. 
 These iterative processes of hypothesis testing while solving a task are 
closely related with learning experiences that are represented in long-term memory 
as declarative and/or procedural knowledge (Jonassen, et al., 1993). Another 
indicator for solving tasks is the person’s awareness of the problem type (applied 
strategy). Sweller (1988) argues that experienced problem solvers are able to 
automatically use strategies to solve familiar tasks. However, transfers of successful 
strategies to different kinds of tasks are on rare occasions (Gick & Holyoak, 1980; 
Jonassen, 2000).  
 Accordingly, two types of change while investigating solving tasks with a 
longitudinal perspective are of special interest. The first has to do with how experts 
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(experienced problem solvers) adapt their learning experiences or strategies within 
the solution processes. The second is about how novices become experts over time, 
how their learning experiences develop / accumulate during this process, and how 
their strategies change (Seel, et al., 2009). 
Research questions and hypotheses 
Based on the literature overview, the following research questions and hypotheses 
were addressed: (1) Do specific transition points within a learning progression exist 
at which the shift of cognitive structures from mental model (fluctuation in 
probability of change) to schemata (decrease in probability of change) occurs? For 
being able to answer our first research question, we argue that there is strong 
evidence that the research on mental models and schemata has to move beyond the 
traditional two-wave design in order to capture changes more precisely (Ifenthaler, 
2008; Willett, 1988). Another requirement for measuring mental models and 
schemata precisely is that the diagnosis should be embedded in a complex problem 
situation (Funke, 1991; Seel, et al., 2009). Hence, participants are confronted with a 
set of different inductive reasoning tasks at ten measurement points. In inductive 
reasoning, the premises of an argument indicate some degree of support for the 
conclusion but not entail it (Feeney & Heit, 2007; Heit, 1998; Holland, et al., 1986; 
Sternberg & Gardner, 1983). There is an ongoing debate on processes of inductive 
reasoning focusing e.g., on development of reasoning process of children (e.g., 
Hayes & Thompson, 2007), teaching of inductive reasoning (e.g., K. J. Klauer, 
1996), self-directed learning (e.g., Wilhelm & Beishuizen, 2003), cross-sectional 
assessments (e.g., Csapo, 1997), and everyday decision making (e.g., Nisbett, 
Krantz, Jepson, & Kunda, 1983). The longitudinal perspective of our empirical 
investigation wants to add and complement the available body of literature on 
inductive reasoning. 
 In order to identify the specific point at which the transition of cognitive 
structures from mental models (discussed in terms of the fluctuation in probability of 
change) to schemata (discussed here as the decrease in probability of change) occurs, 
our experimental groups receive different types of task classes. One experimental 
group receives tasks which require identical solution procedures, whereas the other 
experimental group receives tasks with varying solution procedures. We assume that 
persons who receive inductive reasoning tasks which require identical solution 
strategies will have a stronger decrease in the probability of change, while persons 
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who receive tasks which require different kinds of solution strategies will have a 
stronger fluctuation in probability of change (Hypothesis 1). 
 Regarding feedback, we wanted to investigate a conservative type of 
feedback in our longitudinal study which provides information about the strategy in 
order to solve the task in question: (2) Can feedback effectively support the learning-
dependent development of cognitive structures? As shown above, feedback plays a 
particularly important role in highly self-regulated model-centered learning 
environments because it facilitates the development of mental models and schemata 
(Ifenthaler, 2009). Past research studies demonstrate how different forms of feedback 
can be provided to improve a person’s understanding of a specific task in a given 
context. However, most of these research studies lack a longitudinal perspective 
(e.g., Mayer, 1989; Norman, 1983; Shute, 2008). We assume that if learners have 
access to feedback, which guides them in finding a strategy to solve the logical 
reasoning task, they will perform better than they would without feedback 
(Hypothesis 2). 
 Additionally, previous research studies (e.g., Hilbert & Renkl, 2008; 
Ifenthaler, et al., 2007) have found that verbal and spatial abilities do not affect the 
quality of model-building processes. However, the above mentioned studies did not 
include a longitudinal design. Hence, we are interested in replicating these results 
within a longitudinal perspective. Additionally, as learning in our experimental 
investigation is highly self-regulated, motivation is another important factor to be 
taken into account (e.g., Keller, 1983). However, motivationally relevant factors are 
seldom linked to mental models and schemata. Therefore, a third research question to 
be explored is: (3) Do verbal abilities and the degree of achievement motivation 
affect the logical reasoning task outcome? We assume that persons with higher 
achievement motivation will outperform persons with lower achievement motivation 
(Hypothesis 3a). Additionally, we assume that verbal abilities will have no effect on 
the learning outcome (Hypothesis 3b). 
Method 
Participants 
Initially 73 German university students of educational science took part in our 
experiment. However, as not every student was present at all ten measurement 
points, we had a total of 64 participants (56 female and 8 male). Their mean age was 
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22.3 years (SD = 2.29). They were enrolled in a research methods course of 
intermediate level. 
Design 
The participants were randomly assigned to one of three experimental conditions: 
self-guided & non-varying strategy (SG-N; n1 = 21), self-guided & varying strategy 
(SG-V; n2 = 21), and scaffolding-based & non-varying strategy (SB-N; n3 = 22). 
Varying and non-varying strategy are related to the type of inductive reasoning tasks. 
Varying strategy means that the solution strategy for the inductive reasoning task 
changed at every measurement point. Participants in the SG-N groups had to solve 
four consecutive inductive reasoning tasks in which it was possible to apply the same 
solution procedure. Figure 8.3 shows the longitudinal research design with ten 
measurement points and the three experimental groups. Participants in the SB-N 
group received support on which strategy to apply for the first and sixth task. 
Participants in SG-N and SB-N received tasks in which the solution strategy was 
identical for measurement points one to four and six to nine (see Figure 8.3). 
Participants in SG-V received tasks with varying solution strategies at all ten 
measurement points. At measurement points one, five, and ten, the inductive 
reasoning tasks were identical for all experimental groups.  
 
FIGURE 8.3. Longitudinal research design (SG-N: self-guided & non-varying strategy; SG-V: self-
guided & varying strategy; SB-N: scaffolding-based & non-varying strategy; O = measurement of 
dependent variable; X = treatment; T = task; a, b,c, d, e = strategy to solve the task) 
 
Our experiment was implemented on a web-based platform, which enabled us to 
track the participants’ behavior and, more importantly, the time needed to solve the 
ten tasks. Based on the participants’ login and experimental condition, our web-
based platform assigned the corresponding task (and if required the feedback) at each 
measurement point. It was not possible to log in again to solve the task a second 
time. 
Materials  
• Achievement motivation inventory: The short version of the LMI-K 
(Leistungsmotivationsinventar; i.e. an achievement motivation inventory) 
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was used to test the participants’ achievement motivation. The LMI-K 
consists of 30 items which are combined to form a global value. Schuler and 
Prochaska (2001) report high reliability scores for the LMI-K (Cronbach’s 
alpha = .94). 
• Verbal abilities: A subscale of the I-S-T 2000 R (Amthauer, et al., 2001) was 
used to test the participants’ verbal abilities. This test is a widely used 
intelligence test in Germany with high reliability (r = .88 and r = .96; split-
half reliability). A total of 20 sentences with a missing word had to be 
completed using a set of five words. The participants had six minutes to 
complete this subset on verbal abilities.    
• Inductive reasoning tasks and feedback: 14 inductive reasoning tasks in the 
German language were administered at specific points in time (see Table 8.1 
for examples). Solving a task took approximately 15 minutes on average. As 
shown in our experimental design (see Figure 8.3), we administered tasks 
which required identical and different solution strategies. Two sets of four 
tasks required the same solution strategy, and the remaining six tasks required 
different solution procedures. Table 8.1 shows two examples of tasks, the 
corresponding feedback which was provided to the subjects in the SB-N 
group, and the solution. Difficulty of tasks increased slightly during the ten 
measurement points. 
• Logical reasoning rating test: The logical reasoning rating test consisted of 
five items focusing on the difficulty, motivation, time, solution procedure, 
and replicability of the tasks (Cronbach’s alpha = .83). The questions were 
answered on a four-point Likert scale (1 = totally disagree; 2 = disagree; 3 = 
agree; 4 = totally agree). 
Procedure 
In the first phase of the experiment, the participants completed a demographic data 
questionnaire, the short version of the LMI-K, and the subset of the I-S-T 2000 R. 
Additionally, participants were randomly assigned to the three experimental 
conditions. In the second phase, participants solved ten tasks within five weeks (two 
tasks per week, Mondays and Thursdays). After logging into the web-based platform 
with a personal codeword, the participants were provided with the task. Here the 
participants were asked to type in (a) the solution to the task and (b) the strategy they 
applied to solve it. Additionally, the participants had to estimate how long it took 
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them to solve the task (estimated time on task). Subsequently, they filled out the five 
items of the logical reasoning rating test. 
TABLE 8.1 
Two examples of inductive reasoning tasks with different solution strategies, provided 
feedback, and solutions (translated from German) 
Example task Provided feedback Solution 
A father is the same age as his three sons 
together. Ten years ago, he was three 
times as old as his oldest son and five 
times as old as his second oldest son. The 
youngest son is 14 years younger than his 
oldest brother. How old are the three 
sons? 
The problem includes four 
variables: Father (f), son 1 
(s1), son 2 (s2), and son 3 
(s3). Accordingly, you 
need four equations. 
Equation one would be: f = 
s1 + s2 + s3. Now find the 
remaining equations to 
solve the problem. 
Son one = 25 years old, 
son two = 19 years old, 
and son three = 11 years 
old. 
All three friends Anton, Hans, and Karl 
play two musical instruments. Hence, we 
are able to give everybody two of the 
following designations: Flautist, 
drummer, violinist, cellist, trumpeter, and 
pianist.  
The flutist likes to take the mickey out of 
the violinist; the trumpeter and violinist 
join Anton for watching a soccer game; 
the cellist is in debt to the drummer; the 
flutist is engaged with the sister of the 
cellist; Hans hid the trumpeter’s 
instrument; and Karl has won against 
Hans and the cellist in the last card game.  
Now it should be clear which instruments 
are played by whom? 
First create a table with 
three columns and three 
rows. The first column is 
for the names, the second, 
and third for the 
corresponding instruments 
Anton: pianist, cellist 
Hans: violinist, drummer 
Karl: trumpeter, flautist 
Scoring 
For each participant, an achievement motivation and a verbal ability score were 
determined. Furthermore, we determined each participant’s task solution score, 
points being awarded for partial or full solution of the tasks at the ten measurement 
points (0 – 5 points). Additionally, an average score for the logical reasoning rating 
test was determined. 
 Task strategy measure: To analyze the strategies for solving the tasks during 
our longitudinal experiment, a scoring rubric was developed. We determined each 
participant’s task solution score, points being awarded for partial or full solution of 
the tasks at the ten measurement points (0 – 5 points). The task strategy measure (0 = 
NS; 1 = WS; 2 = RS) at the ten measurement points was scored as follows: (NS) no 
strategy for solving the task; (WS) application of an incorrect strategy for solving the 
task; (RS) application of the correct strategy for the task. For the task solution score 
and task strategy measure we found a very highly significant correlation, r = .914, p 
< .001. 
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 Time spent for solving the tasks: We tracked the time spent on solving the 
task within the online experimental environment (TT: tracked time), and the 
participants were asked to estimate how long it took them to solve the task (ET: 
estimated time). 
 Using transition probabilities to identify change: A process which develops 
dependent on time and in accordance with probabilistic principles is a stochastic 
process. This means that we cannot predict with certainty its future behavior but 
rather only probabilities as to various possible states for the future. Bartholomew 
(1967) introduced the application of stochastic models for describing social 
processes, specifically the growth of different generations within families and 
societies. In this context, Ifenthaler and Seel (2005) considered the progression of 
cognitive structures to be comparable to the growth of such social processes. 
 Thus, we assume that changes in cognitive structures can be characterized by 
transition probabilities which develop over time. In order to model and analyze the 
likelihood that one given state of a cognitive structure (mental model or schemata) 
will be followed by another, we compute transition probabilities from one state to 
another. The results can be presented in a transitional probability matrix (see 
Equation 1). 
          (1) 
In matrix P, the entries in each row add up to 1. For example, there is a .38 
probability that a less elaborated cognitive structure will increase in size or a .23 
probability that an elaborated cognitive structure will decrease in size. These 
transition probabilities can be illustrated by means of a state transition diagram, 
which is a diagram showing all states and transition probabilities (see Figure 8.4). 
Possible missing arrows indicate zero probability; the density of the arrows indicates 
the potency of probability. 
 In order to identify which transition probability deviates significantly from its 
expected values, a z-score is computed to test significance. A z-score larger than 1.96 
absolute is then regarded as statistically significant at the .05 level (Bakeman & 
Gottman, 1997). The above-described stochastic models provide the mathematical 
basis for precisely computing learning-dependent changes in cognitive structures 
(Ifenthaler & Seel, 2005). 
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FIGURE 8.4. State transition diagram of Equation (1) 
 
Results 
Initial data checks showed that the distributions of ratings and scores satisfied the 
assumptions underlying the analysis procedures. Main effects of gender were not 
significant for any measure. All effects were assessed at the .05 level. As effect size 
measures, we used Cohen’s d (small effect: d < .50, medium effect .50 ≤ d ≤ .80, 
strong effect d > .80) and partial ƞ2 (small effect: ƞ2 < .06, medium effect .06 ≤ ƞ2 ≤ 
.13, strong effect ƞ2 > .13).  
Longitudinal perspective on task solution 
Participants spent an average of M = 206.78 (SD = 111.13) minutes solving all ten 
tasks (tracked time). In order to obtain an overview of overall performance during 
the ten measurement points, we analyzed the individual answers. Table 8.2 shows the 
means of task solution score and task strategy measure. An ANOVA showed no 
significant differences for the overall task solution scores between the SG-N (M = 
32.00, SD = 6.85), SG-V (M = 30.00, SD = 7.94), and SB-N (M = 32.54, SD = 8.05) 
experimental group, F(2, 63) = .66, p = .523. Also, we found no significant 
difference for the task strategy measure between the SG-N (M = 12.14, SD = 2.78), 
SG-V (M = 10.95, SD = 3.22), and SB-N (M = 10.86, SD = 3.43) experimental 
group, F(2, 63) = 1.09, p = .344. 
TABLE 8.2 
Means, standard deviations, minimum and maximum scores of task solution score and task 
strategy measure (N = 64) 
 M SD Min Max 
Task solution score 31.53 7.59 15 49 
Task strategy measure 11.31 3.16 4 19 
Note. For ten measurement points, task solution score (maximum = 50); task strategy measure 
(maximum = 20). 
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Learning-dependent progression of task solution score 
We computed a repeated-measure MANOVA with the task solution score at ten 
measurement points as a within-subjects factor, and experimental groups (self-guided 
& non-varying strategy, self-guided & varying strategy, and scaffolding-based & 
non-varying strategy) as a between-subjects factor. The sphericity assumption was 
not met (χ2(44) = 66.17, p = .017), so the Greenhouse-Geisser correction 
(Greenhouse & Geisser, 1959) was applied. The difference between measurements 
was significant, F(7.2, 437.5) = 26.85, p < .001, ƞ2 = .306 (strong effect). We also 
found a significant interaction, F(14.3, 437.5) = 3.06, p < .001, ƞ2 = .091 (medium 
effect). However, the difference between experimental groups was not significant, 
F(2, 61) = .66, p = .523. 
 
FIGURE 8.5. Mean task solution score over time, by experimental group 
 
The results of our MANOVA analysis indicated a significant difference in the mean 
task solution score over time (see Figure 8.5). Additionally, the significant 
interaction effect showed that the mean task solution score of the three experimental 
groups changed differently over time. A pairwise comparison of the task solution 
score at different times indicated significant differences between experimental 
groups for the following measurement points (MP): MP 3 – MP 4 (F(2, 61) = 6.43, p 
= .003, ƞ2 = .174), MP 4 – MP 5 (F(2, 61) = 4.03, p = .023, ƞ2 = .117), and MP 9 – 
10 (F(2, 61) = 4.64, p = .013, ƞ2 = .132). However, we found no difference in the 
mean task solution score between the three experimental groups over time. See 
Appendix A for means and standard deviations. 
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Transition probabilities of task strategy measure 
In order to model and analyze the likelihood that one given state of a cognitive 
structure (mental model or schemata) will be followed by another, we computed 
transition probabilities from one measurement point to another (see Appendix B for 
the transitional probability matrix, including z-scores). Based on the transition 
probabilities, we were able to illustrate all states and transition probabilities by 
means of a state transition diagram. Possible missing arrows within the diagrams 
indicate zero probability; the density of the arrows indicates the potency of 
probability. These transition state diagrams reveal similarities and differences 
concerning the task strategy measure (NS, WS, RS) of the tasks during the learning 
process (ten measurement points). Accordingly, these diagrams help us to identify 
specific points during the task solution process which may give an insight into 
changes of cognitive structures from mental models to schemata. 
 Overall, the transition probabilities and state diagrams for participants in the 
SG-N group (see Appendix B) revealed a possible schematization between MP1 and 
MP4 and between MP6 and MP9, because it was very likely that once they had 
applied a correct strategy for solving a task they did not revert to an incorrect 
strategy (see Figure 8.6).  
 
FIGURE 8.6. State transition diagram for participants in the SG-N experimental group (n1 = 21),  
MP 2 – 3 
 
For participants in the SG-V group the transition probabilities and state diagrams 
revealed a possible construction of mental models between MP1 to MP10 (see 
Appendix B), because it was very likely that they changed state between each 
measurement point and also often reverted to incorrect strategies (see Figure 8.7). 
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FIGURE 8.7. State transition diagram for participants in the SG-V experimental group (n2 = 21),  
MP 6 – 7 
 
The transition probabilities and state diagrams for participants in the SB-N group 
revealed a possible schematization between MP1 and MP4 and between MP6 and 
MP9 (see Appendix B), because it was very likely that once they applied a correct 
strategy to solve a task they did not revert to incorrect strategies. Additionally, the 
feedback at MP1 and MP6 caused higher probabilities of change at the following 
MPs (see Figure 8.8). 
 
FIGURE 8.8. State transition diagram for participants in the SB-N experimental group (n3 = 22),  
MP 8 – 9 
 
Finally, we found a high probability in all three experimental groups of solving the 
task correctly at MP9 and having no solution at MP10. Accordingly, we assume that 
the task at MP10 was too difficult (including the underlying strategy) to be solved by 
the participants. 
Verbal abilities and achievement motivation 
Participants could score a maximum of 210 points on the achievement motivation test 
and 20 points on the subset of the I-S-T 2000 R on verbal abilities. On the test for 
achievement motivation, participants scored M = 140.11 points (SD = 23.04) and on 
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the test for verbal abilities they scored M = 12.97 points (SD = 3.94). Table 3 shows 
the correlations for the task solution score and task strategy measure with the 
participants’ achievement motivation and verbal abilities scores. We found no 
significant correlation between achievement motivation or verbal abilities and the 
task solution score and task strategy measure. The data were divided into high and 
low achievement motivation groups by a median split. Still, a t-test analysis revealed 
no significant difference for the task solution score, t(62) = -.936, p = .353, and task 
strategy measure, t(62) = -1.74, p = n.s. Additionally, we divided the data into high 
and low verbal abilities groups by a median split. Also, the t-test analysis revealed 
no significant difference for the task strategy measure, t(62) = -1.70, p = n.s. 
However, we found a significant difference for the task solution score between 
participants with high verbal abilities (M = 33.41, SD = 7.82) and low verbal abilities 
(M = 29.66, SD = 7.00), t(62) = -2.02, p = .048, d = .51 (medium effect).  
 Accordingly, the results support the hypothesis that verbal abilities are not 
related to mental model and schematization processes for the task strategy measure. 
However, we have to reject our hypothesis for the task solution score since 
participants with high verbal abilities outperformed those with low verbal abilities. 
Additionally, we have to reject our hypothesis that achievement motivation has an 
influence on the task strategy measure and the task solution score. 
TABLE 8.3 
Correlations between achievement motivation, verbal abilities, task solution score, and task 
strategy measure (N = 64) 
 Achievement motivation Verbal abilities 
Task solution score .163 .205 
Task strategy measure .242 .178 
 
Discussion 
This study is part of our current research on model-based reasoning grounded on the 
theoretical assumptions of cognitive structures. In this paper we examined the 
progression of cognitive structures that learners produce in solving a series of tasks 
within a given instructional context. More specifically, we attempt to identify the 
learning-dependent progression of mental models and their transition to schemata. 
 On the on hand, mental models enable mental “leaps” in the establishment of 
truth values and operate only with the premises which are directly consistent with the 
conclusion (Holland, et al., 1986; Holyoak & Thagard, 1995). Thus, mental models 
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make it possible for people with minimal information to reach correct conclusions 
since they test the truth value of only the premises which are subjectively plausible 
and do not contradict the conclusion when combined with one another. On the other 
hand, Bransford (1984) has pointed out that schema activation and schema 
construction are two different problems. Although it is possible to activate existing 
schemata with a given topic, it does not necessarily follow that a learner can use this 
activated knowledge to develop new knowledge and skills. This can be done by 
means of constructing and revising explanatory models – as advocated in the mental 
model hypothesis (Seel, 1991). 
 Although we do not know how many repetitions of similar experiences will 
be necessary to develop a schema, we argue that learning experiences with 
structurally similar tasks will result in a learning-dependent progression of mental 
models. Snow (1990) identified the learning-dependent mental model progression as 
a specific kind of transition mediating between preconceptions, which describe the 
initial states of the learning process, and causal explanations, which are described as 
the desired end state of learning. We understand the initial states of learning as 
working models that are condensed – as a result of repeated learning experiences – to 
a stable mental model or even an inferential schema that can be applied to solve a 
class of particular problem solving tasks. More specifically, we assume that there is a 
specific point in the learning process at which a transition from a mental model 
(indicated by fluctuations in probability of change) to an inferential schema occurs 
(indicated by a decrease in probability of change).  
 At specific measurement points we found interesting significant differences 
between the treatments (Hypothesis 1). We found that learners in the SB-N condition 
(i.e., scaffolding-based with no variations in the type of task) outperformed learners 
in the SG-V condition at the first measurement point, F(2, 63) = 4.97, p = .010, d = 
.14. Hence, at the very beginning of the learning process the feedback (scaffold) was 
very effective and the learners were able to solve the task significantly better than 
students who did not receive the feedback (Hypothesis 2). However, at the following 
nine points of measurement there were only a few significant differences between the 
experimental groups. This indicates that all subjects were successful – independently 
of the particular experimental condition – in constructing effective mental models for 
mastering the tasks provided. 
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 Also, at the second measurement point the learners in the SG-V were 
outperformed by the learners of the SG-N and SB-N conditions, F(2, 63) = 7.05, p = 
.002, d = .19. Accordingly, learners who were able to apply the same mental model 
to the second task (conditions SG-N and SB-N) were more successful than learners 
who needed to apply another strategy (new mental model) to solve the task (SG-V 
condition). This supports the assumptions of our first research question.  
 Additionally, the significant difference between conditions at the fourth 
measurement point strengthens our hypothesis (Hypothesis 1). Here, learners in the 
SG-V condition (self-guided with variations of tasks) outperformed the learners in 
both the SG-N and SB-N conditions, F(2, 63) = 8.68, p < .001, d = .22. Hence, 
having applied different strategies to solve the tasks enables better performance after 
a specific learning period. This result supports the assumption that it is more 
effective to construct flexible mental models like those required by the variation of 
tasks. Seel, Darabi, and Nelson (2006) have pointed out that within any given 
domain of activity, the richness and flexibility of a learner’s mental model directly 
influences the quality of his or her task performances in that domain. In other words, 
a person (for instance, an expert) who has a rich and powerful set of strategies 
(mental models, related to a particular task domain) will show much greater 
productivity and diversity with respect to solving tasks than someone (for instance, a 
novice) who has only weak mental models. 
 Regarding the task solution strategy, we computed transition probabilities to 
identify fluctuations and stability over time. The state transition diagrams helped to 
identify differences between the three experimental groups. Actually, transition 
probabilities and state transition diagrams are good indicators for identifying 
fluctuation and stability in learning processes. This procedure can be considered a 
suitable methodology for assessing the learning-dependent progression of cognitive 
structures.  
 Furthermore, we looked at the influence of verbal abilities and achievement 
motivation on the task solution. We expected that learners with higher achievement 
motivation would outperform other learners (Hypothesis 3a). Additionally, on the 
basis of previous studies (Hilbert & Renkl, 2008; Ifenthaler, et al., 2007), we 
expected no differences between learners with high and low verbal abilities in terms 
of their mean task solution score (Hypothesis 3b). Indeed, the results of our research 
support the hypothesis that verbal abilities are not related to mental model and 
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schema processes for the task strategy measure. However, we have to reject our 
hypothesis for the task solution score since participants with high verbal abilities 
outperformed those with low verbal abilities. Additionally, we have to reject our 
hypothesis that achievement motivation has an influence on the task strategy 
measure and the task solution score. 
 In addition to extending the research literature on cognitive structure, our 
study may enhance information available to instructional designers and educators. 
Most people can cope effectively with cognitively demanding tasks by constructing 
and maintaining a mental model that provides them with enough understanding of the 
task to be accomplished. In this sense, the notion of mental models is interrelated 
with the investigation of inductive reasoning and problem solving, which provides a 
unique challenge for research in the field of learning and instruction (Jacobson & 
Archodidou, 2000). This can be illustrated by the discussion on higher-order 
instructional objectives concerning logical reasoning and problem solving. Actually, 
several scholars such as Lesh and Doerr (2000) and Schauble (1996), encourage the 
pursuit of higher-order objectives and argue that helping students to develop their 
own “explanatory models” should be among the most important goals of math and 
science education. A recommendation often made in recent learning theory and 
research is to involve students, either individually or in groups, in actively 
constructing mental models for mastering cognitively demanding tasks, such as 
inductive reasoning tasks. The construction of a mental model in the course of 
learning often necessitates both a restructuring of the underlying representations and 
a reconceptualization of the related concepts. Of course, there is no need for a mental 
model as long as the learner can assimilate the learning material into the structures of 
his or her prior knowledge. Therefore, a substantial resistance to assimilation is a 
prerequisite for constructing a mental model, and the degree of this resistance 
depends greatly on the complexity or difficulty of the tasks to be mastered. An 
alternative to a model-based approach of inductive reasoning within the realm of 
instruction is certainly a schema-based approach, such as cognitive load theory 
which recommends the use of means-end-analysis and worked examples that are 
presented to students to show them directly, step by step, the procedures required to 
solve conventional problems, such as inductive reasoning tasks (Sweller, 1988). Both 
the model-based and schema-based approach agree at the point that learning occurs 
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when people actively construct meaningful representations, such as mental models or 
schemata (Mayer, Moreno, Boire, & Vagge, 1999).  
 However, such representations are constructed from significant properties of 
external information, e.g. well-designed learning environments or materials. This 
corresponds with a basic assumption of constructivist approaches of learning 
according to which learners respond sensitively to characteristics of the environment, 
“such as the availability of specific information at a given moment, the duration of 
that availability, the way the information is structured” (and presented), “and the ease 
with which it can be searched” (Kozma, 1991, p. 180). In contrast with schema-
based argumentations researchers in the field of mental models argue that context 
sensitivity occurs consciously and intentionally. Among others, Anzai and 
Yokoyama (1984) assume that learners encode information on a problem in a mental 
model as soon as they begin working on it in order to gain a basic understanding of 
the situation and its demands. This initial experiential model can – and the learner is 
generally aware of this – be false or insufficient for accurately representing the 
subject domain in question. However, it is semantically sensitive toward key stimuli 
in the learning environment and can thus be transformed into a new model through 
accurate processing and interpretation of these key stimuli. The results of the 
experimental study of Anzai and Yokoyama (1984) as well as those of other studies 
(e.g., Ifenthaler, et al., in press; Ifenthaler & Seel, 2005; Seel & Dinter, 1995) 
demonstrate the contextual semantic sensitivity in the learning-dependent 
progression of mental models. Accordingly, learners search continuously for 
information in the given learning environment in order to complete or stabilize an 
initial mental model, also know as a multi-step process of model-building and 
revision (Penner, 2001). Hence, providing appropriate scaffolds or feedback could 
influence these complex processes. 
 With regard to the implemented feedback, we found that our conservative 
type of feedback (information about the strategy in order to solve the task; see Table 
8.1) administered at the first and sixth measurement point did not have a strong 
effect on the learning process and performance. However, we assume that a more 
elaborated and repetitive version of feedback could facilitate the development of 
mental models while solving inductive reasoning tasks. Accordingly, based on these 
findings, a newly conducted experimental study including 20 measurement points 
explores the effect of feedback on model-building processes in more detail. The 
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proposed model-based feedback not only includes information about the expert 
solution strategy but also incorporates the learner’s prior knowledge (Ifenthaler, 
2009). 
 In summary, a precise and stepwise assessment and analysis of cognitive 
structures helps us to better understand the differences within and between 
individuals as they develop over time. This will enable us to identify which 
instructional materials and instructor feedback are most appropriate at various times 
during the learning process in order to help educators struggling to find appropriate 
teaching tools to enhance learning and retention. 
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Appendix A 
TABLE 8.4 
Means (standard deviations in parenthesis) of task solution score over time (N = 64) 
    Experimental group Achievement motivation Verbal abilities Tracked time on task Logical reasoning rating 
    SG-N (n = 21) 
SG-V (n = 
21)  
SB-N (n = 
22) 
Low (n = 
31) 
High (n = 
33) 
Low (n = 
32) 
High (n = 
32) 
Fast (n = 
32) 
Slow (n = 
32) 
Low (n = 
32) 
High (n = 
32) 
MP 1 3.95 (1.40) 3.52 (1.66) 4.73 (.46) 4.26 (1.18) 3.91 (1.49) 4.09 (1,3) 4.06 (1,41) 3.81 (1.49) 4.34 (1.15) 4.03 (1.45) 4.12 (1.26) 
MP 2 4.33 (1.32) 2.90 (1.41) 4.32 (1.52) 3.74 (1.65) 3.97 (1.47) 3.75 (1,74) 3.97 (1,36) 3.78 (1.62) 3.94 (1.5) 3.75 (1.63) 3.97 (1.49) 
MP 3 4.29 (1.45) 4.14 (1.39) 4.59 (.85) 4.61 (0.99) 4.09 (1.42) 3.91 (1,51) 4.78 (0,71) 4.31 (1.12) 4.38 (1.39) 4.41 (1.19) 4.28 (1.33) 
MP 4 2.86 (1.32) 4.52 (1.03) 3.45 (1.54) 3.65 (1.23) 3.58 (1.68) 3.53 (1,44) 3.69 (1,51) 3.25 (1.48) 3.97 (1.38) 3.50 (1.48) 3.72 (1.46) 
MP 5 3.24 (1.64) 3.19 (1.57) 2.86 (2.03) 2.68 (1.9) 3.48 (1.5) 2.88 (1,7) 3.31 (1,79) 3.06 (1.63) 3.13 (1.88) 2.91 (1.87) 3.28 1.61) 
MP 6 3.52 (1.69) 3.43 (2.11) 3.64 (1.92) 3.65 (1.76) 3.42 (2.02) 3.09 (1,96) 3.97 (1,73) 2.84 (1.97) 4.22 (1.54) 3.53 (1.87) 3.53 (1.93) 
MP 7 2.43 (1.91) 2.57 (1.96) 3.00 (1.98) 2.45 (1.88) 2.88 (2.00) 2.66 (1,98) 2.69 (1,93) 2.66 (1.95) 2.69 (1.96) 2.13 (1.79) 3.22 (1.95) 
MP 8 2.81 (1.75) 1.76 (1.90) 2.95 (1.94) 2.29 (1.9) 2.73 (1.93) 2.44 (1,9) 2.59 (1,95) 2.28 (1.94) 2.75 (1.88) 2.00 (1.92) 3.03 (1.79) 
MP 9 3.71 (1.93) 2.43 (1.78) 2.59 (2.44) 2.52 (2.17) 3.27 (2.04) 2.66 (2,24) 3.16 (2.00) 2.41 (2.2) 3.41 (1.95) 2.03 (2.04) 3.78 (1.85) 
MP 10 .86 (.85) 1.52 (1.40) .41 (1.18) .77 (1.06) 1.06 (1.39) .66 (0,94) 1.19 (1,45) .84 (1.22) 1.00 (1.27) .84 (1.11) 1.00 (1.37) 
Note. SG-N: self-guided & non-varying strategy; SG-V: self-guided & varying strategy; SB-N: scaffolding-based & non-varying strategy 
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Appendix B 
TABLE 8.5 
Transitional probabilities (z-scores in parenthesis) of the task strategy measure (NS, WS, RS) for the ten measurement 
points (N = 64) 
     Self-guided & non-varying strategy (n = 21) 
Self-guided & varying 
strategy (n = 21) 
Scaffolding-based & non-
varying strategy (n = 22) 
     NS WS RS NS WS RS NS WS RS 
NS 0 (-.23) 
0 
(-.50) 
1 
(.57) 
0 
(.72) 
0 
(-.98) 
1 
(2.11) 
0 
(-.32) 
1* 
(2.58) 
0 
(-1.89) 
WS 0 (-.72) 
.14 
(-.39) 
.86 
(.73) 
.33 
- 
.56 
(.63) 
.11 
(-.80) 
.20 
(.97) 
0 
(-1.01) 
.80 
(.17) MP 1-2 
RS .08 (.80) 
.23 
(.60) 
.69 
(-.95) 
.36 
(.31) 
.46 
(-.21) 
.18 
(-.11) 
.06 
(-.76) 
.13 
(-.25) 
.81 
(.73) 
NS 0 (-.23) 
0 
(-.50) 
1 
(.57) 
0 
- 
.14 
(-1.02) 
.86 
(1.03) 
0 
(-.32) 
.50 
(1.22) 
.50 
(-.97) 
WS 0 (-.50) 
0 
(-1.08) 
1 
(1.24) 
0 
- 
.30 
(.14) 
.70 
(-.14) 
0 
(-.41) 
.33 
(.73) 
.67 
(-1.04) MP 2-3 
RS .06 (.57) 
.25 
(1.24) 
.69 
(-1.43) 
0 
- 
.50 
(1.05) 
.50 
(-1.05) 
.06 
(.56) 
.12 
(-1.44) 
.82 
(1.05) 
NS 0 (-.57) 
1 
(.80) 
0 
(-.42) 
0 
- 
0 
- 
0 
- 
1 
(1.67) 
0 
(-1.12) 
0 
(-.48) 
WS .25 (.06) 
.75 
(.60) 
0 
(-.91) 
0 
(-.65) 
.17 
(.20) 
.83 
(.18) 
.25 
(-.11) 
.75 
(.91) 
0 
(-1.04) MP 3-4 
RS .25 (.23) 
.56 
(-.95) 
.19 
(1.05) 
.07 
(.65) 
.13 
(-.20) 
.80 
(-.18) 
.24 
(-.73) 
.53 
(-.28) 
.24 
(1.20) 
NS .40 (1.37) 
.40 
(-.39) 
.20 
(-.72) 
1 
(1.62) 
0 
(-.98) 
0 
(-.57) 
.17 
(-.68) 
.67 
(1.81) 
.17 
(-1.18) 
WS .15 (-.54) 
.54 
(.73) 
.31 
(-.32) 
0 
(-1.18) 
1* 
(1.96) 
0 
(-1.05) 
.33 
(.70) 
.33 
(-.32) 
.33 
(-.32) MP 4-5 
RS 0 (-.91) 
.33 
(-.54) 
.67 
(1.32) 
.29 
(.18) 
.41 
(-1.22) 
.29 
(1.24) 
.25 
(-.11) 
0 
(-1.67) 
.75 
(1-78) 
NS .25 (.06) 
.25 
(-.18) 
.50 
(.11) 
.33 
(.31) 
0 
(-1.18) 
.67 
(.56) 
.67* 
(2.15) 
0 
(-1.35) 
.33 
(-.96) 
WS .40 (1.66) 
.20 
(-.83) 
.40 
(-.67) 
.30 
(.14) 
.20 
(.71) 
.50 
(-.63) 
.38 
(.43) 
.13 
(-.52) 
.50 
- MP 5-6 
RS 0 (-1.81) 
.43 
(1.03) 
.57 
(.62) 
.20 
(-.49) 
.20 
(.42) 
.60 
(.15) 
0* 
(-2.42) 
.38 
(1.78) 
.63 
(.89) 
NS .40 (-.64) 
.40 
(.97) 
.20 
(-.23) 
.33 
(.65) 
.33 
(-.56) 
.33 
- 
.86* 
(2.29) 
.14 
(-1.21) 
0 
(-1.51) 
WS .67 (.83) 
.33 
(.65) 
0 
(-1.62) 
.33 
(.42) 
.33 
(-.36) 
.33 
- 
.25 
(-1.11) 
.75* 
(2.05) 
0 
(-1.04) MP 6-7 
RS .50 (-.21) 
.10 
(-1.42) 
.40 
(1.66) 
.17 
(-.89) 
.50 
(.76) 
.33 
- 
.36 
(-1.28) 
.27 
(-.46) 
.36* 
(2.21) 
NS .27 (1.78) 
.46 
(-1.14) 
.27 
(-.14) 
1 
(1.62) 
0 
(-.83) 
0 
(-1.24) 
.55 
(1.30) 
.27 
(-1.30) 
.18 
- 
WS 0 (-1.05) 
1* 
(2.22) 
0 
(-1.62) 
.67 
(-.42) 
.22 
(1.72) 
.11 
(-.80) 
.14 
(-1.74) 
.86* 
(2.92) 
0 
(-1.54) MP 7-8 
RS 0 (-1.05) 
.40 
(-.89) 
.60 
(1.78) 
.57 
(-1.02) 
0 
(-1.05) 
.43* 
(1.97) 
.50 
(.41) 
0 
(-1.84) 
.50 
(1.82) 
NS .33 (1.02) 
0 
(-.91) 
.67 
- 
.33 
(.76) 
.60 
(.42) 
.07 
(-1.58) 
.56 
(.79) 
0 
(-1.55) 
.44 
(.28) 
WS .08 (-.90) 
.25 
(.80) 
.67 
- 
0 
(-.94) 
.50 
(-.21) 
.50 
(1.52) 
.56 
(.79) 
.33* 
(2.24) 
.11* 
(-2.37) MP 8-9 
RS .17 (.20) 
.17 
(-.18) 
.67 
- 
.25 
(-.18) 
.50 
(-.32) 
.25 
(.68) 
0* 
(-2.02) 
0 
(-.88) 
1* 
(2.66) 
NS 1 (1.78) 
0 
(-1.78) 
0 
- 
1* 
(2.51) 
0* 
(-2.77) 
0 
(-.65) 
1 
(1.70) 
0 
(-1.35) 
0 
(-.93) 
WS .50 (-.11) 
.50 
(.11) 
0 
- 
.33* 
(-2.55) 
.58* 
(2-21) 
.08 
(.88) 
.67 
(-1.07) 
.33 
(1.57) 
0 
(-.41) MP 9-10 
RS .43 (-1.24) 
.57 
(1.24) 
0 
- 
.67 
(.36) 
.33 
(-.18) 
0 
(-.42) 
.78 
(-.98) 
.11 
(.27) 
.11 
(1.23) 
Note. * indicate transitional probabilities whose values significantly exceed expected, p < .05. 
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9 
FACILITATING LEARNING THROUGH GRAPHICAL 
REPRESENTATIONS &  
This experimental study integrates automated natural language-oriented assessment and analysis 
methodologies into feasible reading comprehension tasks. With the newly developed toolset, prose 
text can be automatically converted into an association net which has similarities to a concept map. 
The “text to graph” feature of the software is based on several parsing heuristics and can be used both 
to assess the learner’s understanding by generating graphical information from his or her text and to 
generate conceptual graphs from text which can be used as learning materials. The study investigates 
the effects of association nets made available to learners prior to reading. The results reveal that the 
automatically created graphs are highly similar to classical expert graphs. However, neither the 
association nets nor the expert graphs had a significant effect on learning, although the latter have 
been reported to have an effect in previous studies. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
& This chapter is based on: Pirnay-Dummer, P., & Ifenthaler, D. (in press). Reading guided by 
automated graphical representations: How model-based text visualizations facilitate learning in 
reading comprehension tasks. Instructional Science. doi: 10.1007/s11251-010-9153-2 
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Introduction 
Notwithstanding the tremendous efforts of research, design, and development for e-
learning, online learning, blended learning, and multimedia learning environments, 
text still holds the key position within learning environments. Learning has a strong 
connection to reading and always will. The material ranges from small annotations to 
whole textbooks. The technologies used in this study to support reading and 
understanding were initially developed as alternative assessment methods for finding 
out what a learner knows as opposed to what he or she does not know (e.g., counting 
errors in classical testing). Like all methodologies they have strengths and 
weaknesses with respect to what they account for and what features they convey. 
They never describe states of the mind directly but rather through the medium of 
external artifacts which correspond to internal states and allow some (but not all) 
conclusions about what is going on internally. This is a constraint for every empirical 
approach which addresses cognition. After using and validating the assessment 
technologies in many studies, we found that the graphical artifacts from the output of 
the new assessment tools may be used not only for assessment but also as a feedback 
component for learners. One reason for this is that they are comparatively easy to 
read, even for non-experts. In this study we investigate an immediate effect of the 
availability of these artifacts when they are used to support a typical short reading 
task. 
Model supported strategies for reading and understanding 
When learners are confronted with medium-sized or long texts, conceptual 
representations can help them to navigate the meaning – to assimilate the content or 
navigate the text more efficiently (Crinon & Legros, 2002; Seel & Schenk, 2003). 
While abstracts, indexes, and sequential information (e.g., tables of content) and their 
counterparts in text layout are very common aids for navigating the logical sequences 
of a text, semantic structures are (if at all) only embedded locally. For instance, many 
texts contain a table of contents, an index, or a glossary, all of which help the reader 
to navigate the logic (overview) of the text. Semantic structures, on the other hand, 
only illustrate local content. They can be found in pictures and graphs which 
illustrate the meaning of locally discussed information (e.g., Eliaa, Gagatsisa, & 
Demetriou, 2007; Hardy & Stadelhofer, 2006). Expert representations (e.g., models, 
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concept maps, or graphs invented and drawn by experts) help the reader to 
understand text as well as to assimilation its information into prior knowledge. The 
integration of new knowledge (assimilation) and the rearrangement of existing 
knowledge in order to incorporate new and conceptually different aspects 
(accommodation) are paramount to learning. Thus, the learning process itself uses 
heuristic resources of reasoning.  
 A theoretical framework for describing this interrelation is the theory of 
mental models, and assessment methods from this area of research may provide 
external graphical structures for visualizing structural content. The role of mental 
models in deductive and inductive reasoning within learning environments has a 
strong theoretical foundation (Dinter, 1993; Johnson-Laird, 1983; Seel, 1991, 2003) 
as well as a sound empirical basis (Al-Diban, 2002; Ifenthaler, 2010c; Ifenthaler & 
Seel, 2005; T. E. Johnson, et al., 2009; Jonassen & Cho, 2008; Jonassen, et al., 1997; 
Schnotz, 2001; Seel & Dinter, 1995). The general use of model representations in the 
form of concept maps for reading has already been investigated and discussed (e.g., 
Mayer, 1989). According to research findings, the best time to present graphical 
representations to learners is before the first reading, i.e. before they access the text. 
One of the major practical problems with this approach is that there is not always an 
expert available to provide the learners with an expert model because such a model 
has to be related solely to the specific text. Furthermore, not every expert is trained 
in reflecting an internal model in the format of a concept map (see Novak, 1998). 
Therefore, the quality may vary widely depending on the concept mapping skills of 
the experts one selects. Of course, such skills could be monitored or controlled. 
However, this involves additional manual effort, and it usually takes too long to 
work for normal classroom applications. Unfortunately, this is one reason why 
concept maps which are directly related to a text are rarely used in classrooms.  
 Therefore, our work integrates automated natural language-oriented 
assessment and analysis methodologies, e.g., SMD Technology (Surface, Matching, 
Deep, Ifenthaler, 2010c), T-MITOCAR (Text-Model Inspection Trace of Concepts 
and Relations, Pirnay-Dummer & Ifenthaler, 2010), into feasible reading 
comprehension tasks comparable to those implemented in an everyday classroom 
setting. Our studies have also already shown that the graphical assessment outputs 
exert considerable influence on ongoing writing (Pirnay-Dummer & Ifenthaler, 
2011) and learning (Ifenthaler, 2009, 2010a). 
	  	   155 
Re-representation 
A model is a representation of a thing or a fact or sets thereof. It always has a 
purpose, yet the purpose can vary. A model may serve more than one purpose. 
Representation formats can be diverse, ranging from analog (e.g., a miniature model 
of a house) to symbolic, from simple (where aspects are few and mostly constant) to 
complex (where aspects, variables, and functions change over time). 
 A mental model is a specific kind of model. It is inherent to a mind. It is 
either a representation of something which is outside the mind (the world) or 
something which is inside the mind (a representation of representations, e.g., a 
simple guess or a mental simulation). The purpose of mental models is to facilitate 
decision making, be it inductive, deductive, or different sets thereof. Decision 
making supports action in the world, including simple and complex problem solving. 
Human decision making uses a set of heuristics which provide shortcuts for problems 
which cannot be solved in a sufficient amount of time. Mental models support these 
heuristics and are thus considered to be at the center of human cognition. 
 Mental models cannot be observed directly. In order to study them, we need 
to represent them externally. The externalization process is a heuristic, as is the 
mental model construction process itself. Because two representation processes are 
involved – one leading from the world to the mind and the other from the mind back 
to the world again – we call external representations re-representations to underline 
the objects we are describing. Re-representations are of course not mental. However, 
they allow inferences about what is going on inside. Re-representation formats can 
be based on any objects which allow us to convey at least a part of the mental model. 
This may be done through language, formalisms, and arranging (e.g., graphical 
parts), but also by way of art or music. 
 Thus, the re-representations have purposes that transcend diagnostics 
(Ifenthaler, 2010d). First, they interact with the inherent model and are therefore 
often considered to be interesting objects during learning. Second, they are used to 
communicate. In fact, they are the only known means of establishing communication 
between minds. Most of the time this is done in natural language. Mental models 
cannot be shared; they can only be communicated by external means. In our studies, 
we rely on re-representations in different formats to assess the complex worlds of 
mental models. However, we also use the same formats to relay content back to the 
learners. 
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Automated graphical representations from texts 
Whereas classical methods like concept maps (e.g., Cañas, et al., 2004), conceptual 
graphs (e.g., Sowa, 1984), causal diagrams (e.g., Jensen, 2001), and structure 
formation techniques (e.g., Scheele & Groeben, 1984) are used to let the learner (or 
expert) conceptualize his or her knowledge graphically, natural language-oriented 
methodologies like T-MITOCAR (Pirnay-Dummer & Ifenthaler, 2010) use multiple 
phases from text to graph. T-MITOCAR automatically converts prose text to an 
association network using a heuristic.  
 To illustrate how far we can get by analyzing texts directly, it will be useful 
come back to an old axiom from research on association and sequences: What is 
closely related is also closely externalized (Pollio, 1966; Smith, 1894, 1918; Wells, 
1911). Texts contain model structures. Closer relations tend to be presented more 
closely within a text. This does not necessarily work within single sentences, since 
syntax is more expressive and complex. But texts which contain 350 or more words 
may be used to generate associative networks as graphs. The re-representation 
process is carried out in multiple stages. The goal of this approach is to improve the 
availability of graphical representations of written text across all subject domains (in 
schools, in companies, in learning management systems, in forums, in chats) and of 
course also for additional use within qualitative research. It can easily interface with 
other automated analysis tools, e.g., with the SMD Technology (Ifenthaler, 2010c) or 
ACSMM (Analysis Constructed Shared Mental Models, T. E. Johnson, et al., 2006). 
The SMD Technology uses pairwise list forms of graphical drawings (e.g., concept 
maps) or natural language statements to automatically generate two structural and 
one semantic measure for quantitatively assessing individuals’ re-representations. 
Besides these quantitative measures, SMD generates four standardized concept map-
like representations which can be used for qualitative analysis and as ready-to-use 
instructional materials: 1) individual or team representation, 2) reference or expert 
representation, 3) similarity representation (only including semantically similar 
propositions between individuals/teams and experts), and 4) contrast representation 
(including propositions which individuals/teams and experts do not share). The 
ACSMM technology aggregates individual models to group models by means of 
propositional frequencies which constitute a probability of “sharedness.” For a 
selectable probability value an aggregated model can be constructed by looking at 
which propositions are commonly shared on this level within a group. Depending on 
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the context, different values are selected. The T-MITOCAR text-to-graph process 
can be divided into four different stages (see Figure 9.1). Stage 1 is the text input 
interface, where text is taken into the system (e.g., through a browser interface or at 
the back end of learning software). In stage 2 the actual model is created by means of 
parsing and the calculation of association measures. Stage 3 contains the visual 
output and graphical analysis of the model, and stage 4 allows multiple structural and 
semantic methods of comparing the graphs. 
 
FIGURE 9.1. Process from text to graph 
When text is pasted to T-MITOCAR from any text source, it may contain characters 
which could disturb the re-representation process. Thus, all characters which are not 
part of a specific character set are deleted. The same happens to tags (e.g., HTML 
tags) and other expected meta-data within each text. When generating the model, we 
do not want to have formatting code in our way. After the whole text has been 
prepared in this fashion, it is split into sentences and tokens consisting of words, 
punctuation marks, quotation marks, and so on. This process is called “tokenizing” 
and is somewhat language dependent, which means that we need different tokenizing 
methods for each language we want to use. We only want nouns and names to be 
part of the final output graph. Hence, we need to find out which words are nouns or 
names. There are many different approaches and heuristics for tagging sentences and 
tokens. We found a combination of rule-based and corpus-based tagging to be most 
feasible when the subject domain of the content is not known in advance, and since 
T-MITOCAR is designed to work domain independently, this is an important factor. 
Tagging and the rules for it is a quite complex field of linguistic methods. An 
explanation of our tagging technique would go beyond what is presentable in this 
paper. Please see Brill (1995) for a good discussion on mixed rule-based and corpus-
based tagging. 
 Usually we would prefer for different inflexions of a word to be treated as 
one (e.g., the singular and plural forms “fire” and “fires” should appear only once in 
the re-representation). Stemming solves this problem by reducing all words to their 
word stems for the following stages leading to the output graph. Therefore, all words 
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within the initial text and all words within the tagged list of nouns and names are 
stemmed. After tagging and stemming, the most frequent noun stems are listed from 
the text. The amount of terms fetched from the text depends on its length in words 
and sentences. Thus, larger texts also generate larger models. There is, however, a 
ceiling value. In the running versions of T-MITOCAR no more than 30 single terms 
are fetched from a text. This value can of course be set for the software. The core 
algorithms of T-MITOCAR calculate associatedness: 
• The default length is calculated. The words are counted for each sentence. 
The default length is the longest sentence in the text plus one. 
• All fetched terms are paired so that all possible pairs of terms are in a list. 
• All sentences are analyzed for each pair. If the pair appears within a sentence, 
the distance for the pair is the minimum number of words between the terms 
of the pair within the sentence: If at least one term occurs more than one time 
in the sentence, then the lowest possible distance is taken. 
• If a pair does not appear in a sentence (also true if only one of the two terms 
is in the text), then the distance will be the default length. 
• The sum of distances is calculated for each pair. 
• The N pairs with the lowest sum of distances find their way into the final 
output model. Like the list of terms, N depends on the number of words and 
sentences within the text (exact values can be controlled by the software 
settings). 
• This process automatically cuts the maximum distance from re-
representation, even if pairs would normally be presented on the basis of the 
number of sentences and words. This prevents the algorithm from just 
deriving random pairs which do not really have any association evidence 
within the text. 
 
The weights are calculated from the pair distances. They are to some extent 
comparable to the combined measure of the MITOCAR toolset. All weights (0 ≤ w ≤ 
1) are mapped linearly so that 1 is the pair with the lowest sum of distances and 0 is 
the pair with the maximum sum of distances. Linguistic word stems sometimes look 
strange to untrained viewers. Although one can still guess which words they come 
from, deriving the output directly from the word stems is no help in reading the re-
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representations. Hence, lists of words and their stems are created during stemming 
for the specific text at hand.  
 After determining the associatedness and the weight, the procedures use this 
table to determine which word led most frequently to the stem: If it was the plural, 
then the plural moves into its place. If it was the singular, then the singular is 
presented. Thus, the final output model contains a real word in that it uses the 
inflexion which was most frequently used in the text. The list form is a table which 
accounts for an undirected graph containing all N pairs (see Table 9.1). It is sorted by 
weight (descending). 
TABLE 9.1 
List form of the graph output 
Term 1 Term 2 Sum of Distances Weight 
economy trade 3428 1 
exchange goods 5710 .60 
… … … … 
 
The weights (0 ≤ w ≤ 1) at the edges describe the overall weight for the whole noun-
distance oriented matrix generated from the text. The weights inside the brackets 
show the weights within the graph. This weight is also taken to generate the color of 
the edges. The strongest edge is red, while the weakest (compared to the graph, not 
to the text matrix) is blue.  
 The “text to graph” feature of the software is based on several parsing 
heuristics and can be used to assess the learner’s understanding by generating 
graphical information from his or her text as well as to generate conceptual graphs 
from texts which are used as learning materials. It may simply help to have the 
option of avoiding the effort of an expert model in everyday classroom settings, even 
if expert models turn out to work better than the automated representations. To create 
a graphical model from a text, all teachers need to do is upload the text and attach a 
label to it – in order to find it later on. Additionally available features to make the 
analysis easier are word counts (of nouns), tables (list form) of the models, and a 
comparison section that allows comparison of different text based models. The 
comparison contains measures for graph comparison and graphical representations 
(pictures), e.g., to represent intersections and difference models. 
 The output models comply with most of the quality indicators suggested by 
Mayer (1989). They are complete because they represent the text – and only the text 
is used to build up the structure. This is also the reason why we consider them to be 
concise as regards the task: They only present the associations within the text and 
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therefore have the same scope as the text. However, if the text itself does not 
correspond to the learning goal or the group then the model that is based on the text 
will also fail. Thus, the possibility of creating such a model does not obviate the need 
for the instructional task of selecting a fitting learning text. The models are directly 
related to the text by design. If the text is compatible with the learners then it will 
also be coherent, as long as it also includes a sufficient amount of words (≥ 350 
words). 
 Pirnay-Dummer, Ifenthaler, and Rohde (2009) provided a study which 
showed a positive effect of available models on writing when the learners’ own text 
was visualized for the experimental condition. We interpret this as an indicator for 
coherence. In order to decide whether the models are conceptual, it is important to 
know which basis they stand on. Within this study, the experts selected a text on an 
encyclopedic level. Thus, both the initial authors and the experts thought that it 
covered correct content and was still able to address a common audience – the 
models are conceptual to that extent. Whether the models are also considerate is not 
yet fully understood. We do not believe that this criterion can be fulfilled a priori by 
means of the algorithm. 
Measures of graph-comparison 
The measures for comparison can be applied to any graph, not only to re-
representations from T-MITOCAR. There are six core measures for the comparison 
of conceptual graphs from the SMD Technology (Ifenthaler, 2010c) and from 
MITOCAR (Pirnay-Dummer, 2006). The indices measure features of graphs. Of all 
the available measures from graph theory we picked the ones which are theoretically 
most likely to correspond to the constructs we are trying to describe. We also 
constructed new algorithms where necessary. In the course of our studies they have 
shown empirical stability on different occasions. Over time some of the measures 
may converge, and new ones will certainly also emerge as a result of discussions on 
future studies.  Some of the measures count specific features of a given graph. For a 
given pair of frequencies f1 and f2, the similarity results in a measure of 0 ≤ s ≤ 1, 
where s=0 is complete exclusion and s=1 is identity. The other measures collect sets 
of properties from the graph (e.g., the vertices = concepts or the edges = relations). In 
this case, the Tversky similarity (Tversky, 1977).  
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 The four structural and two semantic measures are defined as follows: (1) The 
surface measure (Ifenthaler, 2010c) compares the number of vertices within two 
graphs. It is a simple and easy way to calculate values for surface complexity. (2) 
The graphical matching (Ifenthaler, 2010c) compares the diameters of the spanning 
trees of the graphs and is an indicator for the range of conceptual knowledge. It 
corresponds with structural matching as it is also a measure for structural complexity 
only. (3) The density of vertices measure (also often called “gamma”) (Pirnay-
Dummer & Ifenthaler, 2010) describes the quotient of terms per vertex within a 
graph. Since both graphs which connect every term with each other term (everything 
with everything) and graphs which only connect pairs of terms can be considered 
weak models, a medium density is expected for most good working models. (4) The 
structural matching measure (Pirnay-Dummer & Ifenthaler, 2010) compares the 
complete structures of two graphs without regard to their content. This measure is 
necessary for all hypotheses which make assumptions about general features of 
structure (e.g., assumptions which state that expert knowledge is structured 
differently from novice knowledge).  
 (5) Concept matching (Pirnay-Dummer & Ifenthaler, 2010) compares the sets 
of concepts (vertices) within a graph to determine the use of terms. It counts how 
many concepts are alike. This measure is especially important for different groups 
operating in the same domain (e.g., using the same textbook). It determines 
differences in language use between the models. (6) The propositional matching 
(Ifenthaler, 2010c) value compares only fully identical propositions (concept-link-
concept) between two graphs. It is a measure for quantifying semantic similarity 
between two graphs.   
 The individual measures usually correlate differently. There are significantly 
higher correlations within each classification (convergent, structure between r=.48 
and r=.79 and semantics between r =.68 and r =.91) and lower correlations between 
them (divergent, between r = -.24 and .36). The density of vertices (gamma) usually 
stands alone and only rarely correlates with the other structural measures because it 
accounts for a different feature of structure (correlations between r=.37 and r=.38).  
 Pirnay-Dummer et al. (2010) provide a full validation study. The validation 
study was conducted with N = 1,849,926 model comparisons in 13 different subject 
domains ranging from common knowledge to scientific subject domains. There is not 
yet any indication of an interpretable convergence of the measures. They measure 
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different features. Depending on the research question, they either need to be 
reported completely or selected to fit with the hypotheses if possible, e.g., for 
research aiming only at the semantic level the structural indices may be omitted or 
treated as a covariate.  
Research questions and hypotheses 
We assume that conceptual graphs generated by the T-MITOCAR system can be 
used to improve reading comprehension in the same way as graphical representations 
from experts would. This assumption has two aspects. The first has to do with the re-
representation object: If the automated graphical representations and expert re-
representations share the same central features then they should induce similar 
effects because the objects are alike. The second aspect is directed at the source of 
the re-representation. If an expert solution is not available for a specific text, teachers 
only have a general representation to rely on, if at all. The alternative would be for 
them to invest the time to create a representation on their own. This is less likely if a 
large amount of learning texts are at hand, i.e. if the prototype is replaced by a real 
everyday classroom intervention. In this case the automated text representation may 
be feasible and still convey the model of the text – maybe even better than a general 
expert model in the field, because it is directly related to the content of the texts. 
Thus, we believe that the examination of the model representation influences the 
model building process in favor of the learning goals as long as the external 
representation corresponds closely to the selected text basis: Regardless of the 
learning goal, the text and the representations should correspond to each other as 
much as possible and share the same properties. This should result in semantic 
redundancy, which is known to support learning (Christmann & Groeben, 1999).  
 First, we want to show that the automated representations have high 
similarities to expert representations – to be on the safe side for interventions. If they 
are similar it makes sense to assume that they also have similar effects on learning 
because they share the same structural and semantic properties. This leads to the 
following first set of hypotheses we tested in our study (each presented as a classical 
pair of null and alternative hypotheses). 
 
H1.1: T-MITOCAR graphs have high semantic similarities to the expert models.  
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H1.0: T-MITOCAR graphs have only little or no semantic similarity to the expert 
models. 
 
H2.1: T-MITOCAR graphs have high structural similarities to the expert models.  
H2.0: T-MITOCAR models have only little or no structural similarity to the expert 
models. 
 
 Second, we want to compare the effects of the graphical representations on 
reading comprehension directly to see whether they have an influence and whether 
this influence is comparable to the effect that expert models have. 
 
H3.1: T-MITOCAR graphs lead to the same performance gain as expert models or 
more. 
H3.0: T-MITOCAR graphs lead to less performance gain than expert models. 
 
 In a control group we investigated the reading itself without providing any 
representation. Another control group was presented with a graph which was 
constructed from the terms but whose relations were completely arbitrary 
(randomized). With the second control group we wanted to see whether the effects 
were based on the relational structure of the re-representation or if they could be 
explained by the availability of the terms only – regardless of how they may have 
been organized. This allowed us to see how much of the effect was due to the 
organization of the knowledge: 
 
H.4.1: T-MITOCAR graphs lead to more performance gain than random graphs and 
no conceptualizations 
H.4.0: T-MITOCAR graphs lead to the same performance gain as random graphs and 
no conceptualizations or less 
Method 
Participants 
The experiment was conducted with 60 undergraduate students (34 female and 26 
male) from the University of Freiburg. Their mean age was 20.8 years (SD = 1.76). 
They were all students of fields which did not contain any content trained in this 
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experiment. It took the subjects about 1.5 hours to complete the full experiment. 
They were paid 10 Euros each as compensation for their participation. 
 
Materials 
• Three texts for the subject domains geodesy, English literature, and pharmacy 
were provided by three domain experts. Each text was selected to be used for 
training non-experts on the specific topic. The experts on geodesy and 
pharmacy chose texts from www.wikipedia.org, the text on literature was 
taken from Abrams (1993). 
• The conceptual graphs (expert model) for each subject domain (economy, 
English literature, and pharmacy) were provided by the domain expert. Each 
text (economy, English literature, and pharmacy) was processed by T-
MITOCAR, which also resulted in a graph (T-MITOCAR model). The 
similarity indices between the expert model and T-MITOCAR model were 
calculated for each of the three subject domains (see Table 3). Similarity 
indices are between 0 and 1 (0≤s≤1): 1 is identity and 0 is exclusion. To 
simplify the reading of the similarity values, the measure of similarity may to 
some extent be interpreted as being similar to correlations or contingencies 
(although they may of course not drop below zero). 
• Random models for each subject domain were created from the most frequent 
terms. Instead of using meaningful relations, the “propositions” were 
randomly assigned to pairs of terms. The number of randomly created links 
was derived on the basis of the distribution of link numbers within the expert 
models and the T-MITOCAR models. The models were randomized for 
every participant. 
• Test on general reading comprehension: The test was constructed on the 
theoretical basis of Groeben (1992) and Langer, Schulz von Thun, and 
Tausch (1974). All items on this test are measured on five point Likert scales. 
The four scales (45 items) of the test are: simplicity [12 items], (e.g., ease of 
reading, Cronbach’s alpha = .84); order [12 items], (e.g., structure and 
design, Cronbach’s alpha = .94); length [13 items], (e.g., appropriateness of 
length, Cronbach’s alpha = .83); motivational aspects [8 items], (e.g., mood 
of the text, writing style acts as stimulant, Cronbach’s alpha = .88) 
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• Three domain dependent knowledge tests (economy, English literature, and 
pharmacy, pretest and posttest versions), each including six multiple-choice 
questions (higher order) with six alternatives (one correct, five incorrect). The 
knowledge gain is measured as the difference between posttest and pretest in 
order to account for intra-individual differences (individual gain from 
reading). Table 9.2 shows one example question from the test for each 
domain. It contains the correct answer and two of the five incorrect answers. 
 
TABLE 9.2 
Example items of the domain dependent knowledge tests 
 
Item Correct answer Incorrect answer (selection) 
Geodesy Given an average GPS-
receiver, why is it very well 
possible that it shows “- 15m” 
while you are standing on top 
of a hill, 40m above sea level? 
GPS uses reference 
ellipsoid, differs from 
geoid by ± 110m 
With GPS, height is 
measured as "potential 
energy“, which needs to be 
translated into "meters 
above sea level“, which is 
not possible with absolute 
accuracy. 
English 
Literature 
Which term is related to the 
convention that the narrator 
knows everything that needs to 
be known about the agents, 
actions, and events and also 
has privilege to access to the 
characters’ thoughts, feelings, 
and motives? 
Omniscient point of 
view 
Self-Conscious narrator 
 
Self-effacing author 
Pharmacy What is the function of a filler 
in the manufacturing of 
tablets? 
A filler provides a 
quantity of materials 
which can accurately 
be formed into a 
tablet. 
A filler is added to reduce 
friction between the tablet 
and the punches during 
pressing of the tablet. 
 
A filler is used to speed up 
the disintegration of the 
tablet in the gastric tract. 
 
Design 
The three different subject domains (economy, English literature, and pharmacy) and 
the four sources of graphical representation (no conceptualization, random model, 
automated T-MITOCAR model, expert model) resulted in a total of 12 different 
experimental conditions for the 60 participants in our Latin square experimental 
design. In each experimental condition the participants read the domain dependent 
text and received a standardized graphical representation from an expert, a random 
model (including concepts from the subject domain connected randomly), an 
automated T-MITOCAR model, or no conceptualization . 
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Procedure 
First, every participant completed a domain dependent pretest. After completing the 
pretest, they received either an expert model, an automated T-MITOCAR model, a 
random model, or no graphical conceptualization. After five minutes of study time 
with the graphical representation, the participants read the text. They were given 20 
minutes for reading. After the reading, the participants took the reading 
comprehension test and the domain dependent posttest. 
Results 
Graphically, the expert models look different from the T-MITOCAR models (see 
Figure 9.2). The expert uses different shapes, but only to distinguish between the 
topic and the rest of the content. Some but not all of the links are annotated. Link 
annotations are partly hierarchical, causal, or procedural/commenting. Also, some 
but not all of the links have directions. Thus, from a formalistic perspective, the 
graph would have to be analyzed as a non-hierarchical and undirected graph. 
 
	  
 
FIGURE 9.2. Sample graph created by the expert on pharmacy 
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To test the first two hypotheses, we calculated the similarity measures. Semantic and 
structural similarities (relationships) between the expert’s model and the T-
MITOCAR generated model are shown in Table 9.3. The results can be interpreted 
in the form of correlations to determine whether a value may be considered to 
indicate weak, medium, or high similarity (see Williams, 1968, for the interpretation 
of correlations and Tversky, 1977, for the interpretation of similarities). 
 Both semantics (concept matching and propositional matching) and structure 
have high similarities. Only the surface matching values have a medium similarity. 
All similarity indices are statistically significant on the level of graph-feature 
comparison (within each model comparison). Therefore we accept H1.1: T-
MITOCAR graphs have high semantic similarities to the expert models. We can also 
accept H2.1: T-MITOCAR graphs have high structural similarities to the expert 
models.  
TABLE 9.3 
Similarity measures between expert graph and T-MITCAR graph 
 Matching Index Pharmacy Literature Geodesy M 
Surface 0.72** 0.60** 0.50** 0.61 
Graphical 1.00** 0.92** 0.70** 0.87 
Structural 0.77** 0.74** 0.92** 0.81 
Structural 
Measures 
Gamma 0.96** 0.70** 0.67** 0.78 
Concepts 0.86** 0.91** 0.58** 0.78 Semantic 
Measures Propositional 0.84** 0.77** 0.67** 0.76 
Overall  0.86 0.77 0.67 0.77 
 
Additionally, we asked the experts who originally provided the expert models 
whether the T-MITOCAR models represent the content in a good way. Since there 
were only three experts (one for each domain), there is no systematic way to 
aggregate the answers reliably.  
 The pharmacy expert said (answer provided in German, translated into 
English by the authors): “Graphically, the two models do not look alike. However, 
their content is very similar. My own model is more detailed than the other [T-
MITOCAR] model, but the other model is more clearly arranged.” 
 The literature expert said (answer provided in English): “The model I 
provided includes more specific concepts than the other [T-MITOCAR] model. 
However, the core concepts and most important propositions are also represented in 
the automatically generated model. It seems to me that this technique could save a lot 
of time.” 
 The expert on geodesy said (answer provided in English): “I was surprised to 
find most of the core concepts of the matter represented in the automatically 
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generated model. Furthermore, the connections between these concepts are 
remarkably similar in the automatically generated model and the one made by me. 
Thus, it seems to me as though both models represent the important information 
equally well.” 
 Overall, it seems that the experts see a close relationship between the model 
they constructed on their own and the automatically created T-MITOCAR model. 
Additionally, the experts pointed out that the associations between individual 
concepts are correctly represented. The difference between the pretest and the 
posttest was considered to accurately reflect the performance gain. 
 There are no meaningful differences between the conditions as regards to 
performance gain. The differences shown in Table 9.4 are also not statistically 
significant (ANOVA: F(3, 176) = 0.2294, p > .05). No pairs have individually 
significant differences either.  Neither the pretest nor the posttest showed any ceiling 
effects. Ironically, this still corresponds to H3.1: T-MITOCAR graphs lead to the 
same performance gain as expert models or more. Of course this is not the kind of 
outcome we were expecting. But at least T-MITOCAR graphs do not differ from the 
expert graphs. 
TABLE 9.4 
Performance gain within the experimental variation 
 No Conceptualization Random Model Automated T-
MITOCAR Model 
Expert Model 
M 0.67 0.88 0.67 0.87 
SD 1.49 1.80 1.72 1.82 
 
We had to reject H4.1 in favor of H4.0: T-MITOCAR graphs lead to the same 
performance gain as random graphs and no conceptualizations or less. However, the 
text has a high influence on knowledge gain, as can be seen in Table 9.5. 
TABLE 9.5 
Knowledge gain depending on text/content 
 Pharmacy Literature Geodesy 
M 1.82 1.07 -0.56 
SD 1.49 1.31 1.35 
 
This has nothing to do with the fact that reading a text has an influence on learning 
(which should be obvious because text is the only media in this experiment). Rather, 
it means that different texts influence learning differently. The performance gain 
depending on the text is statistically significant (ANOVA: F(2, 177) = 46.426, p < 
.01). The text on geodesy caused a systematic knowledge loss. The pharmacy text 
offered the best chance to increase knowledge. As mentioned above, the tests were 
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constructed by the experts who selected the texts, and they were instructed to create 
the test items to match the texts. A further analysis did not raise any suspicion that 
the tests did not correspond sufficiently to the texts. 
To account for any possible hidden interaction effects, including effects from the 
(systematically varied) position of the subject domain and the models, we also 
conducted a multifactor variance analysis (see Table 9.6). 
TABLE 9.6 
Multifactor Variance Analysis 
 SS df F value p 
Modeltype 2.017 3 0.3408 0.7959 
Position 5.300 2 13.436 0.2642 
Text 159.834 2 405.161 <0.001** 
Modeltype:Position 3.312 6 0.2799 0.9457 
Modeltype:Text 13.046 6 11.023 0.3639 
Position:Text 4.051 4 0.5135 0.7259 
Modeltype:Position:Text 25.567 12 10.801 0.3811 
Residuals 284.036 144   
 
As shown in Table 9.6, nothing but the text had an effect on the knowledge gain (η2 
= 0.563). There were also no interactions between the experimental variation 
(position as varied by the Latin square design) and the outcome. We also compared 
the subjective readability of the texts using the above-mentioned four scale test (see 
Table 9.7). 
TABLE 9.7 
Subjective mean readability (standard deviations in parenthesis) of the texts 
 Pharmacy Literature Geodesy 
Simplicity 3.33 (0.56) 3.45 (0.51) 2.41 (0.52) 
Order / Layout 3.92 (0.61) 3.94 (0.65) 2.79 (0.75) 
Length 3.40 (0.57) 3.46 (0.45) 2.58 (0.50) 
Motivational Aspects 2.37 (0.74) 2.53 (0.84) 1.71 (0.54) 
 
Whereas the texts on pharmacy and literature were well accepted, the text on 
geodesy had obvious acceptance problems throughout all scales.  
 This may explain at least a part of the negative effect the text had on learning. 
All differences are statistically significant according to an ANOVA (see Table 9.8 
for details). There were no factor effects from the type of model presented (no 
model, random model, T-MITOCAR, and expert model) on the subjective readability 
ratings. The scale reliabilities within this study were between α=.84 and α=.94. The 
position in which a text had been presented during the experiment had an effect on 
motivation (see Table 9.9). 
 
 
	  	   170 
TABLE 9.8 
The influence of the text on the text ratings 
Simplicity 
 df SS F p η2 
Text 2 38.843 69.052*** <2.2e-16 .780 
Residuals 177 49.783    
Length      
 df SS F p η2 
Text 2 28.979 55.978*** <2.2e-16 .633 
Residuals 177 45.815    
Order / Design 
 df SS F p η2 
Text 2 51.451 57.107*** <2.2e-16 .645 
Residuals 177 79.734    
Motivation / Stimulation 
 df SS F p η2 
 2 23.126 22.341*** <2.231e-09 .252 
 177 91.608    
 
 Interestingly, the motivational aspects rose during work on the experiment 
(ANOVA: F(2, 177) = 3.4074, p < 0.5, η2 = 0,039). However, the effect is very low 
and the position did not have effects on any other subjective text ratings (see Table 
9.9). 
TABLE 9.9 
Mean effect (standard deviations in parenthesis) of the position on motivational/stimulant 
rating of the text 
 Position 1 Position 2 Position 3 
Motivation / Stimulant 1.99  (0.63) 2.28 (0.76) 2.34 (0.95) 
 
 To sum up, we found an overall knowledge gain in the domain dependent 
multiple choice tests. However, we found no effects indicating that conceptual 
models support reading comprehension, neither with the T-MITOCAR graphs nor 
with the expert models.  
Discussion 
The newly developed T-MITOCAR toolset enables researchers and instructors to 
convert prose text directly to an association net. The application of T-MITOCAR is 
also feasible for practitioners. After any text is submitted to the system, the re-
representation process is carried out in multiple stages. As a result, the system (1) 
provides a list of the most frequent terms, (2) displays a thumbnail and a full size 
picture of the graphical model, (3) displays the model in list form and generates a 
spreadsheet file for download, and (4) allows quantitative pairwise comparisons of 
two or more models. The automated quantitative analysis generates six core 
measures, ranging from surface over structure to semantic indicators (surface, 
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graphical matching, concept matching, density of vertices, structural matching, and 
propositional matching). With the help of these six indicators, we are able to describe 
and track changes in students’ and experts’ representations. An earlier pilot study 
raised high hopes for the efficiency and feasibility of the T-MITOCAR models for 
facilitating learning in reading comprehension. Irrespective of which graphical 
representation was provided (no conceptualization, random model, T-MITOCAR 
model, expert model), we revealed an overall knowledge gain in the domain 
dependent multiple choice tests. However, we found no effects in which conceptual 
models supported reading comprehension, neither with the T-MITOCAR graphs nor 
with the expert models. However, as we used an expert model constructed by only 
one expert, this may limit our results on this side. Accordingly, in future studies it 
could be helpful to ask more than one expert to generate a model, or to ask additional 
experts rating their colleagues expert model, as we did with the T-MITOCAR 
models. 
 The second prediction in Mayer (1989) assumes a reduction of verbatim 
retention when models are used to support understanding of novice or low achieving 
learners. However, we could not find this effect in our study. We cannot yet 
determine whether the models will improve problem-solving transfer either, since we 
did not incorporate a problem-solving performance test. We will have to address this 
aspect in a future study, since this may be an important blind spot for the use of T-
MITOCAR generated models. 
 Finally, administering a Latin square experimental design allowed us to 
control for hidden interaction effects, including the position of the text with foci on 
different subject domains (geodesy, English literature, pharmacy) and the type of 
model representation (no conceptualization, random model, T-MITOCAR model, 
expert model). The only significant effect which influenced the learning outcome 
was the text. Additional analysis revealed a high acceptance of the pharmacy and 
English literature texts, while the text on geodesy was not well received by the 
subjects. The overall motivational rating of the texts rose during our 1.5 hour 
experiment.  
Applications 
The T-MITOCAR technology can automatically generate graphs with only the text at 
hand. These graphs are structurally and semantically very similar to graphs 
conceptualized by human experts. Irrespective of the subject domain, we found a 
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high similarity between the computer-generated graph and the expert’s re-
representation. This could still allow a variety of applications. E.g., learners can use 
them in online learning environments to enhance their text understanding whenever 
they like.  
 The technology can be used on any texts or parts of texts to instantly generate 
a graphical conceptualization. It can also be used by instructors and teachers 
preparing for class or assignments (or for other homework) with an almost negligible 
amount of effort. Whereas human experts are not always available for a certain 
domain, T-MITOCAR can provide the necessary graph any time. Additionally, 
human experts require an extensive amount of time to re-represent a domain specific 
expert model. The T-MITOCAR graph thus saves researchers and instructors 
valuable time. Once our effects have been verified in international studies, the T-
MITOCAR technology will be ready for use in learning environments wherever 
expert models can be implemented to improve the quality of learning. Unfortunately, 
this does not work with simple text reading. 
Future projects 
One of the future projects will therefore concentrate on problem-solving transfer and 
also use a more learner-oriented technology. The technology has already been 
developed and implemented with interfaces to selected research tools like DEEP, 
SMD, MITOCAR (Pirnay-Dummer, et al., 2010). When measures are applied to re-
representations it helps methodologically to look at them from different perspectives 
(Jonassen & Cho, 2008). The different effects from the texts still need to be 
explained.  The experts choose the texts by applying the same instructions. The texts 
all had equal basic layouts and were about the same length. Nonetheless, there have 
to be identifiable features within the text that explain the differences between the 
effects. It would be useful to identify these features on the basis of the texts and test 
them in a further study, also taking a closer look at features of layout, syntax and 
semantics. This would not only help us to understand the reading comprehension 
task better but could also provide criteria for text development for learning and 
instruction. 
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10 
FACILITATING LEARNING THROUGH 
INDIVIDUALIZED AUTOMATED FEEDBACK &  
Feedback is considered an elementary component for supporting and regulating learning processes. 
Feedback plays a particularly important role in highly self-regulated model-centered learning 
environments because it facilitates the development of mental models, thus improving expertise and 
expert performance. In this chapter, different types of model-based feedback are investigated. 
Seventy-four participants were assigned to three experimental groups in order to examine the effects 
of different forms of model-based feedback. With the help of seven automatically calculated 
measures, changes in the participants’ understanding of the subject domain “climate change”, 
represented by causal diagrams, are reported. The results strengthen our assumption that the mental 
model building process for experts and expert performance should be trained in a more direct way, 
such as with simulation environments. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
& This chapter is based on: Ifenthaler, D. (2009). Model-based feedback for improving expertise and 
expert performance. Technology, Instruction, Cognition and Learning, 7(2), 83-101. 
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Introduction 
In the field of learning and instruction, feedback is considered an elementary 
component for supporting and regulating learning processes. Especially in computer-
based and self-regulated learning environments, the nature of feedback is of 
fundamental importance (Simons & de Jong, 1992). However, the empirical 
evidence of effects of different types of feedback is rather inconsistent and 
contradictory in parts (e.g., Bangert-Drowns, et al., 1991; Clariana, 1993; Kluger & 
DeNisi, 1996; Kulhavy, 1977; Mory, 2004). 
 In a broader sense, feedback is considered to be any type of information 
provided to learners (see Wagner & Wagner, 1985). Accordingly, feedback can take 
on many forms depending on theoretical perspective, the role of feedback, research 
goals, and methodological approaches. Unlike this initial general understanding of 
feedback, the term informative feedback refers to all kinds of external post-response 
information used to inform the learner of his or her current state of learning or 
performance (Narciss, 2006, 2008). Furthermore, from an instructional point of view 
feedback can be provided by internal (individual cognitive monitoring processes) or 
external (various types of correction variables) sources of information. Internal 
feedback may validate the externally provided feedback, or it may lead to resistance 
against the externally provided feedback (see Narciss, 2008). 
 Feedback plays a particularly important role in highly self-regulated model-
centered learning environments because it facilitates the development of mental 
models, thus improving expertise and expert performance (Johnson-Laird, 1989; 
Seel, 2003). However, this requires for the person to be sensitive to characteristics of 
the provided environment, such as the availability of certain information at a given 
time, the ease with which this information can be found in the environment, and the 
way the information is structured and mediated (Ifenthaler & Seel, 2005). Feedback 
on mental model construction, such as the use of conceptual models to help persons 
to build mental models of the system being studied, has already been investigated 
and discussed (e.g., Mayer, 1989). Conceptual models highlight the most important 
objects and associated causal relations of the phenomenon in question. However, not 
only do new developments in computer technology enable us to dynamically 
generate simple conceptual models and expert representations; they may also be used 
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to generate direct responses to the learner’s interaction with the learning 
environment. We define this as model-based feedback.    
 In this chapter, different types of model-based feedback generated 
automatically with our own HIMATT (Highly Integrated Model Assessment 
Technology and Tools) methodology will be investigated. The following section 
focuses on mental model development and model-based feedback. In the next section 
we present our newly developed HIMATT methodology, which enables us to 
generate different types of model-based feedback on the fly. Then we will describe 
the research design we used to investigate effects of different types of model-based 
feedback and present our results. We conclude with a discussion of our findings and 
suggestions for further development of our approach.  
Model building and feedback 
Since the beginnings of mental model research (e.g., Gentner & Stevens, 1983; 
Johnson-Laird, 1983; Seel, 1991) many research studies have provided evidence that 
“mental models guide and regulate all human perceptions of the physical and social 
world” (Seel & Dinter, 1995, p. 5). Accordingly, mental models are dynamic ad hoc 
constructions which provide subjectively plausible explanations on the basis of 
restricted domain-specific information (Ifenthaler, 2010c). Various research studies 
have shown that it is very difficult but possible to influence such subjectively 
plausible mental models by providing specific information (see Anzai & Yokoyama, 
1984; Ifenthaler & Seel, 2005; Mayer, 1989; Seel, 1995; Seel & Dinter, 1995). 
Ifenthaler and Seel (2005) argue that it is important to consider how such 
information is provided to the learner at specific times during the learning process 
and how it is structured. In accordance with the general definition of feedback 
introduced above (see Wagner & Wagner, 1985), such information for improving 
individual mental model building processes provided purposely and on the fly is 
referred to as model-based feedback.  
 The importance of feedback for improving knowledge and skill acquisition 
has been discussed controversially in educational research (e.g., Azevedo & Bernard, 
1995; Bangert-Drowns, et al., 1991; Narciss, 2008; Narciss & Huth, 2004; Shute, 
2008). Widely accepted forms of feedback include (a) knowledge of result, (b) 
knowledge of correct result, (c) knowledge of performance, (d) answer until correct, 
(e) knowledge of task constraints, (f) knowledge about concepts, (g) knowledge 
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about mistakes, (h) knowledge about how to proceed, and (i) knowledge about 
metacognition (see Jacobs, 1998; Narciss, 2008). Additionally, Schimmel (1983) 
found that feedback is most effective under conditions that encourage the learner’s 
conscious reception.    
 In accordance with empirical findings on feedback (see Schimmel, 1983) and 
mental model theory (see Ifenthaler, Pirnay-Dummer, & Spector, 2008; Seel, 1991), 
we argue that effective model-based feedback is composed of externalized 
representations (re-representations) of mental models. An externalization of a mental 
model of a learner or expert could be a causal model, concept map, written or spoken 
text, etc. (Ifenthaler, 2010c). Such externalized representations induce positive 
effects on internal information processing (see Galbraith, 1999). Additionally, 
model-based feedback aims at the development of mental models for the 
improvement of expertise and expert performance (Johnson-Laird, 1989). 
Accordingly, model-based feedback is highly associated with necessary expertise 
and expert performance in the specific subject domain. 
 Past research studies have shown how conceptual models (i.e. explicit and 
consistent causal explanations of a given phenomenon) can be provided to improve a 
person’s understanding of a specific problem in a given context (e.g., Mayer, 1989; 
Norman, 1983; Seel & Dinter, 1995). However, we argue that model based-feedback 
should not only include an expert’s solution of the given phenomenon. Rather, in 
order to be more effective the feedback should also take into account the person’s 
prior understanding (initial mental model, preconception), because such 
preconceptions are in many cases resistant to change as they have a high subjective 
plausibility (Ifenthaler & Seel, 2005; Seel & Dinter, 1995). In order to fulfill this 
requirement, we introduce two new forms of model-based feedback in this article: 
(1) cutaway model-based feedback and (2) discrepancy model-based feedback. These 
two forms of model-based feedback are considered as graphical re-representations 
constructed from a set of vertices whose relationships are represented by edges 
(Ifenthaler, et al., in press).  
 The cutaway model-based feedback is based on the individual’s 
preconception or on a more elaborated mental model constructed during the learning 
process. Additionally, an expert’s understanding of the phenomenon in question is 
taken into account. By combining both, the individual’s re-representation 
(preconception) and the expert’s re-representation, we create the cutaway model-
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based feedback re-representation. This re-representation includes all propositions 
(vertex-edge-vertex) of the individual’s re-representation and highlights semantically 
correct vertices (as compared to the expert’s re-representation); see Figure 10.1.  
 The discrepancy model-based feedback is also based on the individual’s 
preconception or on a more elaborated mental model constructed during the learning 
process. However, it includes only the propositions (vertex-edge-vertex) which have 
no semantic similarity to the expert’s re-representation. Additionally, semantically 
correct vertices (compared to the expert’s re-representation) are highlighted (see 
Figure 10.1).  
 Hence, model-based feedback aims at a restructuring of the underlying 
representations and a reconceptualization of the related concepts (vertices and 
edges). This is in following with Piaget’s epistemology (1950, 1976). New 
information provided through model-based feedback can be assimilated through the 
activation of an existing schema, adjustment by accretion, or tuning of existing 
schema. Otherwise it is accommodated by means of a reorganization process which 
involves building new mental models (Ifenthaler, et al., in press; Seel, et al., 2009).  
 In order to fulfill the requirement that model-based feedback be provided to 
the learner on the fly, it is necessary to implement the cutaway and discrepancy 
feedback in a computer-based environment. Accordingly, the automated model-
based feedback generation is described in the following section. 
Automated model-based feedback generation 
HIMATT (Highly Integrated Model Assessment Technology and Tools) is a 
combined toolset conveying the benefits of various methodological approaches in 
one environment. It is implemented and runs on a Web server using Apache, 
MySQL, PERL, and additional packages (Pirnay-Dummer, et al., 2010). The 
HIMATT architecture consists of two major platforms: The HIMATT Research 
Engine (functions for conducting and analyzing experiments) and the HIMATT 
Subject Environment (functions for dynamically providing assigned experiments to 
individual subjects). Methodologically, the tools integrated into HIMATT touch the 
boundaries of qualitative and quantitative research methods. Text and conceptual 
graphs can be analyzed quantitatively with the comparison function of the SMD 
Technology (Ifenthaler, 2010c) and MITOCAR (Pirnay-Dummer & Ifenthaler, 
2010). Additionally, Ifenthaler (Ifenthaler, 2010c) introduced an automated feature 
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of the SMD Technology to generate standardized graphical re-representations of 
subjects’ data with the help of the open source graph visualization software 
GraphViz (Ellson, et al., 2003). This algorithm, the newest add-on to the HIMATT 
toolset, enables us to generate automated model-based feedback. 
 The feedback function of the SMD Technology (Ifenthaler, 2010c), which we 
implemented in HIMATT (Pirnay-Dummer, et al., 2010), automatically generates 
standardized reference (e.g., expert), participant (e.g., learner), cutaway, and 
discrepancy re-representations. A cutaway re-representation includes all propositions 
(vertex-edge-vertex) of the individual’s re-representation. Additionally, the 
semantically correct vertices (compared to a reference re-representation, e.g., expert 
solution) are graphically highlighted as circles (ellipses for dissimilar vertices). The 
discrepancy re-representation of an individual only includes propositions (vertex-
edge-vertex) which have no semantic similarity to a reference re-representation. 
Additionally, the semantically correct vertices (compared to a reference re-
representation) are graphically highlighted as circles (ellipses for dissimilar vertices). 
Figure 1 shows an example of a reference (1), participant (2), cutaway (3), and 
discrepancy (4) re-representation. 
 
FIGURE 10.1. Reference, subject, cutaway, and discrepancy re-representations 
 
These automated and standardized re-representations are generated on the fly while 
participants work within the HIMATT environment. They are then used for 
individual model-based feedback during work on a learning task.  
	  	   179 
 The reference model (1) represents a best practice solution by an expert for 
the task to be completed. The participant’s model (2) is a solution found after a 
specified time of work on the task. With the reference (1) and participant (2) models 
at hand, HIMATT automatically generates the cutaway (3) and discrepancy (4) 
feedback models. The cutaway model allows the learner to see how many vertices 
are semantically correct (graphically highlighted circles compared to the expert 
solution). Additionally, the cutaway model provides information about the 
semantically incorrect vertices (ellipses). The discrepancy model only provides 
information about the semantically incorrect propositions compared to the expert 
solution (vertex-edge-vertex). Additionally, semantically correct vertices are 
highlighted. We argue that either feedback model (3) or (4) will have different 
effects when presented during the learning process. As the cutaway feedback model 
(3) helps to confirm the correct understanding of the phenomenon in question 
(compared with an expert), the discrepancy feedback model (4) causes a cognitive 
conflict, because correct propositions (vertex-edge-vertex) of the person’s 
understanding are deleted from the re-representation.  
 Each of the above described feedback models could help to improve expertise 
and expert performance in various subject domains. Therefore, we conducted an 
experimental study to investigate the effects of different types of model-based 
feedback. The research questions of this empirical investigation are as follows. 
Research questions 
Feedback plays a particularly important role in highly self-regulated model-centered 
learning environments because it facilitates the development of mental models, thus 
improving expertise and expert performance (see Ifenthaler & Seel, 2005). Past 
research studies demonstrate how conceptual models can be provided to improve a 
person’s understanding of a specific problem in a given context (e.g., Mayer, 1989; 
Norman, 1983; Seel & Dinter, 1995). Conversely, model-based feedback includes 
not only a conceptual or expert solution to the given phenomenon; it also includes 
the person’s prior understanding (initial mental model, preconception). Therefore, we 
introduced two forms of model-based feedback: (1) cutaway model-based feedback 
and (2) discrepancy model-based feedback. Accordingly, our first research question 
investigated in this chapter is: 
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Does model-based feedback (cutaway and discrepancy) facilitate the understanding 
of a specific phenomenon in question?  
Since it is possible to generate different forms of model-based feedback, we wanted 
to investigate which form of feedback is most accepted among participants. Thus, 
our second research question investigated in this article is: 
Do participants valuate the forms of model-based feedback differently? 
Additionally, previous research studies (e.g., Hilbert & Renkl, 2008; Ifenthaler, et 
al., 2007) have found that verbal and spatial abilities do not affect the quality of 
model-building processes and declarative learning outcomes. Therefore, a third and 
last research question to be explored in this article is:  
Do verbal and spatial abilities affect the declarative learning outcome and the quality 
of model-building processes? 
Method 
Participants 
Seventy-four students (66 female and 8 male) from the University of Freiburg, 
Germany, participated in the study. Their average age was 21.9 years (SD = 2.3). The 
participants were randomly assigned to the three experimental groups (1) cutaway 
feedback (n = 26), (2) discrepancy feedback (n = 24), and (3) expert feedback (n = 
24).  
Materials 
• A German-language article on climate change (Schönwiese, 2005) with 1,417 
words was used as learning content. 
• HIMATT causal diagram and text input tools were used to assess the 
participants’ understanding of the subject domain climate change. First, the 
participants constructed a causal diagram using vertices and edges in order to 
describe the phenomenon of climate change. Secondly, they had to write a 
text about their understanding of climate change. The causal diagrams and 
texts of all participants were stored in the HIMATT database for further 
analysis. 
• Two subsets of the I-S-T 2000 R (Amthauer, et al., 2001) were used to test 
the participants’ verbal and spatial abilities. This test is a widely used 
intelligence test in Germany with high reliability (r = .88 and r = .96; split-
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half reliability). The first subset we used tested the verbal abilities of the 
participants. A total of 20 sentences with a missing word had to be completed 
using a set of five words. The participants had six minutes to complete this 
subset. The second subset tested spatial abilities. Within nine minutes, the 
participants had to choose similar cubes from a set of five by rotating them. 
Subset two included 20 cube problems. 
• The participants’ experience with concept mapping and causal diagrams was 
tested with a questionnaire including eight items (Cronbach’s alpha = .87). 
The questions were answered on a five-point Likert scale (1 = totally 
disagree; 2 = disagree; 3 = partially agree; 4 = agree; 5 = totally agree). 
• The domain specific knowledge test included 27 multiple-choice questions on 
climate change. In a pilot study with 5 female und 5 male participants 
(average age 26.3 years, SD = 3.49), we tested the average difficulty level in 
order to account for ceiling effects. The participants scored 10.5 out of 27 
possible points on average (SD = 3.54, Min = 5, Max = 17). In our 
experiment we administered two versions (in which the 27 multiple-choice 
questions appeared in a different order) of the domain-specific knowledge 
test (pre- and posttest). It took about 10 minutes to complete the test. 
• The feedback model quality test consisted of nine items on whether the 
provided feedback model helped the participant to understand the text better 
(Cronbach’s alpha = .66). The questions were answered on a five-point Likert 
scale (1 = totally disagree; 2 = disagree; 3 = partially agree; 4 = agree; 5 = 
totally agree). 
Procedure 
First, the participants completed a demographic data questionnaire. Secondly, they 
completed the concept map and causal diagram experience questionnaire. Next, the 
participants completed the test on verbal (six minutes) and spatial abilities (nine 
minutes). Then they answered the 27 multiple choice questions of the domain 
specific knowledge test on climate change (pretest). After a short relaxation phase, 
the participants were given an introduction to concept maps and causal diagrams and 
were shown how to use the HIMATT software. Then, the participants used the 
username and password they had been assigned to log in to the HIMATT system, 
where they constructed a causal diagram on their understanding of climate change 
(ten minutes). Immediately afterwards, they wrote a text about their understanding of 
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climate change (ten minutes). A short relaxation phase followed, during which we 
automatically generated the individual feedback models for each participant. After 
that, the participants received the text on climate change and the automatically 
generated feedback model (cutaway, discrepancy, or expert model – depending on 
the assigned experimental group). All three types of feedback models were 
automatically generated with HIMATT. The cutaway feedback model (see Figure 
10.2) included all propositions (vertex-edge-vertex) of the participant’s pre-test 
causal diagram. Additionally the semantically correct vertices (compared to the 
expert re-representation) were graphically highlighted (circles are semantically 
correct to the expert; ellipsis are semantically incorrect compared to the expert re-
representation). The discrepancy feedback model included only propositions (vertex-
edge-vertex) of the participant’s pre-test causal diagram which had no semantic 
similarity compared to the expert re-representation. The expert feedback model 
consisted of a standardized re-representation of an expert on climate change. The 
participants had 15 minutes to read the text and examine their feedback model. 
Immediately after working on the text, the participants completed the model 
feedback quality test.  
 
FIGURE 10.2. Example of an automatically generated cutaway feedback model used in our 
experiment 
 
Then they answered the 27 multiple choice questions of the posttest on declarative 
knowledge. After another short relaxation phase, the participants used their username 
and password to log in to the HIMATT system for the second time. In the HIMATT 
posttest, they constructed a second causal diagram on their understanding of climate 
change (ten minutes) and wrote a second text regarding their understanding of 
climate change (ten minutes). Finally, the participants had to complete a short 
usability test regarding HIMATT features. 
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Analysis 
To analyze the causal diagrams constructed by the participants in the HIMATT 
environment, we used the seven core measures implemented in HIMATT (Pirnay-
Dummer, et al., 2010). Figure 10.3 shows the seven measures of HIMATT, which 
include four structural and three semantic indicators. 
 
FIGURE 10.3. HIMATT measures 
 
These seven measures are defined as follows (see Ifenthaler, 2006, 2010c, 2010d; 
Pirnay-Dummer, et al., 2010): 
 Surface Matching: The surface measure compares the number of vertices 
within two graphs. It is a simple and easy way to calculate values for surface 
complexity. 
 Graphical Matching: The graphical matching compares the diameters of the 
spanning trees of the graphs, which is an indicator for the range of conceptual 
knowledge. It corresponds to structural matching as it is also a measure for structural 
complexity only. 
 Structural Matching: The structural matching compares the complete 
structures of two graphs without regard to their content. This measure is necessary 
for all hypotheses which make assumptions about general features of structure (e.g., 
assumptions which state that expert knowledge is structured differently from novice 
knowledge). 
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 Gamma Matching: The gamma or density of vertices describes the quotient of 
terms per vertex within a graph. Since both graphs which connect every term with 
each other term (everything with everything) and graphs which only connect pairs of 
terms can be considered weak models, a medium density is expected for most good 
working models. 
 Concept Matching: Concept matching compares the sets of concepts 
(vertices) within a graph to determine the use of terms. This measure is especially 
important for different groups which operate in the same domain (e.g. using the same 
textbook). It determines differences in language use between the models. 
 Propositional Matching: The propositional matching value compares only 
fully identical propositions between two graphs. It is a good measure for quantifying 
semantic similarity between two graphs. 
 Balanced Propositional Matching: The balanced propositional matching 
index is the quotient of propositional matching and concept matching.  
Results 
Over two-thirds of the participants (68%) did not use concept maps or causal 
diagrams to structure their own learning materials before our experiment. Only 12% 
of the participants used concept mapping software to create their own concept maps 
before. On the other hand, over 40% of the participants answered that they did not 
find it difficult to create a concept map or causal diagram. Consequently, there was 
no significant difference in the learning outcome as measured by the domain-specific 
knowledge posttest between participants who used concept mapping software before 
the experiment and those who did not use concept mapping software at all, t(72) = 
.508, ns. 
Domain specific knowledge 
On the domain specific knowledge test (pre- and posttest), participants could score a 
maximum of 27 correct answers. In the pretest they scored an average of M = 7.78 
correct answers (SD = 2.10) and in the posttest M = 18.16 correct answers (SD = 
3.80). The increase in correct answers was significant, t(73) = 28.32, p < .001, d = 
3.096 (strong effect). The cutaway feedback group (M = 10.88, SD = 3.32) 
outperformed the discrepancy (M = 10.42, SD = 2.92), and expert group (M = 9.79, 
SD = 3.23) concerning their knowledge gain. However, these differences were not 
significant. 
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Verbal and spatial abilities 
Participants could score a maximum of 20 points in both subsets of the I-S-T 2000 R 
on verbal and spatial abilities. On the test for verbal abilities, participants scored M = 
12.76 points (SD = 3.66) and on the test for spatial abilities they scored M = 10.39 
points (SD = 3.15). As reported in Table 1, we found no significant correlations 
between the seven HIMATT measures and verbal and spatial abilities. However, the 
higher the learners’ spatial abilities were, the higher was their increase on the domain 
specific knowledge test (see Table 10.1). 
TABLE 10.1 
Correlations between learning outcomes, HIMATT similarity measures, and verbal and 
spatial abilities 
 Verbal abilities Spatial abilities 
Domain specific knowledge 
increase .108 .290* 
Surface Matching -.075 .051 
Graphical Matching -.213 -.139 
Structural Matching -.028 .056 
Gamma Matching .057 -.063 
Concept Matching -.139 -.004 
Propositional Matching .011 .130 
Balanced Propositional Matching -.004 .177 
Note. * p < .05 
 
Quality of feedback models 
An explorative factorial analysis (varimax rotation) was carried out by means of 
selected variables of the feedback model quality test (see Table 10.2).  
TABLE 10.2 
Factor analysis component matrix for nine items of the quality of feedback models instrument 
(N = 72) 
Nr Item (translated from German) Factor 1 Factor 2 
1 The model is clearly laid out. .787 .212 
2 The model is well-structured.                                                                       .733 -.261 
3 The concepts in the model are comprehensible. .725  
4 The links between the concepts are comprehensible. .663  
5 The model helped me understand the text. .640 -.371 
6 The model uses many unfamiliar concepts.  .767 
7 The model is complex.  .757 
8 The model confused me. .345 .612 
9 I would not understand the text without the model. .389 .449 
Note. Factor loading < .2 are suppressed 
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The two extracted factors represent 54% of the variance. The first factor is 
determined by five items. Consequently, the first factor represents clarity of the 
feedback model (Cronbach’s α = .756). Factor two represents support through the 
feedback model (Cronbach’s α = .595) and is determined by four items (see Table 
10.2). The two factors clarity of feedback model and support of feedback model were 
entered into a one-way ANOVA in order to test for differences between the three 
experimental groups (cutaway feedback, discrepancy feedback, and expert 
feedback). The ANOVA revealed a significant effect for the factor support of 
feedback, F(2, 69) = 4.22, p = .019, ƞ2 = .11. Accordingly, participants with 
discrepancy feedback (M = 4.08, SD = .70) rated the support of the feedback model 
highest (cutaway feedback: M = 3.81, SD = .56; expert feedback: M = 3.55, SD = 
.59). The ANOVA indicated no further significant effects. 
Quality of re-representations (HIMATT measures) 
The graphical re-representations of the participants were analyzed automatically with 
the HIMATT analysis feature. Hence, we computed the knowledge gain of the seven 
HIMATT measures by subtracting the pre- from the post measure. Table 10.3 shows 
the average gain of the HIMATT measures (surface, graphical, structural, gamma, 
concept, propositional, and balanced propositional matching) for the three 
experimental groups (cutaway feedback, discrepancy feedback, and expert 
feedback).   
TABLE 10.3 
Average gain of HIMATT measures for the three experimental groups (N = 74) 
 
Cutaway 
feedback  
(n = 26) 
SD 
Discrepancy 
feedback  
(n = 24) 
SD 
Expert 
feedback  
(n = 24) 
SD 
Surface 
Matching 1.731 3.779 3.375 2.871 4.826 4.579 
Graphical 
Matching -.192 1.497 .875 1.985 1.609 1.438 
Structural 
Matching 1.231 3.766 2.583 1.213 3.087 2.353 
Gamma 
Matching .005 .099 -.001 .142 -.019 .155 
Concept 
Matching .052 .074 .020 .067 .-010 .109 
Propositional 
Matching .007 .027 .006 .026 -.001 .002 
Balanced 
Propositional 
Matching 
-.008 .091 .000 .044 -.009 .079 
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The results showed a significant effect between participants in the three experimental 
groups for the HIMATT measure Surface Matching, F(2, 70) = 4.080, p = .021, ƞ2 = 
.10, with participants of the expert feedback group increasing their number of 
vertices higher than the other experimental groups. The one-way ANOVA also 
revealed a significant effect for the HIMATT measure Graphical Matching, F(2, 70) 
= 7.355, p = .001, ƞ2 = .17. The increase of complexity of participants was higher in 
the expert feedback group than in the others. Between the experimental groups, the 
increase of the HIMATT measure Structural Matching was also significant, F(2, 70) 
= 3.140, p = .049, ƞ2 = .08. Again, the participants in the expert feedback group 
outperformed the other experimental groups. For the semantic HIMATT measure 
Concept Matching we found a final significant effect, F(2, 70) = 3.243, p = .045, ƞ2 
= .08. Here, participants in the cutaway feedback group gained more correct concepts 
than the participants in the other two groups. However, we found no further effects 
for the HIMATT measures. 
Discussion 
The large body of theoretical and empirical studies on feedback provides very 
diverse insight into possible ways to support and regulate learning processes. Even 
meta-analyses (Azevedo & Bernard, 1995; Kluger & DeNisi, 1996; Schimmel, 1983) 
have provided contradictory results. However, feedback is considered to be an 
elementary component for facilitating learning outcomes. As feedback can take on 
many forms depending on the theoretical perspective, the role of feedback, and the 
methodological approach, it is important to consider which form of feedback is right 
for a specific learning environment.    
 The aim of our study was to examine different forms of model-based 
feedback for improving expertise. Hence, we introduced two new forms of model-
based feedback, which we defined as (1) cutaway model-based feedback and (2) 
discrepancy model-based feedback. As we were able to generate the model-based 
feedback automatically and on the fly, the participants received the model-based 
feedback just after finishing their pre-test, which served to motivate them further. 
Additionally, our HIMATT analysis features enabled us to score the participants 
solution automatically within an instant. Not only do these automated process have 
very high objectivity, reliability, and validity (Pirnay-Dummer, et al., 2010), they are 
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also very economical, especially when large sets of data need to be analyzed within a 
short period of time (Ifenthaler, 2010c). 
 An explorative factorial analysis of our newly developed instrument for 
identifying the quality of the model-based feedback found two factors. Our 
subsequent analysis of the factors clarity of feedback and support of feedback 
showed that learners rated the discrepancy feedback as being most supportive. Thus, 
by providing propositions which have no semantic similarity compared to an expert’s 
representation we were able to bring about the intended cognitive conflict 
(accommodation processes) and induce a reorganization of the participants’ 
cognitive structures (Piaget, 1976; Seel, 1991). From the participant’s perspective, 
simply receiving an expert solution as feedback seemed less helpful. 
 With the help of our seven automatically calculated HIMATT measures, we 
were able to investigate changes in the participants’ understanding of the subject 
domain “climate change” and re-represent them with causal diagrams. Participants 
who received the expert feedback added significantly more relations to their causal 
diagrams (Surface Matching) than did those in the other groups. Accordingly, the 
expert feedback provided them a broad spectrum of concepts and relations, which 
were then integrated into their own understanding of the phenomenon in question. 
This also explains the significant differences between the measures Graphical and 
Structural Matching. As the number of relations of a causal diagram increases, there 
is also a high probability that its complexity and complete structure will also 
increase.  
 However, an increase in these structural measures does not necessarily mean 
that the solutions of participants in the expert feedback group are better than these of 
the other participants. As a further analysis of the semantic HIMATT measures 
revealed, participants in the cutaway feedback group outperformed the other 
participants with regard to their semantic understanding of the phenomenon in 
question (Concept Matching). Accordingly, even if the structure increases, the 
semantic correctness of the learner will not automatically also increase. Hence, 
learners may integrate a huge amount of concepts into their understanding of the 
phenomenon which do not necessarily help them to come to a better and more 
correct solution to the problem.   
 Therefore, a further empirical investigation will focus on participants’ 
misconceptions (e.g., Ifenthaler & Seel, 2005) and how they can be influenced by 
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model-based feedback. Another study will investigate the similarities and differences 
between causal diagrams and natural language texts written on the same subject 
domain, “climate change.” Our hypothesis is that causal diagrams and texts do 
represent different forms of knowledge. However, this does not necessarily lead to 
the conclusion that one of these forms of assessment (causal diagram or text) is 
obsolete for identifying expertise and expert performance. Rather, we argue that both 
graphical and textual re-representations are needed to better understand the 
underlying cognitive processes of learning-dependent progression from novice to 
expert and, as a consequence, to provide more effective feedback and instructional 
materials. 
 As in a previous study (Ifenthaler, et al., 2007), intellectual abilities (verbal 
and spatial abilities) were not found to have an effect on the mental model building 
process. Only for spatial abilities did we find a positive correlation with the 
participants’ learning outcome. This result was also found in a study by Hilbert and 
Renkl (2008). Accordingly, when we train learners to become experts, we should not 
limit our focus to general abilities such as learning strategies and intellectual 
abilities. For expert performance it is far more important to train mental model 
building processes which enable persons to act and decide within complex domains. 
This strengthens our assumption that the mental model building process for experts 
and expert performance should be trained in a more direct way, such as with 
simulation environments (Dörner & Wearing, 1995; Ifenthaler, et al., 2007).  
 In further studies we will focus on the learning trajectories while providing 
forms of model-based feedback. This will give us more detailed insight into the 
effects of model-based feedback and how it helps to support and improve expertise 
and expert performance. 
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11 
EPILOGUE 
The epilogue will highlight some ongoing projects which are based on the so far acquired scientific 
knowledge on cognitive structure. Combining the theoretical and empirical knowledge on cognitive 
structure with new technological developments of the 21st century opens up new fields of research and 
instruction. First, AKOVIA (Automated Knowledge Visualization and Assessment) is presented as a 
consequent further development of the tools described above (e.g., SMD, HIMATT). Second, a new 
experimental research program is presented which addresses an extended longitudinal perspective. 
Third, a research program investigating emotions and the development of cognitive structures is 
introduced. Finally, two tools for an automated feedback generation (TASA and iGRAF) are 
highlighted. 
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Essentials of cognitive structures 
Much effort was devoted to the development of a theoretical foundation of cognitive 
structures (e.g., Jonassen, 1987; Jonassen, et al., 1993), mental models (Dinter, 1993; 
Gentner & Stevens, 1983; Johnson-Laird, 1989; Norman, 1983; Seel, 1991), and 
schemata (Bransford, 1984; Rumelhart, 1980; Rumelhart, et al., 1986), as well as to 
their instructional application (e.g., Anzai & Yokoyama, 1984; Ifenthaler, et al., in 
press; Mayer, 1989; Seel, 1995, 2003). However, there are still a number of concerns 
as to their validity, i.e., which form of expression (visual or contextual - descriptive) 
better represents what one comprehends from a learning environment (Ifenthaler, 
2008; Ifenthaler & Seel, 2005; Seel, 1999a). 
 One essential question concerning the assessment of cognitive structure is 
which methodology should be used, one that uses visual representation (i.e., concept 
map) or one that consists of a written text (i.e., a summary). Many authors consider 
concept maps to be an adequate format of externalization for analyzing complex 
knowledge structures (T. E. Johnson, et al., 2009; Novak, 1998). Concept maps seem 
preferable to classical knowledge tests, such as multiple-choice tests for the purpose 
of representing linked knowledge by means of network-like visualization. On the 
other hand, there are strong arguments indicating that natural language 
representations are a good method for assessing cognitive structures (Ifenthaler, 
2008; Pirnay-Dummer & Ifenthaler, in press). 
 Various approaches and empirical studies enabling an insight into cognitive 
structure by addressing the above mentioned assessment and analysis issues have 
been presented (Al-Diban & Ifenthaler, in press; Ifenthaler, 2010c, 2010d, accepted; 
Ifenthaler, et al., in press; Pirnay-Dummer, et al., 2010). Further empirical studies 
investigated instructional innovations which may foster learning and therefore 
possibly changing underlying cognitive structures (Ifenthaler, 2009; Ifenthaler & 
Seel, in press; Pirnay-Dummer & Ifenthaler, in press). However, these empirical 
investigations do not mark the end of this challenging research program on cognitive 
structure. If anything, it is a first tiny step for an ongoing research endeavor in the 
21st century. 
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Pursuing the insight into cognitive structure 
The following sections highlight some ongoing projects which are based on the so 
far acquired scientific knowledge on cognitive structure. Combining the theoretical 
and empirical knowledge on cognitive structure with new technological 
developments of the 21st century opens up new fields of research and instruction 
(Ifenthaler, 2010b). First, AKOVIA (Automated Knowledge Visualization and 
Assessment) is presented as a consequent further development of the tools described 
above (e.g., SMD, HIMATT). Second, a new experimental research program is 
presented which addresses an extended longitudinal perspective. Third, a research 
program investigating emotions and the development of cognitive structures is 
introduced. Finally, two tools for an automated feedback generation (TASA and 
iGRAF) are highlighted. 
AKOVIA 
Although HIMATT (Highly Integrated Model Assessment Technology and Tools) 
has already been used by several researchers, it has two design problems worth 
mentioning. On the one hand, the user interface was accepted by researchers and 
subjects alike, and it even had a good usability (Pirnay-Dummer, et al., 2010). On the 
other hand, it was a web service which integrated both the data collection and the 
analysis. Researchers understandably wanted to integrate the data collection into 
their experiments and studies. However, subjects needed to log into HIMATT in 
order to input their data as text or draw graphs. They needed to enter another login, 
username, and password, which might have disturbed the experimental setting in 
some cases. The second design problem results from the first: We were often given 
raw data to upload into the HIMATT system so that the researchers could use the 
analysis facilities on their data. After following this procedure more often than the 
system had been used through the “front door,” it was time for a complete redesign 
of the blended methods. 
 Based on our experience with the HIMATT framework, the diagnostic toolset 
is taken one step further and developed AKOVIA (Automated Knowledge 
Visualization and Assessment). Instead of limiting the framework to a narrow set of 
data collection procedures, the development focuses on the implementation of more 
interfaces to different methods. The core analysis in AKOVIA is a comprehensive 
blend of MITOCAR, T-MITOCAR, and the SMD Technology. Thus, it is also based 
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strictly on mental model theory (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991; 
Seel, 1991, 2003). The results of the analysis are unchanged. However, the input 
formats and outputs have been changed to better accommodate the needs of 
researches, thus allowing more applications as in the original technologies and 
HIMATT.  
 AKOVIA offers several different analysis tools which were initially 
developed for different purposes and integrates them into a single framework to 
obtain a more comprehensive perspective on the knowledge externalizations under 
analysis. 
 
FIGURE 11.1. AKOVIA framework (Pirnay-Dummer & Ifenthaler, 2010) 
 
Figure 11.1 provides an overview on the modules of AKOVIA. There are two 
general input formats (text and graph). Thus, the software can be used to analyze 
many currently available assessment methods. A standard interface may be used for 
graphical methods. This interface is derived from SMD and HIMATT and uses the 
list form. Specific interfaces are under construction. The software can visualize, 
aggregate, describe in detail, and compare the models. The measures from SMD and 
MITOCAR are embedded and available for use, as are the text to graph algorithms 
from T-MITOCAR. The availability of AKOVIA will provide researchers a simple 
to use toolset for a large set of research designs. 
Longitudinal perspective 
In previous research high fluctuations in the probability of change in solving logical 
reasoning tasks have been found (Ifenthaler, et al., in press; Ifenthaler & Seel, in 
press). This result corresponds largely with the theory of mental models (Johnson-
Laird, 1989), where mental models are defined as ad hoc constructions which a 
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person builds over and over again while solving new and unfamiliar problems. 
However, in this previous research not any evidence could be found for the 
emergence and consolidation of a cognitive schema during the time series 
measurements (Ifenthaler & Seel, in press). Based on the results of this study the 
investigation of model-based reasoning over an expanded period of time is extended, 
i.e. in total 20 measurements.  
 
 
FIGURE 11.2. Longitudinal research design 
 
Figure 11.2 shows the longitudinal design of the current study which enables a 
precise assessment across a total of 20 points of measurement. A computer-based 
multimedia learning environment has been created with a large set of different tasks. 
Participants were randomly assigned to two different experimental groups (NSG: 
non-varying strategy vs. VSG: varying strategy). The performance (applied strategy 
and solution) of the participants is measured for each of the 20 tasks (Ta, Tb, Tc, Td, 
Te being different task classes; * being feedback in form of a correct solution after 
solving the task). This extended research design may give a better insight into the 
development of cognitive structures in problem-solving situations. 
Emotions 
Besides the above discussed cognitive foundations of mental models and schemas, it 
is argued that emotional and motivational experiences have a major impact on the 
learning-dependent progression of cognitive structures due to the fact that whenever 
assimilation in a schema fails, this schema enters a state of disequilibrium which in 
turn evokes arousal. The term “motive” can be used to denote the presence of 
disequilibrium. Whenever an attempt at assimilation fails and corrective attempts are 
not immediately successful, a motive will be originated. This argumentation follows 
Berlyne’s (1971) views on the central role of arousal in curiosity motivation and 
active stimulus seeking. High levels of incongruity are innately aversive.  
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 Indeed, emotions are mental states which arise spontaneously rather than 
through conscious effort. A growing body of empirical studies shows that 
information processing is highly related with emotional experiences (e.g., Gray, 
2001; Isen, 1999; K. C. Klauer & von Hecker, 2009; Kuhl, 1983, 2000). According 
to Goetz, Preckel, Pekrun, and Hall (2007), emotions can be differentiated into 
present emotional experiences (state-emotions; e.g. “I am anxious at this moment”) 
and emotional experiences that occur consistently in specific situations (trait-
emotions; e.g. “I am generally anxious while taking math exams”). Kuhl (1983) 
introduced a model of emotional emergence where cognitive, emotional, and 
operational processes are reciprocal affect another.  Accordingly, cognitive processes 
and the reciprocal interactions with emotional states are the basis for goal-directed 
actions (Gross, 1998). More specifically, positive emotions promote the activation of 
schemas and mental models, whereas negative emotions restrict these activating 
functions. Baumann and Kuhl (2002) showed that learners in sad mood performed 
worse while solving tasks than those who were able to regulate negative emotions. 
Alternatively, positive emotional experiences may increase the learner’s optimism 
and confidence and thus facilitate the construction of mental models or application of 
alternative schemata.  
 In light of these observations, it is assumed that while measuring the learning-
dependent progression of model-based reasoning and their associated emotional 
experiences will improve the understanding of these complex cognitive functions. As 
a result, instructional materials and instructor feedback that are most appropriate at 
various times during the learning process may be identified. 
Intelligent feedback 
Research studies have shown that it is very difficult but possible to influence 
cognitive structures by providing specific information (see Anzai & Yokoyama, 
1984; Ifenthaler, et al., in press; Mayer, 1989; Pirnay-Dummer & Ifenthaler, in press; 
Seel, 1995; Seel & Dinter, 1995). Ifenthaler and Seel (2005) argue that it is important 
to consider how such information is provided to the learner at specific times during 
the learning process and how it is structured. In accordance with the general 
definition of feedback introduced above (Wagner & Wagner, 1985), an important 
aspect of model-based feedback is providing dynamic feedback generated 
purposively and individually to student-constructed models (Ifenthaler, 2009).  
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 Intelligent model-based feedback helps students to monitor their individual 
learning process. Automated knowledge assessment tools provide the basis to 
produce instant feedback on semantic and structural aspects of a person’s learning 
progression at all times during the learning process (Ifenthaler, 2009). Such dynamic 
and timely feedback can promote the learner’s self-regulated learning (Zimmerman 
& Schunk, 2001). Based on these new technologies, two intelligent and automated 
model-based feedback tools have been developed and implemented: TASA (Text-
Guided Automated Self Assessment), which generates automated feedback to 
learners based on natural language text input (Pirnay-Dummer & Ifenthaler, 2011). 
iGRAF (Instant Graphical Feedback) automatically generates graphical 
representations based on the prior knowledge of the learner (Ifenthaler, 2009, 2010a). 
 The main limitations for TASA so far are on the volitional level. Hence, 
future studies will concentrate on this aspect and also consider several covariates on 
the learners’ side. With the additional data at hand, we should be able to make the 
tool more stimulating. TASA is applicable to any learning task which involves 
writing. It may be used for short writing assignments. However, its strength clearly 
unfolds in long-term writing assignments, in which the students may continuously 
monitor their own progress and make their own decisions when using the automated 
tool. 
 The graphical feedback produced with iGRAF proved to facilitate self-
regulated learning. However, no systematic effect of the various forms of model-
based feedback could be found yet. However, the overall effectiveness of feedback 
generated with iGRAF shows high potential. Already available empirical evidence 
on the facilitation of self-regulated learning processes through intelligent model-
based feedback (TASA and iGRAF) provides high hopes for future developments 
and practical implications. Therefore, model-based feedback will guide a promising 
voyage towards the world of learning within Web 3.0 (Ifenthaler, 2010b; Ifenthaler 
& Seel, 2010b). 
Technology, Instruction, Cognition, and Learning 
In our digital age, technology, instruction, cognition, learning, and educational 
diagnostics are closely linked (Ifenthaler, 2010d; Ifenthaler, Isaias, Spector, Kinshuk, 
& Sampson, 2009; Ifenthaler & Seel, 2010a, 2010b). Researchers and engineers have 
always endeavoured to design and develop useful diagnostic systems to serve 
professional communities in the field of learning and instruction, and they will 
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continue to do so (Ifenthaler, 2010b). Future work on automated computational 
diagnostics, including approaches such as graph theory, will provide more and more 
powerful dynamic systems for the comprehensive analysis of large amounts of data 
in a short space of time. 
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